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For the National Party of South Africa, Communism was simultaneously a legitimate 
concern and a useful concept with which to attract voters and deflect criticism. The 
threat of Communism was frequently allied with the threat of African nationalism in 
National Party discourse during the apartheid era. The alliance between the African 
National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and the Soviet's role in 
supporting various governments and opposition movements on the subcontinent lent 
credence to the National Party's stance. This study, believed to be the first of its kind on 
the subject, examined the National Party's perception of the Communist 'threat' or 'red 
peril' from c.1985 until February 1990, at a time when the Communist's role on the 
subcontinent was changing but 'revolutionary' unrest in South Africa was escalating. The 
study culminated in an assessment of National Party discourse prior to and during February 
1990 to decipher the influence of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe on the 
decision to lift the bans on the ANC, SACP and PAC. 
Secondary research examined the facets of the Communist 'threat' in South Africa. 
Primary research used the South African Survey, the parliamentary Hansard, key journals, 
party and sub-national newspapers, the papers of P. W. Botha and F. W de Klerk, and party 
electioneering material to analyse National Party references to the Communist 'threat'. In 
addition F. W. de Klerk, and his co-author, David Steward were interviewed. The analysis 
was necessarily qualitative, but the volume of evidence gathered enabled a number of 
insights to be advanced. 
The National Party's references to the Communist 'threat' changed during the period in 
response to political settlement in South West Africa/Namibia, the increased pressure 
from the West to abolish apartheid, and to domestic political challenges both from 
traditional sources of opposition and traditional sources of support. The confusion caused 
by the changing loci of domestic political opposition and international criticism was also 
evident. While the portrayal of a Soviet driven Communist threat declined in party 
discourse and the National Party posited a more constructive approach to socio-economic 
aspects of the Communist threat (in the face of Conservative Party opposition), the 
portrayal of a military and political threat from Communist-backed forces remained 
common until 1989. The discourse between 1985-89 did not anticipate the lifting of the 
ban on the ANC-SACP alliance who were portrayed in party rhetoric as being committed to 
Communism, and therefore illegitimate negotiating partners, as late as July 1989. 
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In this context the study examined the February 1990 lifting of the ban on the ANC-SACP 
alliance, against the background of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The 
study demonstrated de Klerk's misjudgement of the ANC and his belief that as a result of 
the collapse of Communism, the initiative could be seized at the ANC's expense, to create 
a new political dispensation that still 'protected' the white minority. 
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1. Introduction 
"Gogga maak vir baba bang' goes an old Afrikaans saying- bogey scares baby. But if the 
gogga is no longer scary, if the Russian bear has turned into a teddy, how do you keep 
baby clinging to Mama?' 
Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, (London, 1990). 1 
Fear of Communism and anti-Communism were potent motivating forces in white South 
Africa, particularly between 1945 and 1992.2 This study examines the National Party's 
portrayal of the 'Communist threat' during the final years of apartheid and of Soviet 
Communism. 
Many journalists, 3 historians and political scientists4 have argued that Communism was 
used as a 'bogey' in South Africa throughout the era of Nationalist hegemony (1948-90). 
There is certainly a wealth of evidence to back up the argument that the 'Communist 
threat' was over emphasised by the National Party (NP), (chapter 2 below). Members of 
the governing National Party frequently referred to the Communist threat at times when 
the legitimacy, feasibility or morality of the apartheid system was in question, or when 
South Africa faced international or regional condemnation. 
During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the 'Communist threat' to the Southern African 
sub-continent appeared to diminish and the dynamics of Soviet intervention in the 
subcontinent changed. Most historians would agree that the Soviet Union became more 
conciliatory; under Gorbachev the Soviet Union ultimately effectively withdrew from much 
of the African continent, (and consequently played a lesser role in the politics of the sub-
continent). The Soviet Union's changing stance on the subcontinent, and indeed, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union accompanied or preceded apartheid's crisis and dramatic 
political reform in South Africa. The end of the 1980s saw dramatic change in both Soviet 
and Nationalist Regimes. By the end of 1989, revolutions across Eastern Europe showed 
that Soviet supremacy in those countries was no longer to be maintained by force as it had 
been previously and the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolised the collapse of the Communist 
1 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p.363. 
2 BBC, The Story of South Africa, htto://www.bbc.co.uklworldservlce/africalfeatureslstorvofafrica/12chapter8.shtml. 
3 Murphy, South from the Limpopo p.xix; The Argus (Editorial: The Nat bogeyman and South Africa's future), 1 May 1987. 
4 Guelke, South Africa In Transition. p.37. 
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edifice. 5 Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, F. W. de Klerk announced his intention to 
release Mandela, to unban the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress 
(PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 6 
The extent to which the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism were 
necessary portents to the release of Mandela and the ending of apartheid has been the 
subject of debate in political scientists' circles/ Few deny that there was some link 
between the two, and yet, de Klerk himself is unable to atomise the relative importance 
of the changing Communist and Soviet role in the National party's assessments of, and 
response to, the events of the era. 8 
The question remains as to what role the changing global and regional position of the 
Soviet Union and Communism had on the National Party's view of the domestic and 
regional situation in South Africa. What was the National Party's response on the 
domestic and the international stage as the Russian 'bear' turned into a 'teddy'?9 
This study assesses National Party discourse on the subject of Communism during 1985 -
February 1990, (when Mandela was released, the SACP, PAC and ANC unbanned, and the 
process of negotiation was begun). The subject is an important contribution to the South 
African apartheid and post-apartheid history for a number of reasons. Fear of Communism 
had been a useful ideological prop (though one of many) for the apartheid regime since 
1948. As a feature of political discourse in South Africa, anti-Communism had predated 
even McCarthy's Communist witch-hunt in America; it was also one of the first hallmarks 
of oppression within South Africa. During the years of nationalist hegemony, the political 
system of apartheid was accompanied by sophisticated rhetorical justification. The rights 
of Africans, Indians and Coloureds were removed and diminished in the name of apartheid 
or separate development. But alongside the proactive ideology of grand apartheid and 
petty apartheid, with their plans for the racial segregation of South Africa, lay the 
reactive notion of anti-Communism. Though anti-Communism did not have a racial goal, it 
became intertwined with apartheid in South Africa, and a useful baton for castigating 
5 Johnson, Modern Times, p. 760. 
6 Thompson, A Hlstorv of South Africa, p.243·5. 
7 Guelke, South Africa In Transition. the Misunderstood Miracle, pp.23-44. 
8 De Klerk, 'It did contribute, not so much directly as Indirectly' In, The Cltlzen,15.February 1999. 
9 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, 1990, p.363. 
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those who did not agree with the aims of the apartheid government. In addition, the 
Communist threat was used as a tool for garnering international support. 10 The subject 
therefore has an intrinsic importance. 
The 1980s were tumultuous for South Africa. P.W. Botha attempted to reform apartheid, 
but in reality his reforms failed to redress the racial situation. At the same time, 
opposition forces within the country grew, and the country experienced greater unrest 
than it had known since the 1960s. While it was clear that P.W. Botha's reforms were not 
satisfying the disenfranchised masses, members of the NP frequently denied that this was 
the case. Instead of acknowledging the racial dynamics of the political situation, NP 
spokespeople continually reverted to the defence that the situation in South Africa was 
not due to white versus black anger, but rather moderate versus radical. 11 
The late 1980s need to be brought under the microscope because by that stage, the 
international attitude to Communism was changing and Western fear of Communism was 
becoming blunted. While Reagan's election in America was a response to, and a stimulus 
for anti-Communism, his policies received little support in Western Europe outside 
Margaret Thatcher's Britain. Increasingly Communism was viewed by many as 
anachronistic, a stagnant force, and the image of Communist government was of old men 
clinging to power by methods that involved the suppression of basic human rights. 12 
Furthermore, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union became more 
I 
conciliatory in international affairs. 13 The National Party's perception and portrayal of 
Communism at a time when the international consensus was moving towards a less overtly 
hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union merits thorough examination. Though there is 
not room in the dissertation to draw comparisons with the statements made by Western 
governments about the Soviet Union, the changing attitude of the West serves as a context 
for the analysis of Nationalist discourse in South Africa. How did South African politicians 
respond to an international arena where one of the few remaining raisons d'etre of the 
apartheid regime was weakening as a political force? 
10 Further discussed herein, chapter 2. 3.1. 
11 Norval, Deconstructtns apartheid discourse. p.205. 
12 Guelke, South Africa in Transition. the Misunderstood Miracle, p. 37. 
13 Brown, The Gorbachev factor, Chapter 7 and especially p.227. 
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The unbanning of the South African Communist Party and the ANC in 1990 was a measured 
political decision by F W de Klerk. De Klerk clearly did not plan to negotiate himself out 
of power when he lifted the ban on high-profile opposition movements in the country 
(including, principally the ANC, SACP, PAC). 14 In taking the decision, there may have 
been a number of factors that swayed him to go further than simply releasing Nelson 
Mandela, which had become a focal point for international demands. Political scientists 
(Schlemmer, 15 Gilommee, 16) have proposed a number of factors that influenced de Klerk, 
and have weighed up the relative importance of the various factors behind the decision: 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Namibian peace settlement, economic factors. 
In assessing the transition, many historians attribute a great deal of significance to 
changing status of the Soviet Union and its impact on the ANC. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Sparks argued, 'Took the monkey off de Klerk's back and enabled him to justify to 
his people what would otherwise have appeared to them a suicidal course of action' .17 If 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen to have such a restraining effect on the ANC, the 
historian is forced to question how the National Party came from such a position of 
strength at the beginning of the transition period to such a position of weakness by 1994. 
The negotiations that took place after February 1990 are outside the scope of this study. 
But the debate that persists about the role played by the Soviet Union's collapse in the 
February 1990 declaration can only be resolved by an understanding of the Nationalists' 
perceptions of Communism before that date. The point serves to underline the 
significance of the current study. The role of perceptions is important in history. 
Whether or not F. W. de Klerk misjudged the ANC when he unbanned it depends largely 
upon his (and his NP colleagues') perception of the group in 1990. Was there a 
fundamental error of judgement in perceiving the strength of the ANC to be the product of 
an external force rather than domestic support? Whether de Klerk overweighed the 
political significance of the collapse of Communism may similarly be answered by assessing 
the discourse leading up to the speech of the 2 February 1990. 
Critics might argue that given the structure of South African government by the late 
1980s, National Party public discourse on the subject of Communism was irrelevant, that 
14 Further discussed herein, Chapter 8.2-
15 'The turn In the road. Eme!J!inR Conditions In 1990' In Lee and Schlemmer (eds.),Transltlon to democracy, policy perspectives, Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town 1991, 
16 Gflfomee, 'Democratisation In South Africa' In Political Sdence Quarterly Vol 110 Spring 1995. 
17 Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Countrv, p. 98. 
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those in the inner corridors of power increasingly wielded influence and that the 
practitioners in politics and the military manipulated policy. While this was true, the 
National Party did in fact need to respond to national and international public opinion. By 
the late 1980s a strange irony in the South African system made the National Party's 
portrayal of Communism more significant than it might otherwise have been. Since 1979, 
the security system had come to firmly underpin the system of government. The State 
Security Council (in which the military played a significant role) had become, in many 
ways, an alternative cabinet. 18 The State Security Council had been transformed to a key 
decision-making body with direct access to the President. 19 But in spite of the fact that to 
some extent a state within a state had developed, the South African government had to 
maintain an air of credibility and legitimacy amongst the population. The fa~ade of 
democracy (at least amongst the white population) was maintained. Elections were held 
at prescribed intervals.20 The English speaking press, though stifled, was sufficiently 
independent to raise questions about the action of the regime. Each new piece of 
legislation and each government departmental budget had to be passed by Parliament. 
And though the white House of Assembly still had the decisive vote after 1984, the 
Coloured and Indian houses were able to filibuster and create legislative blockages and 
pressure. 21 Deep traditions of democracy and justice were ingrained in the South African 
psyche, 22 and served to pique the enfranchised public's conscience. These factors 
contributed to a situation in which the National Party government had to convince its 
listeners that it was in the right. Most significantly, it had to justify the overweighing of 
the representative system in favour of whites, and the truncation of the electorate to the 
exclusion of Africans. As will be discussed, anti-Communist discourse was an important 
claim to legitimacy made by the NP to an increasingly critical audience. 
This study therefore seeks to assess the nature of National Party's anti-Communist 
discourse in the later 1980s. It also looks to draw a preliminary conclusion as to the 
18 Cock, Jackytn, and Nathan, Laurie, Ed: War and Sodetv. The Mllttarisation of South African Sodetv. p.8. 
19 De Klerk, The Last Trek, pp.11-4- 151. 
20 Ross, A Concise History of South Africa, p.135. 
21 Ourin11 the Amendments to the Group Areas Act, In 1987, the Labour Party's obstruction ultimately led to the withdrawal of the three 11roup 
areas bllts. The House of Representatives then a11reed to consider and dispose of a number of other bllts. See SAJRR, Survey, 1987, p. xxxvl; In 
1988, the Houses of Representatives and Delegates refused to debate four bllts, which were referred to the President's Council In September 
1988. Survey. 1988·89, p.502. 
22 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p. 342. 
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extent to which the collapse of the Soviet Union was a force in the decision in 1990, to 
unban the ANC, PAC and the SACP, and whether F.W. de Klerk had overweighed the 
significance of the Soviet Union's collapse. 
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1 . 1 . Methodology 
There has not yet been sufficient passing of time to quell the passions aroused by the 
collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. 
Predictably, the historiography of the period has not yet matured. Many of the authorities 
on the subject were involved in the events of the late 1980s (e.g., Shubin, 23 Ellis & 
Sechaba/4 De Klerk/5 Mandela26 ). Others operated in the anti-Communist atmosphere of 
Reaganite America (Sparks, 27 Waldemeir, 28 Welsh, 29) or Thatcherite Britain (Sampson, 30). 
The literature and historiography of the period must be treated with caution. Many 
archives are still closed, 31 individuals remain determined to vindicate their own action; 32 
the Truth & Reconciliation Commission has reopened wounds with the aim of healing 
them; 33 and the passions aroused by a subject so contemporary are evident in many of the 
studies of the period. 34 
On the other hand, some historians, so revolted by the atrocities of the apartheid regime, 
may have been inclined to ignore or dispense with evidence pointing to a Communist 
'threat' or indicating the ANC's dependence on Communism. 35 In this respect, I have 
exposed my own handicap as an historian. As a student of the post-Marxist generation, for 
whom 1992 (the collapse of the Soviet Union) were early days in my historical education 
and interest, I was incredulous that any educated South African could have believed the 
23 Shubin, ANC. 
24 Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades Aaalnst Apartheid. 
25 De Klerk, The Last Trek. 
26 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom. 
27 Sparks, A, The Mind of South Africa: Tomorrow is Another Country, 
28 Waldemeir, Anatomv of A Miracle. 
29 Welsh, A History of South Africa. 
30 Sampson, Mandela. 
31 On 24 July 2002, access was won by the South African History Archive (Saha) to apartheid-era mUltary intellisence records. The landmark ruUns 
was, unfortunately, too late for the current study. Africa Hews July 24, 2002 
32 E.s •• De Klerk, The Last Trek; De Kock, A Long Hisht's Damal!!!. 
33 Commission Chairman, Archbishop Desmond Tutu stated the 'need to open the wound in order to pour in a balm'. 
http://www.fadng.o!'!!/fadnK/fhaov3sb.nsf/a29077e36026fddb8525683200630725/3f2a272e6332dbdc85256887006868b8?0oenDocument 
34 The vehemence with which Vladmlr Shubin, for example, responds to Ellis and Sechaba's analysis makes for stimulatins reading, but may lack 
the academic perspective sained by reflection on Ions past events. 
35 Ellis & Sechaba, Comrades A!!alnst Apartheid, pB. 
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magnitude of the Communist threat as stressed by the National Party government. 
Research required me to step outside the paradigm, to recognise the dimensions of a 
Communist threat on the subcontinent, to empathise with the people of the era, and to 
assess the rhetoric of anti-Communism and public perceptions of Communism in that light. 
Secondary research thus sought to illuminate the magnitude of fear of Communism in 
South Africa, how that fear (and anti-Communism) had become enshrined in South Africa's 
international, domestic, regional and security policy and discourse. Research therefore 
covered the history of Communist intervention in Southern Africa and developments in the 
Soviet Union and on the sub-continent of Africa during 1985 - 1990. The effect of such 
developments on the national liberation movements in South Africa was also studied at 
some length. There is a paucity of material on the latter, and those studies that exist are 
subject to the shortcomings mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. However, 
the secondary research was an essential and extensive precursor to the assessment of 
anti-Communist discourse during the later 1980s. 
Primary research sought to produce a qualitative overview of the references to 
Communism made by the National Party in their speeches, statements, publications and 
declarations. A number of difficulties were encountered when undertaking primary 
research. Many of the documents are in Afrikaans, many have been destroyed and many 
are currently inaccessible. It was frustrating, for example, to be unable to obtain a 
comprehensive set of National Party electioneering material which would have enhanced 
the chapter of the study dealing with this aspect of the Party's rhetoric, but telephone 
calls to the New National Party, requests in the African Studies Library, the National 
Library and the Archive Contemporary Affairs only garnered a patchy selection of leaflets 
and posters. The difficulty with attaining documentation that was so publicly accessible 
at the time is one illustration of the difficulties with such a study. 
A framework of primary research was constructed. Initial research involved using the 
South African Institute of Race Relations' Surveys and the Cape Times, to draw up a 
sophisticated chronology of events. When a chronology had been obtained, and the 
events, issues and parliamentary motions that were likely to have stimulated references to 
the Communist threat had been highlighted, the Parliamentary Hansard was consulted. 
The debates during 1985-89 in the South African Houses of Assembly, Representatives, and 
Delegates were considered. Debates relating to each of the topical areas of political 
discussion were scrutinised, with the help of indexes. The use of indexes (rather than 
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reading each volume from cover to cover) might mean that some references to 
Communism were missed; however, there is no doubt that the most significant references 
to Communism would have been noted during the research. Search terms in the indexes 
included inter alia African National Congress, Angola, COSATU, Freedom Charter, Free 
Enterprise, Mandela, Mozambique, Nkomati, OAU, Radio Freedom, Sanctions, Security 
Matters, Slovo, South African Communist Party, South West Africa/Nambia, Soviet Union, 
Spies, Swapo, Tambo, Terrorism, Total Onslaught, United Democratic Front, Unrest. In 
addition speeches relating to particular incidents were consulted. The speeches were 
analysed noting references to Communism and socialism and the political context, as well 
as the symbolism, tone and pace of the passage used (where this was relevant). 
Unfortunately the study did not utilise the Presidential Council's minutes, except insofar 
as these were publicised in the press. This would be the focus of more extensive work on 
the subject. 
As mentioned above, a thorough study of the Cape Times was part of the preliminary stage 
of research. After consideration of the Hansard, a survey of The Nationalist (the 
Nationalist Party Newspaper), and the South African Digest was conducted. In addition, 
media searches were conducted using the South Africa Media Archive at the University of 
the Free State, with a number of key terms: ANC, Angola, Botha, Communism and 
Communist, Cuba, De Klerk, ECC, Malan, Mandela, Russia, Soviet Union, and Slovo. This 
may not have revealed all the references to Communism in the South African newspapers 
of the period. As a press cuttings service the media archive claims to be one of the most 
comprehensive and judiciously selected, but inevitably some articles on Communism may 
have been omitted. However, I am confident that the variety of search terms used 
enabled articles on most of the key events and speeches referred to in the press to be 
selected. The speeches referred to in the press were collated under subject references, 
and considered in the same way as the speeches in the Hansard had been. In addition to 
the media search of South African press, a search was conducted using Lexis Nexis (media 
search engine) for worldwide media coverage of the South African situation, which gave an 
indication of the international perspective on events in South Africa. 
The archives at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs (INEG) at the University of the Free 
State were accessed. The inventories were used to assess which files might contain 
articles of interest, and Mrs Esta Jones ably guided the process. In particular, the private 
collections (and especially the speeches) of Mr F.W. de Klerk, Mr P. W. Botha and Adv. 
Leon Wessels were extensively examined. Some of the papers were at least partially in 
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Afrikaans, but with the use of a dictionary, the most relevant passages were isolated and 
translated. 36 
As will be seen, the focus of much of the final stages of the study was Mr F. W. de Klerk, 
and therefore it was pertinent to find out more about his role in the NP's perceptions and 
portrayal of Communism. Interviews were conducted with the David Steward, Director 
General of the De Klerk foundation, who had been de Klerk's speechwriter and also co-
wrote his biography. De Klerk himself was also interviewed. 
Philip Nel, former Chair of Stellenbosch University's (now discontinued) Institute for Soviet 
Studies, and author of 'A Soviet embassy in Pretoria?' and 'Perceptions, Images and 
Stereotypes in Soviet South Africa Relations - a cognitive interpretative perspective' 
shared some of his insight into the period, which had been gained through active 
participation in the interaction between Soviet Russian and South Africa. 
In addition, Margee Probyn, Alan Macintosh Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of 
English in Africa at Rhodes University was a useful source of suggested lines for inquiry and 
material, including a videotape of 1985-86 news footage contrasting the BBC and SABC 
coverage of the ANC and the conflict in Angola. 
The research relied on the qualitative analysis of National Party speeches and media 
statements. The applied methodology necessarily relied on anecdotal evidence. However 
the collation of individual citations from a large variety of sources enabled trends within 
the National Party's portrayal of the Communist threat to be discerned. Where trends 
existed, they were illustrated in the course of the dissertation with reference to, and 
quotes from speeches, and, as an analysis of discourse, the study drew heavily on direct 
quotation. 
In collating the research, the dissertation was divided into three sections. The first 
section considered the historical context of perceptions of the Communist threat. The 
second section reviewed the National Party's portrayal of the Communist threat during 
1985-89 in five inter-related spheres: 'international', 'military', 'socio-economic', 
'religious' and 'political'. The categories represented a stylisation of the National Party's 
portrayal of the threat; deemed necessary to facilitate analysis and because it reflected 
36 With thanks to Anton Cartwright. 
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the elements of the 'total onslaught' to which the National Party frequently referred. In 
the final section, the portrayal of Communism in February 1990, and de Klerk's own 
perceptions of Communism were considered. 
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2. The role of the Soviet Union and the spectre of Communism in Southern Africa 
2.1. 'Comrades against apartheid' The ANC, SACP and the Soviet Union 
National Party politicians in South Africa in the 1980s argued that the country was under a 
total onslaught, both externally and internally. It was claimed that the total onslaught 
was orchestrated by the Soviet Union and necessitated a 'total strategy' to deal with it. 37 
An understanding of the Nationalist's depiction of Communism during the 1980s demands 
an understanding of the relevant history and relationship of the components of the 
perceived Communist 'onslaught' - the Soviet Union, the South African Communist Party 
and the ANC. This chapter is an overview of the issues associated with Communism and 
anti-Communism in South Africa since World War II, serving to illuminate the context in 
which the politicians of the late 1980s were operating. 
2. 1. 1. Pre-war Contacts Between the Liberation and Communist Movements 
Until 1950, the African National Congress, (formed in 1912), and the Communist Party of 
South Africa, (formed in 1921 ), had a chequered history, vacillating between co-operation 
and hostility, depending principally on the attitudes of the organisations' leadership. 38 
During the early years, there was co-operation, largely due to the relationship between 
some of the key members of each party. Gumede, (then President of the ANC), La Guma 
(a Coloured leader and member of the Communist Party) and Cochraine (member of the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions) attended the International Congress Against 
Imperialism together, and Gumede paid tribute to the role of Communists in South Africa. 
'I am not a Communist, but we find that the Communist Party are the only people who are 
with us in spirit and we are watching them'. 39 However, the 1930s and 1940s saw a 
decline in the relations between the two parties, as Gumede was replaced with the more 
'conservative' Pixley KA lsaka Seme. 40 The CPSA allegedly saw this as the 'ANC revealing 
its true petty-bourgeois colours'. 41 During the 1940s - the heyday of the ANC's youth 
league, suspicion was mutual. Many leaders of the Youth League were cautious about the 
intentions of the white dominated Communist Party. Lembede, the first leader of the 
37 Thompson, The Political M'tthology of Apartheid, p.131. 
38 Ellis a Sechaba, Comrades Aaalnst Apartheid, pp.9-26. 
39 htto://www.anc.onualancdocslspeeches/1920slgumedesp.htm. 
40 Nel, A Soviet Embassy In Pretoria?, p3. 
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Youth League, fiercely attacked Communists and broke up one Communist meeting in 
Orlando with a menacing tirade; 42 the position of the League largely followed his stance. 43 
The limited cooperation between the movements in the domestic sphere was echoed by 
lukewarm support from the Soviet Union for the liberation movement. The exact nature 
of links between the two movements are difficult to establish, and subject to historical 
revisionism. 44 There was some cooperation with the Soviets, but beyond the attendance 
by members of the ANC and the SACP at various international congresses, there was little 
support from outside South Africa for the liberation movement. In 1928 the Soviet Union 
expressed desire for a unity between the movements for national liberation and scientific 
socialism. Inevitably, this had implications for Southern Africa. But the Soviet's desire for 
such unity did not amount to a directed policy. Comintern or the 'third international', the 
Soviet body charged with spreading revolution, 45 declared that the Communist Party of 
South Africa should be urged to work for a long term goal - an 'independent native 
republic' with black nationalists with the goal of establishing majority rule. 46 But during 
the 1930s, Comintern became increasingly preoccupied with the threatening war clouds 
over Europe and gave instructions that less attention should be paid to the ANC. A later 
symptom of the paucity of contact between the groups was that, after World War II (1939-
45) relations between the Soviet Union and the liberation forces were dissolved along with 
Comintern. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Archives do not contain any record 
of bilateral relations between the South African and Soviet Communist Parties in the 
1950s. 47 This lends weight to the notion that events stimulating the development of 
Communism and Communist goals and practices in South Africa prior to 1960 largely took 
place inside South Africa. 
2.1.2. Developments between the ANC and the SACP in the 1950s 
The National Party's actions, perhaps more than any external factor, pushed the ANC and 
the CPSA towards a joining of forces. In 1948 when Malan's National Party was elected, 
42 Sampson, Mandela, p.42. 
43 Davenport 8: Saunden, South Africa: A Hlstorv, p. 364. 
44 Roth, 'Eddie. Brian. Jack' ,pp.191·209. 
45JN Westwood, Endurance 8: Endeavour. p.274. 
46 Hel, P, A Soviet Embassy In Pretoria?, p.3. 
47 Shubin, ANC, p. 33. 
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the Party's earliest legislation included the Suppression of Communism Act. 48 The 
National Party, with the support of the English-speaking United Party opposition, pushed 
the Act through the South African parliament on 2 May 1950 and the Communist Party of 
South Africa was banned. 49 Prejudice towards the Communist Party in the ANC had been 
weakening prior to the Suppression of Communism Act. Individual Communist's personal 
commitment and practical planning had attracted some previously sceptical members of 
the ANC. 50 The banning of the Communist Party catalysed such developments. Members of 
the ANC recognised that the new legislation would effectively be a threat to all 
opposition. Walter Sisulu warned that Communism, to the National Party, meant believing 
in equality between the races and that statutory Communism would be defined far more 
widely than following Marxist policies. The Act was seen as a threat to freedom of 
speech. The Communist and nationalist movements drew together in the face of a 
common enemy. 51 
Communism in South Africa had not been the mass movement that its opponents feared. 52 
The Central Committee of the CPSA's response to the Suppression of Communism Act was 
to dissolve. That there were only two dissenters in Cape Town demonstrated the party's 
numerical weakness. The party was also psychologically crippled. Rusty Bernstein's wrote 
of 'abject dejection' at the meeting in which the decision on future courses of action was 
to be taken. 'We had come expecting a message of courage, hope, perhaps defiance or 
confrontation; but not cold surrender without a whimper'. 53 The CPSA dissolved, but in its 
weakness was forced to abandon its prejudice against the ANC - which it had formerly 
frequently disdained as petty bourgeois and irrelevant. 54 The Act brought together the 
two movements in opposition. As Ray Simons, a Communist stalwart, wrote, 'In the hour 
of dissolution ... the class struggle had merged with the struggle for national liberation'. 55 
2.1.3. The Congress Movement and the Freedom Charter 
48 Sampson, Mandela, p.63. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. p.64. 
51 Ibid. p.61. 
52 Ibid. p.61. 
53 Bernstein, Memory ABatnst Fomtttng, p.121. 
54 Nel, A Soviet Embassy tn Pretoria?, 1990, pl. 
55 Simons, Class a Colour in South Africa 1850-1960, chapter 25 http://www.anc.O!l!.zafbookslccsa25.html. 
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If the two movements 'merged' with the Suppression of Communism Act, it was not 
without dissenters, as will be seen below. The ANC embraced a more encompassing 
structure shortly after the banning of Communism. Non-blacks were not allowed to 
become members of the ANC proper but a broader anti-apartheid coalition was sought. To 
this end, the Congress movement was founded in 1953. The Congress movement 
represented a broad spectrum of South African society and aimed to organize a campaign 
to enlist the participation of black masses and win the sympathy of the outside world. 56 
The South African Coloured People's Organisation, the South African Indian Congress, the 
small, predominantly white Congress of Democrats and the multi-racial South African 
Congress of Trade Unions came under the Congress umbrella. Some commentators 
alleged that Communists drove the formation of the Congress movement. 57 This is not 
true. 58 The Congress movement was not a Communist Initiative. 59 But the South African 
Communist Party, when it reconvened under a new name in 1953,60 recognised Congress 
leadership in the struggle and became active and dynamic in promoting such leadership, 
through each of the four organisations. 61 
A meeting of 3,000 Congress delegates in Kliptown Square near Johannesburg to adopt a 
Freedom Charter was attended by representatives of many different bodies opposed to 
apartheid. Though the Liberal Party and Smuts's United Party refused to attend the 
meeting, the fact of their invitation was not insignificant; it demonstrated the Congress' 
aim to be an anti-racist alliance of all hues of opinion. 62 The Kliptown meeting was called 
to declare the aims, method and philosophy of the struggle against apartheid, but was 
deemed by the State to be a contravention of the Suppression of Communism Act. The 
implication was that the Congress of the People was a Communist initiative. But this was 
never proved (and the State's case eventually collapsed). 
56 Thompson, History of South Africa, p.208. 
57 Including, Henry Pike, A Hlstorv of Communism In South Africa, p. 30. 
58 Thompson, History of South Africa, p.208. 
59 Bernstein, Memory Al!alnst Fo!l!ettlng, pp.142- 144. 
60 Even the reconvention of the Communist Party was galvanlsed by the action of the National Party state. Bernstein details the genesis of the 
new party, which only emerged from the tiny splinter groups when the 'Liquidator' appointed according to the Suppression of Communism Act, 
demanded that fifty members of the Johannesburg party be listed unless they could prove otherwise. This demand, Bernstein recalls, broke 'the 
log jam which had blocked the path to the resurrection'. Bernstein, Memory A!zalnst Forgetting, p.124. 
61 Shubin, ANC, p.13. 
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The nature and content of the Freedom Charter adopted at Kliptown, was a further 
subject of controversy. The Charter included concessions to socialism: 'The mineral 
wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole. [and] .. Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis 
shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it'. 63 It was 
undeniable that members of the SACP (particularly Rusty Bernstein through his role in the 
Working Committee) had assisted in the drawing up of the Charter. 64 But the Charter was 
not a Communist document: a fact underlined by the state's inability to convict any of the 
156 delegates arrested at the meeting for their association with the Congress and the 
Charter. 65 The Freedom Charter's originator was in fact a conservative elder statesman 
and Cape President of the ANC, Professor Z.K. Matthews. 66 A number of statements (both 
contemporary and retrospective) underline that the Freedom Charter was not a 
Communist document. In 1956, in an article in Liberation, Nelson Mandela refuted claims 
that the Charter was socialist. He argued that, yes, it was a revolutionary document, and 
that it underlined the need for public ownership. But he also welcomed the opportunity 
that would be created for free enterprise to expand, and for the development of a 'non 
European bourgeoisie class', 67 pointing out that the Charter endorsed private enterprise 
and would allow capitalism to flourish among Africans for the first time. 68 In an ANC 
article in New Age, it was argued that the Charter was 'Not Socialism .. Whatever one's 
views might be as to the desirability of establishing a socialist system in South Africa, the 
immediate aim of the liberatory movement is not and cannot be the establishment of 
socialism'. 69 38 years later, in Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela argued that the Charter 
'was not meant to be capitalist or socialist but a melding together of the people's 
demands to end the oppression'. 70 
62 Sparks, Mind of South Africa, p.240. 
6 3 http://www .anc.of!!. zal ancdocs/hlstorv/charter. html 
64 See Bernstein, Memory Against ForJ!ettl!ll!, Ch. 10. 
65 Ellis a Sechaba, Comrades Allalnst Apartheid, p.26. 
66 Ross, Concfse History of South Africa, p. 125. 
67 Sampson, Mandela p.95. 
68 Ibid. p.64. 
69 New Age Magazine, 'Does the Freedom Charter Mean Socialism', November 17 1957 http://www.anC.OrJI.za/ancdocs/hlstory/campalgnslcop/fc· 
soclallsm.html 
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Not everyone concurred with Mandela. Debate about the Congress alliance and the 
allegation that, as a result, non-blacks manipulated the ANC became intense. In 
November 1958, frustrated by the ANC's commitment to non-racialism and by their own 
failure to reshape the ANC from inside (as the youth league had before them), a group of 
Africanists broke away from the AN C. 71 The Pan African Congress (PAC) claimed to be the 
true heirs of the 1912 ANC and the 1940s Youth League. 72 The PAC posited the alternative 
goal of an African social democratic order avoiding the totalitarianism of the Communist 
state. 73 The PAC's claim that the ANC was an Xhosa tribal movement, dominated by white 
Communists, was to be a thorn in the ANC's side for years to come. Meanwhile South 
African Liberals and many Western sympathisers portrayed the Charter as a typical 
Communist ploy aimed at discreetly achieving influence through a popular front. 74 The 
Communists' influence, amongst other things, caused some members of ANC to contest 
that the Congress represented a departure from previous ANC policy. The Government 
portrayed the Communist 'bogey' more menacingly after the Congress of the People and 
the Freedom Charter. 75 
While the Communist influence was often seen in the Congress movement, it is important 
to underline that the Congress movement was indigenous: it was not driven from outside 
South Africa. As stated above, the contact with the Soviet Union was, at this stage, 
minimal. The Freedom Charter and the Congress of the People were uniquely South 
African phenomena. 76 
2. 1.4. Closer ANC-SACP contact: Developments of the 1960s 
The ANC's relationship with the SACP, which had grown steadily in the years following the 
banning of the latter, was further cemented by a change in State policy in 1960. The 
Unlawful Organisations Act banned the ANC and the PAC, and closed all legal channels for 
combating apartheid. New strategies had to be developed. In May 1961, recognising that 
fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people, 'Nothing but more and more 
71 Barber, South Africa In the 20th Century, p.155. 
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repressive legislation' / 7 the ANC and the SACP commenced a violent campaign against the 
state. The decision to undertake violent struggle was not a Communist initiative. 
Opinions on the armed struggle were not divided along party lines. For example, SACP 
General Secretary Moses Kotane surprised Mandela by his opposition to the formation of a 
military wing, and was ignorant of the plans for armed action when he left South Africa for 
Moscow in October 1961/8 In May 1969, Joe Slovo, emphasised, 'The simultaneous 
decision by both leaderships to chart the new way - the way of armed struggle'. 79 
The decision to form an armed wing in 1961 was neither imposed from above nor imported 
from outside. Two of the principal authorities are in agreement on this. Shubin 
commented that, 'Moscow neither instigated nor agitated for the armed struggle in South 
Africa, but rather respected the decision taken by South Africans themselves', 80 a view 
supported by Appollon Davidson. Davidson stated that the policy departure was, 
'Presented as fact. Moscow was sometimes more moderate than the groups it supported, 
in Palestine, Algeria or South Africa'. 81 The decision to take up arms, however, 
necessitated support outside South Africa. Black South Africans lacked the resources to 
sponsor such a campaign. 82 
The ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe, (Spear of the Nation or MK), commenced 
action in December 1961. Formally separate from the ANC, but in reality subordinate to 
it, the MK's formation brought the ANC into closer league with the SACP, and ultimately 
necessitated the movement seek support outside the Republic. 83 The formation of MK 
necessitated that the people with a flair for, and knowledge of strategy and armed 
insurgency should have a role in the movement. Individuals with these skills were often to 
be found in Communist Party ranks. The High Command of Umkhonto had three members 
from each organisation - Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Andrew Mlangeni from the 
ANC; Joe Slovo, Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba from the SACP. Even so, after 1963, 
77 http://athena.engltsh.vt.edu/-carllsle/PostcolonlaVSouth_Afrlca_Apartheld.html 
78 Sampson, Mandela, p.150. 
79 Shubin, Dll!lllng In the gold mine: the Maylbuye Centre Archive as a Source on the history of the South African Liberation Stru1111le, at 
htto://www. hlstorv.llstu.edu/mtavakoVcssaameNol. %2019-1/Shubln. DOC. 
80 Shubin, ANC, Cape Town p.43. 
81 Appollon Davidson, Interviewed by Sampson, Mandela, p. 151. 
82 BBC Documentary, 1986, (Title not available), Courtesy of Margie Probyn. 
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the MK was almost exclusively directed by ANC exiles, while the Communist Party 
involvement was negligible. 84 
The turn to armed struggle necessitated support from countries that were prepared to sell 
or donate arms; but even then, Eastern Bloc countries were not the only port of call. 
However, the ANC's alliance with whites and Communists caused some reluctance amongst 
other countries (such reluctance was expressed during Nelson Mandela's trip to African 
countries in 1962): for example, when in Cairo, Egypt, Mandela had to respond to 
complaints about the Johannesburg weekly New Age criticising President Nasser for 
attacking Communists and assure Egyptian officials that the journal was not an ANC 
mouthpiece. 85 ANC spokespeople persistently argued that they would have preferred 
Western support at this time. 86 
2.1.5. Closer Communist I African National Congress Co-operation 
Moscow's role in supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa matured during the 
1960s. In 1962-64 the ANC's internal mission received a series of blows and a number of 
high-profile arrests (most prominently at Rivonia) which all but eliminated it as a force in 
South Africa. 87 
With the internal mission suppressed due to the imprisonment or exile of its major leaders 
inevitably the external mission gained influence. 88 Western support was piecemeal and 
Western nations were very reluctant to supply armaments. The International Defence and 
Aid Fund in London supported political trialists and prisoners and their families but beyond 
that, support was minimal. Furthermore, the functions of the Pan African Freedom 
Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa were taken over by the Organisation of 
African Unity Liberation Fund, and the Liberation Committee's support was extremely 
limited. 89 Paucity of support from the West and from other African countries increased 
the role of the SACP and the Soviet Union in the liberation movement. In 1963 Soviet 
84 Karis, Thomas, South African Liberation: The Communist Factor, Note 5. 
85 Sampson, Mandela, p.165. 
86 Cape Times, Oliver Tambo Interview, 4 November 1985. 
87 Ellis & Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid p.38. 
88BBC Documentary. 1986, (Title not available), Courtesy of Margie Probyn. 
89 Shubin, ANC, p.66. 
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funding of the ANC increased, as the ANC turned to a country that was prepared to 
sponsor revolution in South Africa. 90 
2.1.6. 'Colonialism of a Special Type' and the Revolutionary Council 
A re-articulation of South African Communist Party strategy in 1962 formulated the 
protocol for a two-stage revolution in South Africa. The SACP's made the decision to act 
as part of a broader front of opposition. The SACP's National Conference adopted a 
resolution expounded in 'The Road to South African Freedom', which concluded that South 
Africa was suffering from 'Colonialism of a special type'. 91 According to this 
interpretation of South African history, the country showed, 'The characteristics of both 
an imperialist state, and a colony within a single indivisible political and economic entity ... 
The Non European population, while reduced to the status of a colonial people, have no 
territory of their own, no independent existence, but is almost wholly integrated in the 
political and economic institutions of the ruling class'. The interpretation offered an 
ideological middle ground and a means by which the ANC and the SACP were able to work 
together, in spite of their differing long-term goals. 92 
In 1969 the creation of the Revolutionary Council by the ANC recognised the contributions 
of non-African Communists in the ANC - Yasuf Dadoo, Reginald September and Joe Slovo. 
Ellis and Sechaba claim that this demonstrated that the ANC was dependent on 
Communists. 93 However, the Revolutionary Council, operating outside South Africa, was an 
effective way of both rewarding and further utilising the dedication, commitment and 
strategic thinking of the three men, who were unable to be members of the ANC's 
National Executive. Furthermore, the disbanding of the Revolutionary Council in 1983 
highlighted that the National Executive was the most important body in the ANC 
structure. 94 
2.1. 7. Depictions of Individuals' Roles 
90 Vladmlr Shubin 'Soviet Union/Russian Federation's Relationship with South Africa' ,p.6. 
91 Eilts a Sechaba, Comrades A&alnst Apartheid, p.36. 
92 D. Everratt, 'Alliance politics of a special TYJ)e: p.39. 
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Political scientists have debated the significance of the 1960's developments on the ANC 
and the extent to which policy departures shed light on the link between the two 
movements. 95 It is not easy to assess the Communist role in the ANC alliance. National 
Party members cited policies and speculated about numbers for many years, to back up 
the assertion that the Communist Party dominated the movement. The two organisations 
were intimately, even symbiotically linked at leadership level, but, as has been 
demonstrated, there was credible reasoning behind this. 96 The ANC was an open 
organisation, and its top leaders Tambo and Mandela, were not Communist. 97 At Rivonia 
Mandela likened the alliance to that between the Western allies and Stalin to defeat 
Hitler: a progressive alliance to defeat fascism. This did not mean that the ANC as an 
organisation had aligned itself with the SACP's Marxist philosophy. 'The two influence 
each other. The ANC is quite capable of influencing, and is likely to be influenced by 
others', Oliver Tambo, said on 30 June 1981, at the 60th Anniversary Celebrations for the 
SACP. 98 
Speculation as to an ANC membership of the SACP or the number of SACP members on the 
executive fuelled debate by outsiders for decades. But even people within the 
movements did not know which members of their leadership belonged to the Communist 
Party. Nelson Mandela, for example, remained an enigma. The fiery youth leader who 
had been vehemently opposed to Communism, appeared to change his attitude. By the 
time Mandela was imprisoned, even his colleagues admitted that he was indistinguishable 
from a Communist or even a secret SACP member. Mandela was always able to refute 
claims that he was a member. At his trial in 1964, Mandela convinced even Western 
diplomats that Communists did not dominate him. His statement led one Member of the 
UK Foreign Office to comment, 'His arguments for collaborating with Communists 
[presumably strategic] are very difficult to answer'. 99 In July 1966 while serving life 
imprisonment on Robben Island, Mandela received a letter from the Department of Justice 
informing him that he was to be included in a list of members/ active supporters of the 
SACP. Mandela's emphatic response denying that he had ever been a member of the 
Communist Party and asking twelve questions for details of any affidavits, stumped the 
95 lncludlna Inter alta Eilts a Sechaba, Comrades Al!alnst Apartheid, pp. 39 - 60, and Shubin, ANC. 
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Department of Justice, and caused them to withdraw the threat. A secret letter by the 
Official Liquidator of the Communist Party endorsed Mandela's stance, admitting that on 
the available evidence he could not be described as an office bearer, member or active 
supporter of the CPSA. 100 
2.1.8. Soviet Assistance to the ANC-SACP Alliance 
Just as the departure from peaceful resistance gave a new role to the SACP in the 
Congress alliance, it also increased dependence on the Soviet Union. The ANC's link with 
the SACP probably increased their credentials with the Soviet Union, but according to 
Shubin, the ANC did not need to channel their requests for assistance to the Soviet Union 
through the SACP. 'From the 1960s onwards the ANC had direct access to the USSR. The 
supplies were requested by the ANC leadership and sent to the ANC initially through (and 
by agreement with) Tanzania and Zambia, and later Angola and Mozambique. The very 
fact that the ANC's regular delegation to Moscow, headed by President Oliver Tambo or 
Secretary General Alfred Nzo, usually included leading members of the SACP, such as 
Moses Kotane, Yusuf Dadoo, Mose Mabhida and Joe Slovo, was clearly an additional weight 
for the Soviet Union. A certain assistance to the SACP was provided directly, but as a rule 
with the full knowledge of the ANC's top leadership'. 101 High-level contacts between the 
Soviet and the ANC leaders were a feature of the relationship after 1963. 
Soviet assistance to the ANC took many forms, principally military. According to the 
Department of Military Technical Co-operation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations, the volume of assistance to the ANC between 1963 and 1990 was about 61 
million Roubles. Of 53 million roubles worth of supplies, 36 million were armaments. To 
those au fait with military terminology, the physical size of supplies is perhaps more 
revealing (armaments were particularly cheap in the USSR): several thousand AK-47s, over 
3,000 SKS Carbines, over 6,000 pistols, 275 RPG grenade launchers, 20 Malyutka anti tank 
missile launchers, over 60 mortars. 102 At the same time, Umkhonto fighters were sent to 
the USSR to be trained in the camps of Odessa, Moscow and Tashkent, later in the Crimea. 
When relations between African countries and Pretoria improved, dependence on the 
Soviet Union was increased (for example after the Lusaka Manifesto of April1969, ANC had 
100 Ibid. p.220. 
101 Shubin, 'Soviet Union/Russian Federation's Relationship with South Africa', p.11. 
102 Ibid. p.15. 
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to move its camps to the USSR). 103 But from 1979 onwards, Soviet instructors started to 
train Umkhonto cadres on African soil. Several dozen officers were posted in Angola 
during the early 1980s. 
Soviet support was not limited to the military. Non military support included diplomatic 
support, participation in international solidarity campaigns, supplies through Soviet 
governments and NGOs of food, clothes, cars, trucks, stationery, sportswear, building 
material and other goods. 104 
However, Soviet assistance to the ANC did not approach the level given to socialist 
countries or even other liberation movements (For example Soviet aid to the ANC at about 
£24m in 1985 did not nearly approach the level of aid provided to Joshua Nkoma's ZAPU at 
the height of the Rhodesian civil war). 105 Additionally, in spite of military and other 
support rendered by the Soviet Union to the ANC, the Soviet Union did not dominate the 
movement. It had autonomy and remained, in its statements, committed to being non-
aligned. The ANC continued to declare itself non-aligned: welcoming support from East 
and West. A statement by Mandela in 1989 asserted that, 'The only difference is .... that 
the socialist countries supply us with weapons, which the West refuses to give us' .106 
The available evidence confirms that the ANC and the SACP were in a relationship prior to 
the 1980s. The debate lies about the nature of the relationship: it has been seen that this 
relationship was one of co-operation in the face of adversity. By distinguishing two stages 
of the revolution the SACP could put its energy into achieving the first stage of the 
revolution, without abandoning aspirations towards the second phase - the establishment 
of a socialist worker's republic - at a later date. The link was one forged in adversity and 
cemented by opposition and repression from the state. More importantly, the Soviet 
Union was not actively involved in the movement between 1948 - 1960, and even then, 
that regime was not the only port of call for assistance. The ANC's emphasis that it was 
103 The Manifesto adopted at the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States In April 1969, and later by the UN and the OAU, held 
that without commitment to the prindples of human equality and self determination, there could be no basts for peace, but emphasised a 
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non-aligned should be underlined: it had not committed itself to the establishment of a 
Soviet style government. However, the National Party had other evidence for their 
argument that South Africa was under an onslaught. Developments on the sub-continent 
after 1974 seemed to lend credence to their stance on Communism. 
2. 2. The Soviets, the Sub-Continent and the South African Response 
2.2.1. Soviet Intervention in the Front-Line States, 1974-84 
Beyond the National Party's fear of the ANC and its Communist Links, the other cause of 
the National Party's fear of Communism lay in Communist doctrine and the Soviet Union's 
actions since World War II, and Soviet activity amongst South Africa's geographical 
neighbours. Soviet leaders had espoused expansionist policies to varying degrees. The 
iron curtain across Europe symbolised the division of the world into two camps, but Soviet 
expansionism was not limited to Europe. Under Nikita Khruschev (CPSU First Secretary, 
1953- 1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (CPSU First Secretary, 1964- 1982) Soviet policy makers 
began to look towards the Third World to exercise influence. 107 
In the mid-1970s, the withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and Mozambique (1975), the fall 
of the Smith government (1979) and civil war in Zimbabwe opened opportunities for Soviet 
influence in Southern Africa. When Portuguese rule came to an end in Angola in November 
1975, the democratic elections anticipated by the international community did not take 
place. Instead, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seized 
power and Soviet arms shipments to the movement, which had commenced eighteen 
months previously, were increased to a 'massive scale' .108 An expeditionary force of 
20,000 Cubans was introduced to back up the MPLA's war effort against the FNLA and 
UNITA. In October 1976, a treaty of friendship and co-operation signed between the 
Peoples Republic of Angola and the Soviet Union sealed the relationship. 109 A similar 
treaty was signed with Mozambique on April4, 1977, and thereafter Moscow supported the 
Frelimo Socialist government against the insurgent Rename movement. 110 
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Soviet influence and the sovereignty of the frontline states piqued Pretoria. South Africa's 
'fifth province' (South West Africa/Namibia) now had a frontier with a sovereign black 
state, and the South West African Peoples Organisation acquired bases within easy reach 
of the frontier. 111 Furthermore, these new sovereign regimes were friendly to the African 
National Congress. The ANC had played an active role in the international campaign in 
support of the MPLA and was rewarded in February 1976 when Angola opened an ANC 
base. Cubans became involved with the training of ANC cadres. An ANC office was also 
opened in Mozambique. The ANC was more easily able to reach its principal target - the 
Republic of South Africa. 112 
Soviet involvement in the Frontline states seemed to underline the assertion that the sub 
continent was under a Communist onslaught, but significantly South Africa also became 
involved - attempting to exert influence in the vacuum left by decolonisation. South 
African troops clandestinely invaded the territory of Angola on the eve of independence in 
support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). 113 
Even after the Angolan War, 1976, in spite of withdrawal in the face of the MPLA (rearmed 
by the Russians), South Africa asserted dominance over the sub-continent 'by means of 
destabilising acts, forward defensive strikes and economic leverage'. 114 This involved 
covert assistance to the MPLA's opponents, UNITA, in Angola, and to the Frelimo 
government's opponents, Rename, in Mozambique. 
By 1984, the cost of such support had taken a toll financially and psychologically on the 
South African population. In that year, the South African government coerced its 
neighbours into signing the Accords of Lusaka and Nkomati with the respective socialist 
governments. The Nkomati Accord guaranteed non-aggression or assistance to the 
resistance movement, in return for Mozambique's termination of support for the ANC. 115 
Discussions relating to Pretoria's failure to keep these accords were a feature of 
parliamentary discourse of the later 1980s. 
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The South African government continued to assert heavy-handed control over Namibia in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This aggravated the MPLA in Angola, and SWAPO in Namibia. 
Although South Africa abandoned its policy of annexation of the territory under Vorster, 
but formally annexed Walvis Bay and aimed to transfer authority to anti-SWAPO 
alliance. 116 The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance to whom Pretoria bequeathed power was 
designed to be responsive to the needs of Pretoria. In 1978, when the initiative passed to 
the UN, South African stipulations regarding the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 435 combined with the delivery of heavy attacks on SWAPO's bases in Angola 
and ongoing harsh administration of the territory all but wrecked the negotiations. Talks 
in 1981 were similarly brought to nought. By 1984, when a government of National Unity 
was proposed (and accepted by Pretoria) little unity could be found amongst Namibia's 
warring factions. 117 
The South African government, in its attitude to its neighbours, was able to tap into 
international conservative support. The United States under Reagan (US President 
November 1980) vindicated Pretoria's regional policy. Reagan stipulated that the removal 
of the Cubans from Angola should precede or be concurrent with any pacification of 
Angola or independence of Namibia. South Africa accepted this notion of 'linkage' but the 
Angolan government rejected it. 118 The Angolan's dependence on the Cubans was 
increased by South African support of UNITA. Thus, by the mid 1980s, South Africa's 
policy of simultaneously trying to negotiate with the Angolan government and reinforcing 
UNITA, contributed to a stalemate on the subcontinent. 119 The Communist threat so 
denounced by National Party (NP) politicians was unlikely to decline unless Pretoria 
altered its policy. The 'onslaught' on the sub-continent was partially a result of South 
African raids on, and destabilisation of, neighbouring territory. 
South African politicians of mid-1980s onwards were operating in the political context and 
atmosphere outlined above. The stalemate reached by the end of the 1980s might only 
have been alleviated by a change of attitude on behalf of the one or other of the 
protagonists. However, for the previous 30 years, Pretoria's anti-Communist policy had 
been aimed at eliminating a perceived threat, and in 1985, it was not easy to envisage a 
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change of policy. While there was some evidence for the existence of the threat, in 
attempting to combat it, Pretoria had not only over emphasised it, it had increased the 
ANC-SACP solidarity and the dependence of South African's neighbours on the Soviet Union 
and Cuban proxies. 
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2.3. Anti-Communism in Post-War South Africa 
Chapter 2.2 discussed the international and national evidence that was provided as 
evidence for the National Party's anti-Communist stance. However, any assessment of the 
anti-Communist discourse of the late 1980s demands an understanding of the nature of the 
National Party's anti-Communism and its historical depth. 
The portrayal of the Communist threat was a facet of National Party discourse even before 
the party was elected in 1948. Prior to their election, one of the NP's major disputes with 
General Smuts's post war government related to South African support of the Yalta 
agreement (1945), which the party contended would expose the whole of Europe to 
Communist domination. The National Party further argued that the Soviet Union was 
promoting Communism in South Africa and was intent on instigating a revolution amongst 
Blacks in South Africa. This argument became entrenched in election policy. One of the 
key themes in the National Party manifesto for the 1948 election was opposition to the 
twin threats of Communism and South Africa's 'black sea'. 120 
Many politicians, including Jan Smuts, had ~ccasionally used the communist party as 
a scare mongering technique; but since its reunion in the late 1930s, the National Party 
had frequently in its propaganda fused the themes of the red menace and the black 
threat, and this persisted after Hertzog departed. 121 In the context of African 
urbanisation which increased racial divisions, militancy and strike action amongst 
labourers (for example, the African Mineworkers Union strike of August 1946 in which 
70,000 were involved), and of the difficult economic climate of the 1940s; as well as the 
advances that communists were making amongst some trade unions (and the credit that 
they claimed for strikes), there might have been some legitimate fear of the increased 
threat of Communism. 122 
In understanding the National Party's perception of Communism in the 1980s, the historian 
has to comprehend the extent to which fear of Communism infused government policy and 
the extent to which individuals acting within the government truly believed that they 
were fighting an international enemy. J.P.J Coetzer's attempt to refute the findings of 
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's on the crimes of apartheid is insightful. 123 
Coetzer, who served over many years as director general of the Department of Justice and 
a member of the State Security Council conveys the government's paranoid fear of 
communism and argues that the scale of the Communist threat justified the National 
Party's actions. Coetzer's simplistic argument - that the National Party was fighting 
against communist inspired forces, controlled by Moscow, provides a useful insight into 
quite how real the threat was communist threat was felt to be by members acting within 
the government after the 1948 election, and indeed, how individuals - even intelligent 
individuals - were able to justify draconian measures (with which they did not necessarily 
agree) due to the nature of the threat. Coetzer conveys the extent to which the 
Communist threat manifested in political -or even personal - decisions. For example, 
although Coetzer believed that a judicial commission of inquiry should have investigated 
Steve Biko's death in 1977, he was happy to be overruled by Vorster due to the warlike 
situation in which he felt his country was. That other individuals within the National Party 
were guided by similar emotions enables the historian to understand the climate of 
opinion, which formed the background to the 1980s. Coetzer's stance gives the historian 
an insight into quite how real the threat may have seen to those working within the 
National Party, though it leans heavily on Pike's flawed History of Communism. 
If Coetzer's attitude- still clearly piquing him in the year 2000 - demonstrated how potent 
the fear of Communism was for a National Party apparatchik, a more objective 
demonstration of how acute the threat felt to some, is provided by the political life of 
Patrick Duncan. A liberal politician, and editor of the party mouthpiece, Contact, Duncan 
was 'one of the strongest anti-Communists in the country' according to Helen Susman. 124 
In an Open Letter to Albert Lutuli in May 19!9, Duncan recited some of the most salient 
evils of the Communist threat. A catalogue of Soviet Crimes, including the millions killed 
by collectivisation and the destruction of minority populations; a chilling picture of the 
tyranny of Communist China, and a portrayal of the imposition of Soviet dictatorship on 
Eastern Europe125 highlight how invasive this threat was perceived to be by this- a staunch 
opponent of the NP. Duncan repeated the chilling picture in other statements. However, 
the silencing of Duncan under the Suppression of Communism Act, as discussed below in 
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section 2.3.2, also demonstrated the National Party's zeal to use any fear of Communism 
against those who were equally opposed to Communism as they were to apartheid. 
As J.P.Brit demonstrates, the National Party effectively used whatever legitimate fear 
existed to emphasise the communist threat during the 1948 election campaign, using it as 
a weapon against the Smuts-Hofm~ constellation. Although those who voted for the 
National Party on the 26 May 1948 were voting for a 'comprehensive Afrikaner ideology' 126 
the threat of communism was an effective part of the package. The Nationalists 
represented communists and 'race liberals' as synonymous, and in one speech D.F. Malan 
stated that the Communist Party 'palmed in' one after the other of the black 
organisations. 127 J.H Hofmey1r, who as the main torchbearer for liberalism during the .__...... 
election, was a particular target for the National Party. Ultimately, Brit concludes that 
the National Party won because it was more acceptable that the Smuts-Hoffme_:t idea, 
which seemed tentative, reluctant to serve Afrikaner ideals, soft on communism and other 
radical movements, unprepared to accept the dogma of race policy, and servile to British 
interests. 128 But the seeds of anticommunism evident in the election campaign were to 
bear legislative fruit soon after the Party's election. 
2.3.1. Anti-Communism in Foreign and Diplomatic Discourse 
Anti-Communism impacted on many areas of political life. The specific measures that the 
National Party took in aligning themselves against the 'Communists' and the threat from 
Moscow should also be understood to contextualise the 1980s. The NP abandoned its 
wartime advocacy of neutrality. In foreign policy, support was shown for the West. In 
1948 South African forces were dispatched to help with the Berlin Airlift. In 1950-53 South 
African troops were also sent to fight alongside the American forces in Korea. Through a 
diplomatic, military and anti-Communist stance, Pretoria sought to win the approval of 
the West, but in fact, failed to win it. 129 Hopes for some form of participation in military 
agreements with the West were not met. For geographical reasons, South Africa was 
denied entry to NATO or to a similar agreement for countries in the Atlantic Ocean. 130 In 
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1955, South Africa signed the Simon's Town Agreement with the United Kingdom, but this 
fell short of a military alliance, and signified that the anti-Communist stance of the 
Republic had not reaped great diplomatic rewards. In 1963-64 a UN arms embargo showed 
just how far short the Republic had fallen of its diplomatic and military aspirations. 131 
In the late 1960s the South African government tried a different strategy: attempting to 
capitalise on its strategic position at the junction of the Indian and Atlantic Ocean, 
Pretoria argued (in 1968) that the newly established Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean constituted a major threat to the security of Western shipping lanes around the 
Cape. South Africa's projected image as the 'bastion of the free world' failed to convince 
Western policy makers. In the West the opinion prevailed that the Soviet's naval policy 
sought political influence rather than the means to provoke military confrontation and 
that in the event of conflict in the southern oceans, the Republic's anti-Communist 
posture would leave it little choice but to place its ports, harbours and military facilities 
at the West's disposal. Strategic considerations thus dictated that closer political and 
military co-operation was unnecessary. 132 
At the same time as trying to curry Western favour through an anti-Communist diplomatic 
stance, the Republic waged a diplomatic war on the Soviet Union. The closing of the 
Soviet Union's embassies in Cape Town and Pretoria in 1956 showed that two enemies-
black and red - were merging in the view of the National Party. When justifying closure, 
Eric Louw referred to the accusations made by Die Burger that the Soviets were trying to 
subvert blacks and transgressing South African laws by serving liquor to them during 
consular parties. The accusations showed that as a foreign government that had made 
common cause with South African blacks, the Soviet Union would be regarded as an enemy 
of South Africa. 133 
During the 1960s and 1970s the NP's picture of the Communist threat gained new 
dimensions, and Communist inspired insurgents were seen as the new danger. The 
independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 removed two vital links in South Africa's 
cordon sanitaire. 134 Vorster became convinced that the Soviet Union wanted to, 'Establish 
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a string of Marxist states across Africa from Angola to Tanzania'. When in 1980, Robert 
Mugabe became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, completing the link between the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans; the Communist threat must have appeared more sinister. The 
presence of Cubans in Angola and Soviet support for the front line states, (discussed above 
chapter 2.2.1 ), created a genuine sense of being surrounded. Even the Lusaka Accord and 
Nkomati Accords of 1984 did not stop the Defence establishment proclaiming the Soviet 
threat and it was stated in 1986 that, 'The major threat to world peace remains the 
USSR's pursuit of world domination'. 135 
Furthermore, during the later 1970s the threat of sanctions, which had hovered since a UN 
resolution in 1962, began to take shape. The actions of the United Nations and of 
Western governments became another element of the total onslaught perceived by the 
NP. Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan claimed that the Western powers, 'Make 
themselves available as handymen of the Communists and they are indirectly contributing 
to the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world Communism' .136 
2.3.2. Anti-Communism on the Home Front 
Anti·communism became a crucial part of the National Party's election strategy in 1948. 
On gaining power in 1948 the National Party's action rapidly gave legislative framework to 
the Party's entrenched anti-Communism. A Commission of Inquiry Report in 1949 
concluded that Communists had already made dangerous inroads into South Africa, and 
recommended decisive action. 137 Shortly afterwards, the Suppression of Communism Act 
marked a definitive step on the march against Communism. The Act, together with later 
amendments, (1967 and 1972) provided a pillar of the restrictions on political activists in 
South Africa. Not only did the Act outlaw the South African Communist Party, it also 
introduced so-called 'statutory Communism', and deemed the latter a criminal offence. 
The police were given the means for silencing a wide range of opponents of the regime by 
defining any person a Communist whom the Governor General deemed as, 'Aimed at 
bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the union .. by 
unlawful acts'. The act also prohibited the encouragement of feelings of hostility 
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between the European and non-European races of the Union. 138 In laying down such a 
broad definition, the Act paved the way for a widespread clampdown on voices of dissent 
within South Africa. Anti-Communism was used to constrain many forms of extra-
parliamentary opposition. As Dervla Murphy travelling in South Africa 43 years later, 
perceptively noted: 'The apartheid regime, set up at the start of the Cold War, 
immediately jumped on the West's anti-Communist band-wagon. For the next forty-five 
years many opponents of apartheid, however impeccable their Christian/liberal/capitalist 
credentials, were defined as Communists and treated as Criminals' .139 
References to the Communist threat were made to justify repressive measures within 
South Africa to its citizens and to the international community. The Rivonia Trial became 
a showpiece operation for Pretoria to demonstrate that she was protecting not only her 
own interests but also the whole of the Western world. Of the hundreds of documents 
seized at Lilliesleaf farm, the most prominently referred to was one in Mandela's 
handwriting on 'How to be a Good Communist'. A key state witness was 'Mr X' or Bruno 
Mtolo (a former ANC member) whose testimony linked Mandela, the MK and the 
Communist Party. Four days after the close of the Trial, and in response to world outrage, 
Prime Minister Verwoerd declared, 'We are dealing here with a Communist attack which 
was directed not only against South Africa but against the West' .140 Uprisings against the 
government, such as the Sharpeville incident, in which 67 people were killed and hundreds 
injured by the police were dismissed as a 'Communist inspired plot' .141 
The National Party and other members of the white community often perceived protest 
events within South Africa as a demonstration of Communist activity. Indeed, any 
legitimate protest was often deemed to be unacceptable and 'Communist'. The 
Suppression of Communism Act was used against some very unlikely characters. Patrick 
Duncan, for example was served with a five-year banning order under the Suppression of 
Communism Act. The banning of Duncan, who had been so opposed to the Communist 
influence within the Congress of Democrats that he had deeply offended Chief Lutuli and 
as editor of Contact, had dismayed his colleagues by refusing to run COD advertisements 
because of potential influence of Communism, demonstrated the 'looking glass world' of 
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the Security Police. 142 Duncan's conflict with the COD was seen as adding to their claim 
that he was furthering the aims of Communism. 
Likewise, protest against apartheid - be it violent of pacifist, was often conceived as 
motivated by Communists. The ANC's bombing of SASOL and Koeberg installations, and 
other acts of sabotage were seen as Communist motivated. The 1984 Defence White 
Paper stated, 'The South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, 
which for all practical purposes has been integrated with the SACP and acts as its military 
wing, are the major elements of a Soviet plan to obtain control of the RSA' .143 
2.3.3. The 'Total Onslaught' and 'Total-Counter-Revolutionary Strategy' 
Under P.W. Botha first as Minister of Defence (1966-80), and later as Prime Minister (1978-
89) and then State President (1984-89), anti-Communism was elevated to a central pillar 
of government strategy. In 1977 the notion that South Africa was facing a 'Total 
onslaught' became enshrined in government policy and its counter revolutionary strategy -
'total strategy' was launched in a Defence White Paper. The onslaught, General Magnus 
Malan elucidated in 1980, was aimed at 'the overthrow of the present constitutional order 
and its replacement by a subject Communist-orientated black government'. 144 
'Total strategy' as adapted by Pretoria meant mobilising a number of resources in order to 
combat the perceived Communist threat in all its dimensions. Total strategy sought to 
combine effective security measures with reformist policies aimed at removing grievances 
that revolutionaries could exploit. 145 The strategy also aimed to restructure society in 
ways acceptable to industry (increasingly alienated by apartheid's restrictive measures 
and inhibitive labour practices) in the political interest of Botha 's National party and in 
the security interest of military and security forces. 146 
Behind the strategy of counter-revolution lay the writings of a French anti-guerrilla 
strategist General Andre Beaufre, who had fought in Indo-Chinese and Algerian wars. The 
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belief that the onslaught was taking place at many levels: psychological, political, 
economic, military, diplomatic, social, and religious was the key precept driving the 
notion of a total strategy. Beaufre argued that total strategy was 'At the top of the 
pyramid .. [of different forms of strategy] ... whose task it is to lay down the object for 
each specialised category and the manner in which all - political, economic, diplomatic 
and military should be woven in together'. 147 In reality this perspective gave the security 
establishment a greater influence on P.W. Botha, and became the means through which 
the new Prime Minister consolidated his hold on power. 148 Both a formed an elaborate 
network of security committees, collectively called the National Security Management 
Systems, at the top of which lay the State Security Council. Since Communism was 
perceived to drive the onslaught, and since the total onslaught necessitated a total 
strategy to combat it, anti-Communism penetrated many areas of political and social life. 
During the period under consideration, the total strategy evolved into a 'total counter-
revolutionary strategy'. The writings of Lieutenant Colonel John McCuen, an American 
officer, supplemented Beaufre's total strategy theory and advised that the tactics being 
followed by insurgents should be analysed and then applied in reverse. Thus it was 
deduced that the multi-headed United Democratic Front (UDF) must be imitated and 
countered in its spheres of action, and revolutionary organisation should be destroyed or 
neutralised, and 'the majority of the population which is normally neutral and initially 
uncommitted to either side' .. must be mobilised so it that it supported the governing 
power' .149 Repression was to be accompanied by a strategy of 'Winning Hearts and Minds' 
in order to persuade this neutral majority to support the government. 150 
2.4. Anti-Communism in Broader Discourse since 1950 
Even before the genesis of total strategy, fear of Communism had pervaded many areas of 
political and social life, from parliament through to the university lecture halls. 
Numerous institutions and organisations through their literature, lectures, television and 
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radio broadcasts, gave depth and breadth to the National Party's contention that South 
Africa was under a Communist onslaught. 151 
The works of academics, such as Dirk J. Kotze, and Henry R. Pike substantiated the 
government's contention that there was a Communist onslaught on South Africa. While 
Pike, an American clergyman's 'History of Communism' was a polemical narrative, Kotze's 
analytical work 'Communism in South Africa' dissected the Communist interest in South 
Africa. As an academic at Stellenbosch University, Kotze's work shows the tenor of 
opinion amongst some educated Afrikaner Nationalists at the time. His conclusions about 
the nature of the threat were bleak. Kotze's analysis is important as a demonstration of 
why and how the 'Communists are interested in South Africa'. A chapter on the subject 
categorised Communists' interest in the country. Though each argument was explained, it 
will suffice here to summarise the arguments briefly: 
South Africa was on the hit list of Communist revolutionaries simply because it purported 
to be capitalist. South Africa was suited to revolution because it was a highly 
industrialised country with two developed classes engaged in a class conflict and it would 
also provide high publicity value. The country was the greatest obstacle to Communist 
endeavour to gain control of the whole of the African subcontinent. Militarily and 
economically it would be a great asset to the Communist world. The gaining of South 
Africa to the Communist cause would be a victory in the worldwide struggle especially 
against the US (because of investment in South Africa). If the Soviet Union conquered 
South Africa, it would be able to be employed against China in the struggle between two 
nations. Nationalistically inclined blacks would be amenable to Communist aid. Blacks 
would readily accept the Communist order for two reasons: because of their communal 
traditions, and because, as equal wage earners they would stand to gain from 
nationalisation. Red China had added that the have-nots in capitalist society were black, 
yellow and brown people, and the owners of capital were whites, therefore, the 
expropriation of the whites was a natural Communist strategy. 152 Significantly, Kotze 
dissected different aspects of the Communist threat such as African Socialism and Soviet 
Socialism. This was different from other political discourse of the day, which stressed 
'Communism' but did not elucidate what the 'Communist' threat was or what the 
components of Communism were. As will be seen, in political discourse it was sufficient 
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to brand someone a 'Communist'; further explanation appeared not to be needed by the 
political community. 
The Communist threat was also taught in schools, ('An Outright Enemy: International 
Communism' was a chapter heading in one textbook on South African history). 153 The 
dangers of Communism were also emphasised in the pulpits and through church leaflets. 
The atheist nature of the threat was an anathema to English speaking and Afrikaans 
speaking churches, and their fear of Communism found expression in pamphlets produced 
by Frontline Fellowship, 154 and Christian Mission International. 155 
The threat of Communism was also stressed through the teaching of history at Afrikaner 
Universities, if lecture notes from the University of Durban-Westerville are indicative: 
'Communism poses a threat to every inhabitant of South Africa under the pretext of 
fighting for the liberation of all Africa, it has nothing less in mind than world domination. 
Already the Communists are aiding the so-called freedom fighters on South Africa's 
extended borders'. In addition to this, questions in examinations suggested that the 
Communist threat was neither taught, nor examined, in a neutral tone: 'Give a critical 
account of the methods employed by the Government - in the Republic of South Africa to 
combat the Communist menace 1961-1966'. (History Ill, 1973). Though the author of the 
study emphasises that such questions had 'disappeared forever' by the 1980s, the 
examples given illustrate the conditioning to which those educated at an Afrikaans 
institution were subject. 156 
Women were also mobilized in the fight against Communism. Groups such as 'Women for 
South Africa', produced documents exhorting fellow women to study the dangers of 
Marxism and the threat it posed to society, and to know how to recognise the Marxist in 
and around the home. A document produced in 1979, Women our Silent Soldiers, 
encouraged women to, 'Make a study of Marxism in your own family, social or political 
circles' and to educate their children so that they would not be drawn away from the 
'National fold by foreign dogmas'. In 1986, a similar document produced by the group 
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modelled conversations that should take place between women and their domestic 
servants. 'The Communists are really like all these animals. They look like lambs at first, 
soft and innocent. Then they change into the jackal, sly and under hand. When they 
change in to wolves, they show their true colours. They show their teeth that will cruelly 
rip us up. Then you see the Communist in his true colours' .157 The metaphor of the 
cunningly disguised wolf was a vivid depiction to scare the housewife into seeking out the 
wolf in her daily contact with those near to its influence: the domestic worker. 
Perhaps the single most effective channel for presenting the Communist threat to the 
community was state television. Television was not introduced into South Africa until 
1975, but became a useful instrument of propaganda thereafter. A broadcast in 1986 by 
Netwerk, a state 'news' programme, evidenced how the media was used. 158 The 
programme on the ANC (in stark contrast to a BBC documentary of the same time) was rich 
with both overt and covert messages linking the ANC to the SACP and the Soviet Union, 
and sinister and hostile forces. Stating that the present government was 'trying level best 
to bring peace and harmony' the documentary juxtaposed this with a 'three-stage 
revolution' to be undertaken by the ANC. The documentary spoke of the 'red tide' with 
its 'hired ANC puppets'; meanwhile the ANC were also stated to be 'terrorists and 
butchers with Marxist designs'. A concluding voiceover in chilling tones stated that 'the 
ANC operates under the shadow of the sickle. History will hold accountable all who betray 
the hope of democracy, all who betray the right to freely voice their opinion, all who 
betray the hope for peaceful change in South Africa'. In another stage of the programme, 
the ANC's Communist and Soviet links, and their links with Cuba were outlined. Again, the 
rhetoric was strong and the images enduring. It was stated that the SACP was 'the most 
faithful disciple of Moscow', and simultaneously an outline of the map of the USSR against 
a red background filled the screen. A flashing hammer and sickle and a piece of barbed 
wire were in the foreground. At another stage, the image 'ANC' flickered onto the 
screen, written in broken text with the image of a bear drawn above the three letters. 
The connotations of Russian dominance were so obvious that they do not warrant further 
analysis. In addition, the programme had numerous images of crowds, stone throwing, 
and flames - pictures of cars being overturned, and angry Africans. The images confirm 
Posel's suggestion that visual imagery on television conveyed a sense of disorder, 
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destruction, unbridled energy- the absence of reason or intelligent purposes. 159 Suffice to 
say that television was a rich media for propagating the message that Communists 
dominated the ANC and that Communist domination was dangerous. Radio, particularly 
the daily editorial entitled 'Current Affairs' performed a similar function. 
Fear of Communism thus penetrated many facets of life in South Africa. While this was 
not dissimilar to other states where Communism was feared, in South Africa, anti-
Communism was a useful prop for an otherwise discredited regime. This dissertation 
seeks to outline how, against a background of anti-Communism and fear of Communism, 
the regime adapted when the Soviet Union began to withdraw from the continent, to 
crumble and collapse, and Communism came to be perceived internationally as a much 
less severe threat. 
159 Posel, Deborah, 'A battlefield of perceptions: State discourse on political violence 1985·1988' pp.262-254. 
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3. The International Front: Soviet Communism and South Africa 
The notion that Communism was an external threat driven internationally by the Soviet 
Union was central to the National Party's depiction of the Communist threat to South 
Africa, and was frequently used on public platforms to justify the National Party's 
aggressive cross border action, and aspects of internal repression prior to 1985. However, 
during the late 1980s, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (and, therefore, the nature of 
international Communism) changed dramatically. 
The appointment of Mikhael Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union paved the way for a new era in international relations. The principles of 
glasnost (openness) perestroika (restructuring) and demokratizatisya (democracy), and 
rapprochement abroad framed Gorbachev's policies. In August 1985, Gorbachev declared 
a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons setting the scene for cautious trust between 
the opposing cold war factions. The subsequent transition to disarmament or peace was 
not smooth. But diplomatic brinkmanship became less common and the threat of nuclear 
war reduced. The new premier's motives were the subject of debate and scepticism, but 
his actions amounted to a profound change in direction for international relations and 
consequently for Communism. 160 
There were implications for Southern Africa. The Soviet Union had intervened in Africa 
since 1975 (see Chapter 2.2.1 ). But, in the climate of glasnost that pervaded the Soviet 
Union after 1985, differing views regarding the conflict in Southern Africa found voice. 
Preliminary indications of discordant opinions within the Soviet hierarchy came from Gleb 
Starushenko, a Deputy Director of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
when he delivered a paper in Moscow urging the ANC to consider giving white South 
African collective guarantees and group rights. In Zimbabwe a year later the other 
deputy director, Victor Gontcharov, told a South African journalist that Moscow's position 
on apartheid was unchanged, but that the Soviets were prepared to act, 'More 
realistically, more flexibly, with every side participating'. 161 Gontcharov stated that if the 
opposition were to insist on promoting the ideas and principles of socialism before settling 
160 A Brown, Gorbachev, p.217. 
161 Sparks, Tomorrow ts Another Countrv. pp.364-365. 
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the problems of national liberation, they would lose both potential and existing allies. 162 In 
1987, Vladimir Tikhomirov (soon to become Secretary of the Africa Institute) offered the 
opinion that a future black government in South Africa should moderate economic 
reconstruction, not nationalising any more of the economy than at present. Boris Asoyan, 
Deputy Director of the Southern Africa Department, commented that while in the past it 
had been assumed that there would have to be a classical revolutionary overthrow it was 
now accepted that there would have to be a political settlement. 163 While each of these 
positions represented a personal opinion, collectively they reflected a reappraisal of 
policy taking place throughout the Soviet polity. 
Gorbachev was not immune to the influence of senior personnel. In February 1986, at the 
27th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev's attitude towards regional conflicts was outlined. 
Gorbachev outlined the USSR's interests in 'stepping up a collective search for ways of 
unblocking conflict situations .. in all the hot-beds of the planet' 164 Gorbachev recognised, 
inter alia, the expense of Brezhenev's expansionist policy; Third World issues were no 
longer high on the Soviet priority list. Soviet support for South Africa's socialist 
neighbours was ultimately radically redrawn. Gorbachev stressed the need to end regional 
conflicts via political negotiation. The exact details of commitments made regarding the 
African subcontinent during superpower meetings are the subject of some debate. 165 But 
it is clear that the Soviet's action on regional issues were raised at both Geneva and 
Reykjavik, and Gorbachev's desire to engage more proactively in fresh thinking on issues 
such as East West relations rather than prioritising regional issues, must have been 
clear. 166 
The change in Soviet rhetoric did not immediately manifest in policy. Gorbachev affirmed 
that the USSR would not 'abandon' Angola and even replenished its weapons (at an 
estimated cost of $1.bn). 167 During the mid 1980s the Soviet Union made some record 
sized arms deliveries to the conflict areas of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua 
in response to some unprecedented armed sorties by local insurgents in these areas. As 
162 Pottinger, The lmoertal Presidency, p.136. 
16 3 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p. 364. 
164 Jaster, The 1988 Peace Accords and the future of South West Africa, p.28. 
165 Ellis a Sechaba, Comrades Al!alnst Apartheid, p.182, Shubin, ANC, p.306. 
166 Brown, Gorbachev, p.219 
167 Jaster, The 1988 Peace Accords and the future of South West Africa, p.29. 
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will be discussed in chapter 4, in Angola, the period 1985 - April 1987 was one of renewed 
conflict. However, there was some progress towards a settlement in South West 
Africa/Namibia as the deadlock that had existed since the failure to implement UN 
resolution 435 in 1978 finally began to crack. The Multi Party Conference's (an alliance of 
anti-Swapo groups) recommendation that a transitional government be established with 
MPC parties proportional to their strength was taken up by the South African government 
and established on 17 June 1985. Section 3.1 considers the rhetorical response by the NP 
to the diplomacy of the Soviet Union during 1985-87. 
However, changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev began to impact on the 
subcontinent of Africa in early 1988. Gorbachev earned the respect of the international 
community when he kept his word regarding arms limitation commitments and pressed on 
with domestic reform, despite the friction generated amongst Soviet citizens. Early signs 
of dissident nationalism did not go unnoticed internationally, for example Estonia declared 
economic autonomy in 1987 and independent sovereignty in 1988. By acquiescing in 
nationalism and not responding harshly to local dissent, Gorbachev demonstrated that he 
was prepared to break the pendulum swing between reform and reaction/repression that 
had characterised the actions of his predecessors in the Soviet Union. 
Similarly Gorbachev proved trustworthy on regional issues. On 15 April 1988 Soviet troops 
began to withdraw from Afghanistan. In a speech on February 8 1988 Gorbachev signalled 
that an Afghan settlement could open the way to a more constructive approach in other 
regions. Gorbachev's hope was realised to an extent in Southern Africa. Although in 1988 
conflict in Angola escalated, ultimately transformation occurred on South Africa's borders. 
A meeting between the Soviets and the US symbolised a new level of commitment to 
peace in South West Africa. By March 1988, the Soviet Union had joined the US in 
pressuring the opposing sides towards a negotiated settlement. And when negotiations 
were held, the Soviet Union were observers in the meetings. In June, the Soviets indirect 
intervention behind the scenes was praised in the South African media for preventing the 
talks falling into impasse. 168 The move towards peace will be considered in more depth in 
chapter 4; section 3.3 considers the impact of the Soviet's diplomatic changes on the 
National Party's discourse. 
168 Caoe Times, 27 June 1988. 
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Negotiations on the future of the sub continent facilitated some high level contacts 
between Soviet and South African diplomats. As relations between the two countries 
eased, (in contrast to South Africa's relations with the West), some South Africans visited 
neighbouring states for discussions with Russian diplomats (in December 1988, for 
example, Roelof (Pik) Botha and Magnus Malan met Anatoly Admashin, Russian Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Brazzaville). 169 Shortly afterwards, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in Pretoria established a Russian desk and several Russian journalists were 
allowed into the Republic. 170 In March 1989, Soviet and British academics convened to 
discuss the ANC and the armed struggle, 171 and the ensuing headline in the Cape Times 
('Soviets prefer talks to war on South Africa's future') suggested that representatives of 
the Kremlin were espousing a constructive attitude towards the situation in Southern 
Africa. Such reports were later partly refuted ('Soviet's back violence'); 172 and it is clear 
that the Soviet continued to support the ANC through 1989 and into 1990. 173 But the 
increased contact between the Kremlin and Pretoria combined with advances elsewhere 
on the sub-continent inevitably impacted on the portrayal of the Soviets by the NP. 
Concurrent with the changing attitude of the Soviet Union towards the South African 
situation, the South African government was faced with an increasingly hostile Western 
attitude. If Western nations and institutions had ever been convinced that the 
Communist threat was sufficient justification of the National Party's apartheid policies, 
that conviction appeared to wane during 1985. In July 1985 Chase Manhattan Bank 
refused to roll over its short-term loans to South Africa, commencing a snowball effect 
and stimulating a capital haemorrhage. 174 Disinvestment by foreign firms was stepped up-
one fifth of British firms had pulled out by April 1988 and British investment fell from £6bn 
in 1980 to under £3bn in 1986. In America, Congress seized the diplomatic initiative, 
overriding Reagan's veto of sanctions against South Africa and in August 1986 the senate 
voted 48 to 14 for a comprehensive sanctions bill and in October that year implemented a 
comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The legislation imposed bans on new investment, 
loans, airport landing rights and exports of oil. Like British firms, American firms pulled 
169 Shubin, ANC, p349. 
170 Philip Net, Pers. Comm.; SAIRR, Survey, 1987-88, p.xxxfll. 
171 Cape Times, 13 March 1989. 
172 Cape Times, 9 May 1989. 
173 Shubin 'Soviet Union/Russian Federation's Relationship with South Africa', p.5-31. 
174 Welsh, History of South Africa, p.491. 
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out of South Africa, or were discouraged to stay by the threat of further penalties 
contemplated by Congress. The Commonwealth, slower to act due to Margaret Thatcher's 
influence, ultimately implemented the 'most decisive package [of sanctions] of all' .175 
Attempts were made by foreign governments to seek peaceful solutions in South Africa 
during the late 1980s. Margaret Thatcher's initial reluctance to impose sanctions forced 
the Commonwealth to look for constructive ways of promoting negotiation in South Africa. 
When the Commonwealth Conference held at Nassau (October 1985) failed to reach an 
agreement on sanctions, members proposed an alternative method of promoting reform in 
South Africa. A group of 'Eminent Persons', headed by Former Australian Prime Minister, 
Malcom Fraser and Former Nigerian Premier, General Olusegun Obasanjo, visited South 
Africa between March and May 1986. The report of the group is intrinsically significant as 
a counterview to the National Party statements of the time and is discussed in Chapter 
7.1, below. However, the EPG was not able to complete its mission. On the 19 May, 
when the report was still being researched, the ANC bases in Harare, Gaborone, and 
Lusaka were bombed. It was probably more than a coincidence that these bases were in 
commonwealth countries. 176 The EPG mission left South Africa that evening. 
3 .1. 'The Concentration of World Evil is There': 177 Depictions of the Soviet Union, 
1985-87 
National Party spokespeople depicted the Soviet Union as the epicentre of the Communist 
onslaught between 1985 and 1987. 178 The Soviet interest in South Africa was seldom 
defined, but references to the Soviet's interest in the Cape Sea Route and the mineral 
riches of South Africa abounded in NP discourse. Johannes A. Vermeulen (NP, Indirectly 
elected) spoke at some length in 1986, to explain the Soviet interest in the subcontinent. 
The three reasons for Soviet interest were: minerals and strategic importance to the 
development and growth of the industrial and military strength of the Western world; the 
control over countries bordering on the Indian and the Atlantic oceans and shipping routes 
175 Davenport and Saunders, South Africa, pp.536-37. 
176 Swtlllns and Phillips, 'State power In the 1980s, from total strategy to counter revolutionary warfare', p.8. 
177 Hansard,House of Assembly, 19 Aprll1987, col. 3802. 
178 Hansard,House of Assembly, State President's openlns speech, 31 January 1985, col. 326; State President's appropriation speech, 12 April 
1985, col. 3327; State Presidents openlnB speech, January 1986; State President's openlns speech, 30 January 1987, col. 10. 
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Soviet Union's revolutionary history served to further emphasise the external origin of the 
threat to South Africa, even when the Communist threat being discussed was not directly 
linked to the current Soviet threat. References to the Communist onslaught frequently 
invoked images of rapacious hunger. Botha likened the Communists to, 'Locusts ... they 
want to devour what has been built up over centuries in the Republic of South Africa'. In 
using this analogy, Botha implied that Communism would strip South Africa bare; destroy 
what South Africans had created over years: the so-called 'fruits of freedom and private 
enterprise'. 183 The image of 'fruits' with connotations of juiciness, health, sunshine, and 
growth, reinforced previous images of hunger and greed. In suggesting that all would be 
devoured by a Communist regime, Botha again implied that the moral good was on South 
Africa's side. He reinforced that the threat was backed by the Soviet Union by an 
extensive reference to Polenski, a dissident from Soviet Russia. 
The onslaught in South Africa was portrayed (particularly by President Botha) as an 
apocalyptic battle between the 'forces of hatred and devastation', which were, 'dictated 
to by Moscow' and the, 'civilising principles and Christian norms' .184 The notion of a 
'force' was a powerful one. It suggested that the movement had coercive strength and 
potential for violence. It hinted that the onslaught was organised - suggesting a military 
operation. By contrasting this 'force' with 'civilising principles and Christian norms' Botha 
suggested that there was an abundance of free will in South Africa at that time and that 
people were able to organise their lives according to principles, but free from coercion. 
By contrast, Moscow was 'dictating' - the suggestions of a dictatorship emphasised the 
lack of freedom in Russia. The two concepts juxtaposed created a chilling picture of the 
possible outcome of the Communist onslaught, and re-emphasised the Soviet nature of the 
onslaught. The picture resonated throughout 1985-87, and was reinforced and 
embellished in speeches by other National Party MPs. 
Soviet Communists were depicted as a power hungry elite, and as the forefathers of the 
revolutionaries in South Africa. Botha stated, 'They are interested in power, just as their 
predecessors were in Soviet Russia until they seized that power and used it to create an 
elite government with the masses in subjugation .... South Africa will be transformed into a 
dictatorship that will not only result in a blood bath but will mean that the masses they 
183 Hansard, House of Assembly, 17 Aprll1986, col. 3597. 
184 Hansard, House of Assembly, 12 April1985, col.3327. 
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supposedly wished to save will not be saved' .185 The repetition of the explosive 'p' 
consonant, and the hissing 's' consonant, implied that the Communist onslaught was 
simultaneously an overtly dangerous, forceful threat and an insidious one which would 
creep through the population. As the course of this study shows, the dual pronged nature 
of the Communist threat: depicted paradoxically as both overtly aggressive and insidiously 
subtle, was a key theme in party perspectives on Communism in the period. 
Furthermore, by referring to the situation in Russia, the speaker tapped into years of anti-
Soviet propaganda. The image of a blood bath was a potent one, suggesting that the 
pogroms, disappearances, and death camps of the 1930's would be repeated in South 
Africa. Furthermore, should the government's opponents be brought to power in South 
Africa, the country would be plunged into chaos, with an elite of power hungry despots 
capitalising on the efforts of the masses. The notion that 'the masses they supposedly 
wished to save will not be saved', suggested that those leading the revolutionary struggle 
were deceiving their followers; 'wishing to save' whilst all the time aiming to further their 
own ends. 
State President P. W. Botha was the most vocal articulator of the Communist threat; 
analysis of P. W. Botha's speeches suggests that the Communist threat was Botha's 
personal obsession. Indeed, on some occasions Botha amended speeches prepared for him 
to emphasise the Communist threat. For example, in the speech quoted above, the typed 
version did not include Alexander Solzhenystin's quote. Botha added the quote in after 
the speech had been typed. 186 As a result the tone of the speech changed from a 
relatively sober analysis of the Communist threat to a chilling depiction of an apocalyptic 
battle of world forces in which South Africa was caught up. 
P.W. Botha's so-called 'Rubicon Speech' to the National Party Congress at an in August 
1985 was particularly significant. As an example of the President's attitude towards the 
Communist threat, and its implication for South Africa's interaction with the international 
community, the speech merits close analysis. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roelof Botha had 
raised international expectations of a major policy departure. However, although the 
speech was televised internationally it was no more than a damp squib. 187 The speech was 
peppered with furious implicit and explicit references to the Communist threat. Angered 
185 Hansard, House of Assembly, 17 Aprll1986, col. 3597. 
186 Observing Botha's papers at the Institute of Contemporary History has revealed a number of occasions when this occurred.[INEG]. 
187 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p350. 
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have been that the passage referred to above was personally altered by the President - as 
other speeches had been. 
It is useful, therefore, in an analysis of the perceptions of Communism, to examine P.W. 
Botha's personal attitude, and indeed how this influenced the National Party at large. 
P.W. Botha was 'both a' reformer and a reactionary. 191 As Henry Kenney noted, Botha at 
least recognised the need to 'adapt or die'; and he was fundamentally responsible for the 
demise of Verwoerd's ideology and for the move towards a more egalitarian society, even 
in the face of resistance from his constituency (the tricameral parliament established in 
1983 and the notion of 'healthy power sharing' epitomised political blasphemy to many 
members of the NP). Botha viewed South Africa as a country of minorities - he was 
committed to the flawed notion of 'separate but equal' .192 However, beyond this he did 
not seem to have a driving ideological or political goal; he had little patience with grand 
ideology and was essentially a crisis manager. 193 
According to Van Zyl Slabbert, Botha's philosophy was simple: if things go wrong there 
must be an enemy responsible, and if they go right it is because of 'good government'. 
The simplicity of the total onslaught theory had appealed to Botha during his tenure as 
Minister of Defence: if all else fails Moscow must be responsible for what goes wrong. 
When reform failed to elicit widespread gratitude amongst the disenfranchised, to earn 
international favour, or to promote peace within South Africa, Botha's initiative as well as 
his patience, seemed to run out. By the time of the State of Emergency- even by the time 
of the Rubicon Speech in 1985, Botha's patience with reform had run out and the 
petulant, reactionary side of his character re-emerged. 
Both was a formidable character, remembered for his blustering, bullying and hectoring. 
At caucus meetings, he terrified MPs into a cowed silence. 194 Those who crossed him were 
subject to carefully conceived denigration as evinced by his dressing down of Chris Ball in 
1987, his attack on Allan Hendrickse, and his vituperative letter to Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu. National Party MPs would only have challenged the President's depiction of the 
struggle. Increasingly, Botha saw the struggle as a personal one and therefore any 
191 Steward, pers. com.21.08.01 
192 Kenney, Power. Pride and PreJudice. The Years of Afrikaner Nationalist Rule in South Africa, p.361. 
193 Van Zy/ Slabbert, Last White Parliament, p.147. 
194 Leon, FW de Klerk. the Politics of Enigma, p21. 
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challenge might be conceived as a personal attack. Criticism was likely to provoke a 
searing attack from the 'old crocodile'. Meanwhile, within Parliament, it became very 
difficult to criticise the President. Increasingly, Botha relied on the position of president 
to protect his position. In parliament in September 1986, the Speaker Mr. Johan Greef 
announced that he would 'take strict action' against any Member who humiliated the 
State President. 195 
National Party MPs and other spokespeople were seldom as theatrical or as colourful as 
the State President when speaking of the Soviet led Communist threat. Nevertheless, MPs 
created a picture of a sprawling mass that could envelop the RSA. In the lead up to the 
1987 General Election (during which allusions to the Communist threat were pervasive), 
Jacobus (Kobus) Meiring, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, constructed an idealistic 
picture of a South Africa where all 30 million people might live happily together. The 
potential for this utopia was in jeopardy due to Communist expansionism. 'The threat of 
Communism and its hunger for expansion have already reached all outposts of the world. 
It is a danger aimed at dominating and controlling the entire world. This country of ours is 
and will be no exception on this road of Marxist hunger. No democratic dispensation can 
or will deny the evil nature of Communism or ignore the danger it holds. Consequently it 
is vital that the danger of Communism be acknowledged and that the bear be called by 
name' .196 Meiring's speech lacked the alliterative resonance of the State President, but 
the message was essentially the same. The words 'threat', 'hunger' 'danger' and 'evil' all 
created a terrifying impression of Communism, which appeared to be sweeping around the 
world, swallowing up anyone unable to stand up against it. 
Gorbachev's accession to power, and conciliatory statements regarding the need to seek 
peace in regional conflicts was not reflected in an alteration in the National Party's 
assessment of the Soviet threat during 1985-87. On the contrary, Magnus Malan depicted 
Gorbachev as, 'A stronger Marxist and revolutionist than his two predecessors'. His 
evidence was the build up of arms in Angola and the style of Gorbachev's accession to 
power: 'He was even taking over the reins ... when his predecessor was ill' .197 By referring 
in such a way to Gorbachev's method of winning power (a method used by a number of 
Soviet leaders) Malan suggested that the man was duplicitous and deceitful, and prepared 
195 Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency P.W. Botha. the First Ten Years., p.364. 
196 Hansard, House of Assembly, 5 February 1987, col. 409. 
197 Hansard, House of Assembly, 18 Apr111985, col. 4253. 
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to exploit others' weaknesses. In a statement (when renewing the State of Emergency in 
1987) that emphasised the duplicity of Communism, P. W. Botha suggested that Gorbachev 
had cynically taken over the West's own phrases relating to democracy and freedom in his 
publication 'The Way to Peace'. The NP did not accept Gorbachev's reputation as a 
peacemaker. Indeed, in phrase that linked Gorbachev to evil practices, the new premier 
was said to be disseminating 'diabolical stratagems' .198 
Thus between 1985 and early 1988, the Soviet Union was portrayed as the origin of the 
Communist threat to South Africa, as an evil empire, and no acknowledgement was given 
to Gorbachev's conciliatory statements or placatory action on the international scene. 
There was a profound distrust that the man with whom Margaret Thatcher has said she 
'could do business' was anything other than a fraud. 
3.2. 'A Seriously Ill Man': 199 Depictions of the Soviet Union, 1988-90 
In early 1988, in spite of the changes in Afghanistan, and the hope for change on the 
African sub-continent (outlined above), it did not appear that the NPs depiction of the 
Soviet Union was to change rapidly. P. W. Botha, in a 'Statement on Matters of National 
Importance' in June 1988 claimed that Gorbachev would not allow interference in Russia's 
internal affairs, but he allowed the exportation of weapons to enable other people to 
bring the internal affairs of South Africa to a head. 200 Though the comment was made only 
in passing, it propagated the opinion that Gorbachev was malicious and untrustworthy, 
and suggested that, like his predecessors he was bent on world domination. A number of 
other MPs echoed the view. Mrs Esme J. Chait (NP, Indirectly elected) stressed that it was 
necessary to protect South Africa and its borders from the external threat, which, she 
said, was driven by 'dogmatic left wing ideologues to further the aims of Soviet 
expansionism in the region'. 201 Similarly in June 1988, Mrs Johananna E. L Hunter (NP, 
Edenvale) argued against co-operation with 'atheists in Moscow'. She expressed distrust of 
Gorbachev and dismissed reforms as 'eye wash'. 202 Hunter linked the policies of Moscow 
and of the ANC. 
198 Hansard, House of Assembly, 4 February 1987, col. 245. 
199 Hansard, Joint Meetfna, 3 May 1989, 7499. 
200 Hansard, House of Assembly, 21 June 1988, col. 14215. 
201 Hansard, House of Assembly, 17 May 1988, col. 9993. 
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However, the increased level of interaction between Soviets and South Africans did impact 
on the rhetoric of the NP, beginning with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Members of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the way in publicly elucidating an alternative image of the 
Soviet Union and Soviet-South African relations. While in May 1988, members of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that Gorbachev was a dedicated Communist, 
committed to improving the system in which he believed, 203 by September 1988, it was 
evident that a change had occurred in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Kobus Meiring 
spoke at the Free State Congress of the National Party in September 1988 and commented 
that the USSR 'had reached a period in its history where it simply cannot do what it wishes 
outside its borders. The bankruptcy of Communism no longer allows it'. 204 Meiring 
unveiled a new attitude towards Moscow; the choice to do so in a strong Afrikaner 
constituency was significant. It marked a watershed in the evolution of opinion within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, members in the upper echelons of the NP must 
have been sufficiently confident of the change in attitude of the Soviet Union to raise the 
issue at a public meeting. The changing portrayal of the Soviet Union, from being an 
outright enemy and source of evil, to being a victim of its own ideology - bankrupted by 
Communism, implied that Communism too, was bankrupt. The Soviet Union was no longer 
seen as a severe threat, but as a crippled enemy. 
Pragmatic considerations regarding the Soviet Union prevailing within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs were aired in Parliament, too. By May 1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
was defending his interaction the Soviets at some length in parliament. Responding to a 
question about 'what he was getting up to in Russia', Pik Botha claimed to be serving 
South Africa's interests in every discussion. Botha stated that he was not so naive as to 
think that the RSA could escape the impact of American sanctions by trading with Russia, 
but he was not going to insist that the Soviet Union would boycott RSA. He therefore 
justified increased trade with the USSR on pragmatic grounds. 205 His speech illustrated a 
new, pragmatic attitude to the Soviet Union embraced at the foreign ministry. The 
Minister was defensive in the light of criticism from the right wing. He dissected 
international attitudes to Gorbachev. He concluded that South Africa had not been 
effusive towards Russia, but the latter's attitude during the unravelling of South West 
203 Hansard, House of Assembly, 11 May 1988, col. 9722. 
204 Cape Times, 8 September 1988. 
205 Hansard, House of Assembly, 3 May 1989, col. 7503. 
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Africa had shown that her diplomats were not bluffing. Significantly, Botha stated that, 
'Russia, is no longer going to employ organisations such as SWAPO and the ANC to achieve 
its hegemonic objectives'. 206 The implication was that Russia was no longer sponsoring 
revolution, and therefore could be approached as a disinterested entity. 
The scrutiny of the Gorbachev regime that took place after September 1988 stressed the 
regime's size and significance, but portrayed the empire as a defunct dinosaur. Pik Botha 
quoted a new economic thinker who had likened the Soviet Union to a, 'Seriously ill man, 
who after a long time in bed takes his first steps with the greatest degree of difficulty and 
finds to his horror that he has almost forgotten how to walk'. 207 Gone were the images of 
greed, of hunger and expansion of the previous years in the lexicon of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Union was portrayed as an old man whose days were 
numbered. The speech portrayed Russia in such a way that it was almost pitiful. The use 
of a metaphor suggested that the Soviet Union was not only weak militarily (physically) 
but that it was weak cerebrally - or ideologically, too (loss of memory). The suggestion 
was significant, for it could be inferred that the very nucleus of Communist ideas were 
damaged. This must have had implications for the Nationalist's perception of the 
Communist influence in South Africa. 
By April 1989, it appeared that most of the Party rank and file had assimilated the new 
attitude towards the Soviet Union. Where it was mentioned, the tone adopted towards 
the Soviet Union in NP speeches by 1988 was generally more sympathetic. For example, 
Gert B. Myburgh (NP, Port Elizabeth North) reminded his audience that they must not 
forget that Russia was still the paradigm of international Communism. And yet, he argued 
that the country had to make adjustments: 'Any immediate turnabout will result in a 
credibility crisis. .. change takes place on an evolutionary basis and even when changes 
have taken place they are always regarded with suspicion ... honourable members know 
how it is a continuous struggle to make people realise that changes have taken place in a 
society .. we must not ourselves be guilty of measuring other countries with the same 
unfair criterion with which we are measured'. 208 Myburgh traced the change from Soviet 
commitment to violence back to 1986. Myburgh's choice of words was significant. The 
word 'evolutionary' describing the changes taking place in the Soviet Union was frequently 
206 Hansard, Joint Meeting, 3 May 1989, col. 7503. 
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used to defend the pace of the NP's incremental reform. The tone of sympathy and the 
exhortation not to be hypocritical were not criticised by members of the NP ranks, and 
members' silence on the subject implied that the Soviet Union was viewed afresh. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus led the rejection of the notion that the Soviet Union 
was at the epicentre of world evil. As will be seen in chapter 4, the defence 
establishment was slower to respond to changes in the Soviet Union and continued to 
portray a military threat. Furthermore, the change in the governing party's attitude 
towards the Soviet Union did not amount to an abandonment of all the facets of total 
Communist onslaught rhetoric, nor did the changing attitude towards the Soviet Union 
mean that references to the Communist threat were entirely abandoned. While P.W. 
Coetzer, (NP, Springs) was forthright enough to stress the demise of the total onslaught, 
arguing that J.F. Le Roux (CP, Brakpan), 'Was really like the child in the old joke this 
afternoon. He swallowed the gramophone needle and it got stuck on the one old tune', 209 
but the conviction of many of National Party speakers on the subject differed from 
Coetzer. The fact that the Soviet Union no longer posed a great threat, it was implied, 
would not effect a change in the Communist threat from other sources. MPs stressed that 
though the international Communist onslaught was declining, this was not the case in 
South Africa itself, (to be discussed in Chapter 7). The two aspects of the Communist 
onslaught, international and internal, were desegregated in much of NP discourse. The 
de-coupling of the international and local threats fundamentally weakened the Communist 
threat as a vehicle for winning the support of the electorate and parliament. With the 
international backbone of the Communist threat acknowledged as crippled, the NP 
sometimes had to find other reasons to explain their failure to negotiate with their 
opponents. 
By the end of 1989, the international dimension of the Communist threat was absent from 
National Party discourse. This had implications for party policy, as the international 
dimension of the onslaught had been central to the party's border, defence and security 
policy. Furthermore, the desegregation of the international and the domestic onslaught 
fundamentally undermined the notion that the Communist onslaught was a threat to South 
African society and undermined many aspects of the militarisation of society that had 
taken place since the late 1970s. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the defence ministry 
209 Hansard, House of Assembly, 2 May 1989, col. 7342. 
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did not adapt their notion of the onslaught as quickly as had the ministry of foreign 
affairs. 
3.3. 'Better to have Sworn Enemies than •• this kind of Friend': 210 The Portrayal of the 
Communist threat vis a vis the West, 1985-89 
As discussed at the outset of this chapter, Western nations increasingly put pressure on 
the South African state after 1985. Significantly, although the West and indeed, the very 
bastions of capitalism (the banks) - were responsible for disinvestment, many NP 
politicians continue to draw links between the economic pressures and the Communist 
threat in 1985 and 1986. Initially the NP's response to the threat of sanctions and 
diplomatic pressure suggested that if only the perpetrators knew the real - i.e. 
Communistic motives - of the revolution in South Africa, then the country would be left 
alone. During the budget appropriation for the department of foreign affairs in 1985 (and 
therefore prior to the Anti-Apartheid Act in the US), G.P.D. Terblanche (NP, Bloemfontein 
North) stated that, 'The eyes of the Reagan administration and many Americans have been 
opened as regards the realities and capabilities of South Africa. One can only hope that 
other Western countries will follow this example and cease playing right into the hands of 
Moscow in their attacks on South Africa'. 211 The NP's public discourse showed that the 
Western powers were perceived to be playing into enemy hands. Communism was the 
ultimate enemy, but in the National Party's opinion South Africa was virtually alone in 
recognising the Communist forces for what they were. 
When sanctions became a political reality, the NP sought to demonstrate a link between 
the Communist onslaught and sanctions. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha implied 
that Moscow itself had designed sanctions. Speaking at a public meeting, Pik Botha argued 
that the United States' House of Representatives did not want to hear the views of blacks 
on issues such sanctions and South Africa must fight against the, 'Slug of lies and distortion 
from abroad', by making further changes that were believed to be right. He argued that, 
'Western countries were doing the work of Moscow'. 212 On another occasion, Pik Botha 
stated on that, 'What the West is doing is trying to promote Moscow's cause here by 
encouraging those who want to achieve their political aims by means of the violence and 
210 Ibid. 
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refuse to negotiate'. 213 The suggestion that the West would want to promote Moscow's 
cause was incongruous, and the reason why the West should want to promote Moscow's 
cause was never explained. It was doubtful that Botha would have an answer, but the use 
of rhetoric was significant. The word 'Moscow' was potent, suggesting an immoral enemy, 
tapping into all the emotional depths outlined above - and painted the West in the same 
colours. In 1988, Pik Botha again made a similar statement, suggesting that, 'Nothing 
short of a black Marxist regime would satisfy the international community'. 214 That the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was forced to make such pronouncements, without cohesive 
explanation, underlines the challenge that sanctions imposed by Western capitalist nations 
posed to the legitimacy of the National Party regime. 
The NP therefore implied that Communists had duped the Western world. During the early 
part of the period, National Party members acted as if the West simply needed to be made 
aware of the way in which their actions were playing into enemy hands. President Botha 
was a vociferous proponent of this viewpoint. Botha frequently seized the opportunity to 
try to convince foreigners that sanctions were playing into the hands of the Communists. 
For example, when the French withdrew their ambassador, the President was quoted as 
saying that, 'Communists and Communist inspired forces were murdering people and 
attempting to disrupt black communities'. 215 Similarly, the night before South African debt 
re-negotiations, Botha told the American business community that unrest was due to a 
worsening economy and a few Communist agitators, and that sanctions would only play 
into Moscow's hands. 216 He maintained a similar stance on German television in 1986.217 
The implication was that if the West were woken up to the threat, they would cease 
playing into the hands of the Communists by applying sanctions. However, as will be 
shown, by the end of the period, these arguments were abandoned in favour of a more 
aggressive stance towards the Western world. 
The abrupt end of the Eminent Persons' Group visit to the RSA, and the South African 
bombing of the ANC bases in Commonwealth countries marked the beginning of a 
watershed in the NP's depiction of the Communist threat. The South African 
213 Hansard, House of Assembly, col.10657. 
214~,11 May 1988. 
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government's public response to the invasion, outlined in a statement at an international 
press conference, represented a reiteration and codification of previous discourse. The 
Deputy Minister of Information, Louis Nel, coordinated the justification of the invasion in 
the media. A three-columned article outlining the 'Facts' regarding the ANC's links with 
the international terrorist network and the Soviet Union, Nel claimed that the RSA's 
military action had not been correctly understood. The ANC was a terrorist organisation, 
forming part of the international terrorist network and dependent upon foreign support 
and attacking lives and property of innocent citizens. It placed the ANC firmly under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union, and in the international terrorist movement alongside 
Gadaffi's PLO. The statement was cogent and comprehensible. But the bulk of the 
information referred to the ANC's Communist links. Fact after fact was cited, to 
demonstrate the link between the Soviet Union and the ANC: 
'ANC terrorists are trained mainly in the Soviet Union, East Germany and Libya. 
The PLO also receives training in the Soviet Union and East Germany ... 
The ANC is dependent for its arms support exclusively on the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern Bloc countries ... 
The ANC consistently rejects peace initiatives by the West. On the other hand, the 
ANC supports, without exception, the initiatives of the USSR and the actions of 
Communist supported international terrorist organisations for example the PLO, 
SWAPO and others ... 
The official ANC Mouthpiece, Sechaba, which is printed in East Germany also bears 
out this fact. 
On 12 May 1986 the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev again confirmed his support of 
the ANC ... 
The escalation of terrorist actions in the past 18 months can be ascribed mainly to 
the support that the ANC receives from the USSR, to the availability of bases and 
transit facilities in certain neighbouring states of the RSA and to opportunities 
created by the unrest situation ... 
The Government cannot prevent the Soviet Union from training, arming and 
logistically supporting the ANC. It can however, prevent the ANC from enjoying 
secure base facilities in its neighbouring states and from subsequently achieving its 
objectives of terror in the RSA'. 218 
The NP did not want to leave the international press in any doubt- they were fighting the 
ANC because it was a Communist supported organisation. The implication was, again, that 
218 South African Digest, May 23 1986. 
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if the West only understood that the Communist nature of the opposition to the NP, they 
would condone South African government action. The document is evidence of the 
National Party's conviction that they West needed to be persuaded that the Soviet Union 
was behind the revolutionary onslaught. The clarity and emphasis of this statement 
indicated an attitude within the ranks of the National Party that if the West only 
understood the nature of the ANC, then they would refute any attempt to find common 
cause with it or to further the negotiation between the ANC and the National Party. 
While the public response was not a new departure in National Party rhetoric, the 
diplomatic response to the invasion represented a new approach in the South African 
attitude towards the international community's pressure. Botha was unrepentant. In two 
letters to Margaret Thatcher dated 26 May Botha revealed his attitude to international 
interference, and his conviction that the Communist threat justified the aggressive action 
of the SADF. In a letter that enclosed an unpublished SACP document, Botha implied that 
South Africans had a special insight into the machinations of Communist expansionism, and 
as a result South Africa was under a special obligation to act. In a closing sentence, laced 
with hyperbole, Botha claimed, 'We in South Africa who bear the responsibility of 
upholding civilised standards and Christian principles do not delude ourselves as to the 
motives and methods of the dangerous and deceitful forces aligned against us'. 219 The 
assonant repetition of consonants, 'motives and methods; deceitful and dangerous' 
suggested that there were layers of the Communist threat that only South Africa had 
unravelled and exposed for what they were. The implication rang clear: South Africa 
was a bastion against Communism and the rest of the world was being deceived. 
Why Both a wrote a second letter on the same day is unclear. But the tone adopted 
marked a change in the portrayal of the Communist threat. Botha coupled the Marxist 
threat with the threats of the Western communities. He used apocalyptic phraseology, 'If 
the Republic of South Africa is forced to make a choice between accepting the domination 
by Marxist revolutionary forces and threats from certain Western countries and our 
determination to maintain civilised standards and our very existence - we have no option 
but to follow the dictates of our own consciences'. 220 In a similar manner to the Rubicon 
Speech, Botha loaded multiple clauses into a sentence, underlining his anger. Botha's 
response was illustrative of a new attitude in some National Party circles. Former 
219 Letter to Margaret Thatcher, 26 May 1986, P.W. Botha Private Collection (INEG] PV 203 P5!1313211. 
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diplomatic allies in the West now expressing their desire for change in South Africa were 
equated with the threat from the Soviet Union. Significantly, in a letter to Reagan, Botha 
did not allude to the Communist threat. Reagan's own letter had pre-empted the 
discussion of Communism by referring to it himself. 221 But Botha's letter was 
confrontational. 'Frankly, Mr President, when it comes to the use of force in international 
relations, South Africa's record .. is demonstrably better than that of the USA'. 222 The 
anger resonating in Botha's statement indicated his willingness to justify his actions with 
any useful argument - be it against Communism or not. But as will be seen, the threat of 
Communism remained a prevalent justification for NP policy. 
During 1986, therefore, the portrayal of the Communist threat changed. The Soviet led 
Communists were no longer seen as the only threat to South Africa; the West was seen as 
a partner in the threat. P W Botha's response to international diplomats altered 
accordingly. He referred to the Communist threat when approached by the English 
Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, and told him that there could be no talks with the ANC 
as long as they were 'under Communist control' .223 George Shultz, US Secretary of State, 
received similarly dismissive treatment. When speaking to the country after Howe had 
left, portraying the Communists as the ultimate enemy, Botha stirred South African 
patriotism. 'Let there be no question about it', he said of Howe's visit, 'I can never 
commit suicide by accepting threats and prescriptions from outside forces and hand South 
Africa over to Communist forces in disguise. If we are forced until our backs are against 
the wall, we will have no alternative but to stand up in self respect and say to the world 
you won't force South Africans to commit national suicide. Leave South Africa to the 
South Africans and with God's help our country can go forward in faith' .224 Apocalyptic 
phraseology evoked the image of death and linked it with the potential future of the 
country. The notion that Communist forces were 'in disguise' suggested that giving into 
the West's demands was equal to giving into the demands of the Communist forces. 
Botha's invocation of 'God' and faith suggested that God was on South Africa's side; that 
unity would help them combat the threat to their fundamental beliefs: a concept which 
221 Letter to P W Botha from Mr Ronald Reapn, dated June 1986: 'I labor under no misconceptions about the ANC. I realize that many of the 
ANC leadership are members of the South African Communist Party and have ties to Moscow. We are not nal've, but at the same time we recognize 
- as Indeed you have-the strong strain of nationalism that runs through Important elements of the ANC'. 
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223 Toronto Star, 30 July 1986. 
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could be traced back through Afrikaner history to the Great Trek. 225 But most 
significantly, Botha no longer deemed that the West could be woken up to see the nature 
of the Communist threat for what it was. Instead, he coupled the Soviet threat with the 
threat from the West. His demand that South Africa should be left to the South Africans 
highlighted South Africa's isolation; as if morally inferior enemies (both Eastern and 
Western) surrounded the country. 
President Botha's statements could not hide that South Africa was becoming increasingly 
alienated from the Western powers - an international pariah. His arguments that the 
Western powers were now supporting those with a, 'Commitment to terrorist murder and 
violence; a dedication to a Marxist form of government; a commitment to nationalisation 
and a socialist economy; the destruction of freedom of faith and worship' ,226 sounded 
increasingly desperate. The late 1980s saw a proliferation of enemies in the NP discourse. 
Communists were still enemy number one, but South Africa's former allies supported 
them. When speaking about the forces of revolution within South Africa, Botha claimed 
that they were, 'Supported by goodie goodies from America, goodie goodies from Britain 
and goodie goodies from Europe .... the goodie goodies are in blissful ignorance of the 
devils they are supporting'. 227 To Botha, the West's support of revolution was unpalatable, 
because reform had been attempted in South Africa. He was indignant that the more 
South Africa reformed, the more they were condemned and punished by those who they 
had perceived as 'friends'. Botha demanded, 'Is that what the Statue of Liberty really 
symbolises? To that we say: no thank you, we cannot regard them as our friends. For us it 
is often better to have sworn enemies than to have this kind of friends'. 228 Thus the 
former 'friends' of South Africa were now perceived as enemies, and this view was 
increasingly infused into statements regarding the international community. As Anthony 
Sampson observed in an article in Newsweek, the 'big bad Russian bear mythology' was 
being abandoned, and replaced with a depiction of Western nations as more dangerous 
than Communist countries. 229 The West largely displaced the Soviet Union as the focus for 
Both a's wrath. 
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The State President was not alone in perceiving and discussing a change of enemies, and 
budgetary speeches reflected the alteration of the National Party's view of the 
international scene. In 1988, Pik Botha argued angrily against the 'imperialistic 
arrogance' exhibited by the USA, Europe, Japan or Russia passing laws their legislative 
bodies to impose sanctions on South Africa. 230 In 1989 during an austere budget, Finance 
Minster Barend du Plesssis declared, 'Every South African will have to make a sacrifice in 
the battle against an economic onslaught which is being organized against the country 
internationally'. 231 Significantly, as the Soviet Union became more amenable to discussion 
in South Africa, and to trade with South Africa, and as the West became more inclined to 
put pressure on the Republic, the Soviet Union was portrayed less severely, and the West 
more severely. Incongruously however, the West was frequently portrayed as pushing 
South Africa to Marxist ends. 
Thus, as the threat of Soviet sponsored revolution diminished during 1985-89, National 
Party discourse changed. References to the 'evil empire' were modified and dimmed. 
Ultimately, the NP's attitude to the Soviet Union mellowed, references to the Soviet 
Union became almost sympathetic, and new 'enemies' came to dominate the NP's 
depiction of the international scene, as the West imposed sanctions and attempted to find 
solutions to the South African situation. The notion of a Communist onslaught became 
riddled with internal contradictions. The efficacy of the antiCommunist argument as a 
motivating factor was that it wedded an international threat and domestic pressure. The 
change of the international threat necessarily had implications for the portrayal of the 
domestic threat. However, the decline in the references to Communist threat originating 
from the Soviet Union did not result in a concurrent abandonment by the NP of the 
argument that Communism was a significant threat to the South African polity. Thus in 
spite of the change in the international scene, the threat of Communism remained 
common in NP discourse. 
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4. The Military Onslaught 
The military onslaught on South Africa's borders was the most tangible element of the 
Communist onslaught referred to by the National Party, and it was inseparably linked with 
the portrayal of an Soviet Communist threat. The National Party portrayed the Communist 
onslaught on South Africa's military capabilities as distinguished not only by conflict on 
the battlefield, but also by subtle methods used by Communists to undermine and 
denigrate the Defence Force. 
As seen in chapter 2.3.4 above, the South African government and the Soviet Union had 
supported opposing factions in Angola and Mozambique since Portuguese decolonisation in 
1975. By 1985, the South Africa government in Pretoria was under pressure from the 
international community for positive action on South West Africa/Namibia and from 
business interests within South Africa, which saw a regional settlement as one way to 
reduce the defence budget. 232 In 1984, in the Lusaka Accord (February) South African 
undertook to withdraw troops from Angola, and, in exchange for Angolan controls on 
SWAPO, to work towards Namibian independence under Security Council Resolution 435. 
In March 1984, the Nkomati Accord 'on non-aggression and good neighbourliness' 
stipulated that neither South Africa nor Mozambique would provide facilities for 
'elements' hostile to either, i.e. that South African assistance for Renamo would end, in 
return for the cessation of Mozambican hosting of and support for the AN C. 233 But hopes 
that the South African military instrument was being retired from direct use and replaced 
by economic instruments to maintain regional hegemony were rapidly dashed. 234 Indeed, 
rather than diminishing, military conflict on the subcontinent escalated during 1985-88,235 
despite the good 'intentions' declared at the Accords of Nkomati and Lusaka. In spite of 
the commitments made at Lusaka it took the SADF more than a year (until April 1985) to 
withdraw its troops from Angola; when withdrawal ostensibly took place, the SADF's 
support for UNITA barely flagged, UNITA operations continued and South African troops 
continued to cross the border in hot pursuits; 236and in September 1985, the SADF 
232 Hanlon. Bel!gar your neighbours, p.S0-15. 
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intervened on an unprecedented scale on UNITA's behalf. 237 The history of Mozambique 
was not dissimilar: war there 'increased', in spite of the commitments made by South 
Africa to terminate support to the opposition movement, Rename. (It later transpired 
that two months before the Accord of Nkomati, South Africa had given Rename six months 
worth of supplies and launched an attack on Maputo at the time of the Accord's 
signing). 238 South Africa destabilisation of her neighbours, which had commenced in 1977, 
persisted during the period, causing widespread devastation, loss of life and homelessness. 
Investigating South Africa's activity, the Truth & Reconciliation Commission found that, 
'While some acts of regional destabilisation may have been a defence against Communism, 
the purpose of the war was to preserve white minority rule in South Africa'. 239 The NP's 
discourse did not refer to the efforts to preserve minority rule, instead the SADF's actions 
on the subcontinent were shrouded by the obfuscation of the State Security Council and 
NP spokespeople. But when the mask of South African pacification on the subcontinent 
was 'rudely pulled off'240 and South African intervention in neighbouring states revealed, 
threatening to severely tarnish the government's reputation, public opinion called for an 
explanation. At this point the threat of Communism was widely referred to (discussed in 
chapter 4.1.1 ). 
After 1987 the power balance on the sub-continent changed, and with it the rhetoric 
employed by the NP. In March 1987, South African reconnaissance commando teams in 
Angola reported People's Liberation Army of Namibia, Cuban and Angolan troops moving 
south-eastwards, and again deployed air support, but with less success than before. In 
November 1987, the Angolan-Cuban defenders managed to bring SADF-UNITA forces to a 
halt at Cuito Cuanavale, and until May 1988, a series of battles ultimately changed little, 
reinforcing a stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale but the Cubans notched up considerable 
successes. 241 In November, the South African government admitted for the first time that 
its troops were actively involved (saying that the involvement was necessary to prevent 
UNITA from being overwhelmed by Soviet and Cuban troops supporting the MPLA) but by 
this time, international and domestic pressure was moving the opposing sides towards 
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negotiation. Chapter 4.1.2 considers the NP discourse after military deadlock had been 
reached. 
In January 1988, in talks on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the 
independence of Namibia, Chester Crocker (American Assistant Secretary of State) was 
joined for the first time by a Cuban Official, and at the end of the talks, it was announced 
that Angolan and Cuban troops had agreed to the eventual withdrawal of some 40,000 
Cuban troops from Angola. Under Crocker's leadership, which sought terms to allow each 
side to claim victory, further progress was made in August 1988 when South African, 
Angolan and Cuban representatives announced a cease-fire agreement in which South 
Africa would withdraw its troops from Angola by 1 September, at which time Angola and 
Cuba would present a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops. 242 In addition, it was 
agreed that Angolan hosting of the ANC would be terminated. 243 A target date was also set 
for the implementation of Resolution 435, and the holding of UN-supervised elections in 
Namibia. The Brazaville Protocol of December 1988 firmed up the agreement and 
provided for Namibian independence and on 10 January 1989 Cuban troops began their 
withdrawal from Angola. Chapter 4.1.3 considers the NP's discourse about the Communist 
military threat as the Namibian situation was settled. 
The discourse relating to the military onslaught on South African borders thus responded 
to the dramatic political events of the time; however, during the period, the military 
budget was increased (until 1990) and that increase had to be passed by parliament. 
Elements of the discourse relating to the military threat became divorced from the reality 
of the situation on the borders, and were related to the demands of the military 
establishment within South Africa. 
4.1. 'Moscow's Springboard': The Depiction of the Namibian Situation and 
Explanations of Cross-Border Raids, 1985-87 
During 1985 and 1986, the failure to resolve the Namibian situation came under 
parliamentary scrutiny. The National Party portrayed the South African presence in 
Namibia as a necessity for defending against the Communist threat there. Opponents of 
South Africa's presence in South West Africa were depicted extremely negatively as Soviet 
242 Jaster, The 1988 Peace Accords and the future of South West Africa, p.32. 
243 Riley, E, Malor political events In South Africa, p206. 
Page 69 
'interventionists', supporting Cuban forces. 244 South Africa's continued presence in the 
region was consistently blamed on the threatening presence of Cubans in the region. 
Meanwhile the Multi-Party Conference (essentially an alliance of anti-SWAPO groups 
responsive to the needs of Pretoria) was implied to be the legitimate government in SWA 
opposed by the Communist organisation, SWAPO. It was suggested that a dangerous 
vacuum would be created in the absence of South Africa's stabilising influence in the 
region. 245 'Who is to fill that vacuum? For whom must the table be set? For Swapo? For 
Cuba? For Russia?' 246 The implication of speeches during 1985 and 1986 was that South 
Africa was at war against the Soviets in Namibia, and this was dangerously close to South 
Africa itself. 'We dare not allow the Communist forces and Cuban troops to raise their red 
flag in Windhoek'. 247 
Although the situation in Namibia was often blamed upon the Cuban presence in Angola, 
the role of the SADF continued to be a focal point of criticism in parliament. In spite of 
Parliament's and civilians' ignorance of the precise details of the South African Defence 
Force's action in the field, in 1985-87 there was extensive criticism of the role of the 
Defence Force in cross border raids. In countering the accusations of various opposition 
voices, and in order to legitimise their own actions, members of the NP with defence 
portfolios frequently emphasised the severity of the Communist threat, both in parliament 
and beyond. The onslaught was shown to be both very real- in terms of a frontal attack; 
and psychological - in terms of subtle undermining of the SADF. Both elements of the 
Communist's military onslaught were stressed simultaneously when the defence 
establishment was responding to criticism. Such criticism occurred during the 'Cabinda 
Scandal' of 1985 when it was suggested that South Africa was contravening its 
commitments in Angola; and after the discovery of the Vaz diaries in a camp recaptured 
from Renamo by the Mozambican government when it was found that the South African 
government had shored up Renamo prior to the Nkomati Accord and maintained its support 
for the insurgent movement throughout the period. 248 
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The debates succeeding the Cabinda Scandal were an early and high profile example of NP 
Member's rhetorical tactics for diverting criticism from the SADF and South African policy 
towards neighbouring states. On 21 May 1985, despite South Africa's supposed withdrawal 
from Angola in April, two men were killed and one man (Captain Wynand du Toit) captured 
allegedly attempting to blow up a Gulf Oil installation in the North of Angola. A public 
-·---. -
relations disaster loomed for the South African government and defence establishment if 
the allegations were verified. Sasol was a source of essential foreign revenue for Angola 
and of Angolan oil for America. SADF spokespeople first claimed that the Defence Force 
was gathering information about 'hostile elements', but it later transpired that this was 
untrue and that South Africa was covertly pursuing a strategy designed to bring the 
Angolan government to its knees. 249 During the debates relating to the Cabinda Scandal in 
the House of Assembly, Malan claimed that the SADF was both a principal target of 
Communist attack and a central vehicle in the combating of the Communist threat. Malan 
dismissed as 'Marxist disinformation' the allegations that Wynand du Toit had admitted 
that he was on a raid to blow up the installation. Malan maintained that Marxists were, 
'Masters of the art of forcing captives to make false confessions and promote propaganda 
and lies'. 250 The implication was that Du Toit's captors were corrupting him; that he was 
being subject to torture and brainwashed to discredit South Africa. The Deputy Minister of 
Defence, Adriaan J. Vlok, reiterated this argument later in May, citing a 1956 report from 
the American Government to back up his argument. 'It is true that a Communist has 
considerable skill in the extracting of information from prisoners, and in making prisoners 
do his bidding, including confessions for crimes they do not commit'. 251 The language used 
by both Malan and his deputy emphasised the cunning ('masters of the art' 'skill') and 
cruelty ('forcing', 'extracting') of Marxist captors. Du Toit's captors were labelled neither 
as Angolans, nor as members of the MPLA or FPLA but as Marxists or Communists. This 
rhetoric flagged up that the captors were a moral enemy in the wrong, thus apparently 
justifying and vindicating the Defence Ministers' stance. The impression given was that 
Communists were highly skilful at perverting their captives. In can be surmised that in 
stressing this, Malan and his deputy sought to discredit information that might 
subsequently contradict the statements made by the South African government and to 
prevent any further revelations being taken seriously. For their reputation it was crucial 
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that they did so. The revelations regarding Cabinda were potentially very damaging. 
Malan's resignation had been demanded, should he be unable to explain. 252 By laying the 
blame squarely at the feet of 'Marxists', Malan and his deputy propagated and sought to 
benefit from the perception that Marxists held different moral standards. 
In discussing cross border raids, Malan simultaneously emphasised the threat of 
Communism and belittled his opponents in parliament. He poured scorn on his critics by 
referring to the Communist, organised nature of the onslaught. By suggesting that they 
little understood the severity of the situation, Malan implied that the official opposition 
(Progressive Federal Party) were too simple minded to understand the threat, and thereby 
attempted to prevent any discussion of the military situation. Any one wishing to discuss 
destabilisation in the sub continent, he said, should first consider the gravity of the 
situation. During the Defence Appropriation Bill of 1985, Malan stated that, 'The threat 
against us especially from Kremlin inspired terrorist circles is not child's play or fireside 
chat'. 253 A reference to the Kremlin cleverly tapped into the fear of Soviet Communism 
discussed in the previous chapter. The ensuing phrases implied that those who dared to 
postulate about the Defence Force's actions were idle and immature; the notion of child's 
play or fireside chat was derisive and disdainful of those who felt that they should 
intervene: it strongly implied that they had no comprehension of the scale of the problem. 
In depicting the forces opposing South Africa on the subcontinent, Malan and his 
colleagues implied, firstly, that South Africa was innocent and good neighbourly -
extending a, ' Hand of friendship that is rejected' 254 and secondly, that the nexus of 
expansionism was neither South Africa nor her neighbours, but Soviet Communism. In a 
speech at the Springbok Air Show, Malan claimed, 'The tragedy of Angola is that its 
government is being shunted around by Moscow and Moscow is using Angola as a 
springboard to reach its ultimate goal'. 255 The terminology suggested that the Angolans 
were victims of Soviet expansionism, that the country was unwittingly being used as a tool 
in the hand of a larger force. The word 'tragedy' implied sympathy with the Angolan's 
plight, and similar terminology was used in depicting the situation in Mozambique. For 
252 Cape Times, 24 May 1985. 
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example, speaking to recruits at the Louis Trichardt air base, (after the SADF had been 
under attack for attempting to destabilise Mozambique, and cynically dishonouring the 
Nkomati accord), Malan used terms of sympathy and respect as he defended South Africa's 
action by alluding to the threat of Communism. 'South Africa recognises the existence of 
a sovereign state like Mozambique and we respect them, as we do the Nkomati accord. 
But it is in the interests of our region that the USSR and its surrogates are not given 
unlimited free reign, in this subcontinent, under the so-called cloak of liberation'. 256 
Malan implied that South Africa was a diplomatically scrupulous country virtuously 
upholding the Accord and he juxtaposed that with unscrupulous Soviets. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' public reaction to the Cabinda scandal were not dissimilar 
to that of the Ministry of Defence. In a statement to the press, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs highlighted the avenues through which progress might be achieved. Some editors 
interpreted Botha's statement as an indication that the government might now press on 
with an internal settlement in SWA/Namibia if the United States agreed. But the 
statement also played on fears of Communism. Botha implied that the Cabinda affair was 
a confirmation of a dangerous superpower presence on the subcontinent against which 
South Africa was dwarfed. The size and sinister nature of the supporters of the Angolan 
government were emphasised. 'The presence of foreign forces on such a large scale, 
together with the presence of organisations which proclaim the so-called virtues of 
international terrorism, can only serve the purposes of a superpower whose ideology and 
policy have bought misery to untold millions of people all over the world'. 257 Botha's 
statement merits underlining - it demonstrates that at this stage a fear of the military 
threat of Communism still pervaded the Department of Foreign Affairs, if only as a tool for 
justifying military incursions on the subcontinent. 
4.2. 'War is War, Negotiation is War, Peace is War': Cuito Cuanavale, Military Setback 
and Independence for Namibia, 1987-89 
By early 1988 South Africa's military grip on the sub-continent was loosening. In Angola, 
at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale when South African troops clashed directly with Cuban 
forces, they suffered strategic defeat: The South African Air Force had lost control of the 
256 Ibid. 
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air (ageing Mirages were outmanoeuvred by Cuban MiGs) and the number of men dying on 
the borders was no longer politically acceptable. 258 
A statement by Magnus Malan aimed at the Gorbachev suggested that military setbacks 
and diplomatic advances were promoting a change in the portrayal of the Soviet Union's 
military role on the subcontinent. In March 1988, Malan indicated South Africa's 
willingness to come to a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union along the same lines as 
that reached between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in which, provided the Soviets 
accepted Angolan non-alignment, and the MPLA and Unita reached an agreement, South 
Africa would withdraw from Angola. Malan stated, 'We realise that a future government in 
Luanda, seen against the tension between East and West, must certainly follow a non-
aligned and neutral political attitude'. Significantly, the statement did not vilify the 
Soviets, and it further accepted a non-aligned government as a future prospect. The 
statement suggested that a less hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union might be 
permeating the corridors of military power. Though the speech received a negative 
response from Soviet diplomats who were unsympathetic (commenting that the only 
similarity between the two countries was that they began with the letter 'A'), 259 it was 
widely lauded in the South African press; the Star ran the headline 'Magnus Malan: South 
Africa rejects US to woo Soviets'. 260 
The Star's headline was premature, however, for Malan and his colleagues continued, 
during 1988, to vacillate between a negative and a neutral portrayal of the Soviet Union. 
In May 1988, Malan's profound distrust of the Soviets was revealed in a budget speech, in 
which he stressed that negotiations were only the continuation of war by other means. 
'To the Communists war is war, negotiation is war and peace is war'. He suggested that 
the Russians were pursuing two alternatives simultaneously; a political method and a 
military method, in order to achieve their ultimate target- the RSA. The anti-Communist 
statements in the speech were frequently directed against the Cubans but the Soviets 
were seen to be the originators of the Communist threat and the bank-rollers of the 
Cubans. The speech was saturated with anti-Soviet sentiment, and demonstrated that the 
military establishment had not yet abandoned their hostile posture towards the Soviets. 
Similarly, in a speech to the Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria in November 1988, 
258 Althoush only 37 white combatants had been killed. Sampson, 'A change of enemies', Newsweek, 27.3.89. 
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Malan expressed vehemently anti-Soviet views and emphatically denied that any change in 
Soviet policy would impact upon the sub-continent. He stressed the continuing military 
threat to South Africa and warned that the relaxed East West relationship, might well 
conceal the fact that in changing course the Soviet Union had retained, 'The fundamental 
principles of Lenin... the dialectic remains a fundamental principle'. He stated 
unequivocally that Soviet pronouncements declaring that regional conflicts must be solved 
were not made applicable to Southern Africa and that there was no firm or visible 
evidence that the Soviet Union's more relaxed international relationship had permeated to 
Southern Africa. 261 The assessment of the theoretical origin of the Soviet threat to the 
sub-continent underlined its violent origin and suggested that this had not changed 
fundamentally. 
The focus of the portrayal of the Communist military threat did shift, however. While the 
Russians were less frequently referred to in National Party discourse relating to the 
military onslaught, the Cubans were increasingly depicted as untrustworthy and mercurial, 
particularly since none of the terms in the Western lexicon (peaceful co-existence, 
negotiation) meant the same to a Communist. The implication of the depiction of the 
Cubans during 1987-88 was that they had inherited the Soviet's role and history was 
referred to in order to urge caution in negotiation and to illustrate that the Cubans might 
not carry out promises: it was underlined that when Gorbachev had first come to power, 
in spite of his iterations on nuclear weapons, he had tried to expand influence in Angola, 
and similarly, the Cubans could not be trusted. The Cuban forces in Angola were held 
responsible for havoc, 'Like locusts, [they] can only destroy' / 62 and statements as to the 
untrustworthiness of Communist forces were underlined. In July 1988, in response to 
Cuban successes in the border war, Malan underlined the threat, stating that while the 
implementation of UN Resolution 435 was a bold and positive step, sight could not be lost 
of Soviet expansionism and Cuban bravado in Angola. Cubans were increasingly seen to be 
the wild card on the subcontinent, and even in February 1989, the Cubans presence was 
shown to be 'tremendously unpredictable' and an extremely dangerous force on the sub-
continent. 
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Thus the Ministry of Defence was slower than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to espouse a 
view of the Soviet Union and its leadership as anything other than an expansionist evil 
empire. When the Soviet based military threat began to fade from National Party 
discourse, the depiction of a Cuban based threat escalated. This was in part, a response 
to events, but it also became clear that the military establishment depended for their 
budget upon the conception of an onslaught. 
4.3. 'The Minimum to Develop Constitutionally': The Military Budget 1985-89 
Between 1985 and 1989, Malan increased the defence budget. The budget for the year 
1985-86 was R4.2bn,Z63 and for the 1988-89 year the budget was R8.2bn. 264 Malan faced 
opposition criticism in each budgetary cycle, and it was particularly vociferous when the 
PFP were the official opposition. In the speeches justifying the increases lists of Soviet 
weaponry laid emphasis on the build up on the borders. It was a fact between 1985 and 
1987 the supply of arms to the Angolan MPLA by the USSR increased. 265 In the budgetary 
debates, Malan scrutinised figures relating to the increase; these numbers were, he 
implied, ample justification for increasing the defence budgets commensurately every 
year until 1989. In 1985, Malan listed 49 attack aircraft, 25 helicopters, 3 transport 
aircraft moved to Angola and created a frightening picture of the armed forces in Angola. 
A list of weaponry created the impression that the increase was out of all proportion of 
need. 1986's budget list was almost as fearsome - Russians had delivered 19 assault 
aircraft, MIG 21s and MIV 23s, a total of 25 helicopters and 21 to Angola alone and a few 
Ml 17s, transport air craft. The number of foreign soldiers in Angola also emphasised the 
severity of the military onslaught on the border. It was stated that Russians and 53,000 
Cubans, 'alien' to the continent were gaining a foothold in Africa. 266 The emphasis on the 
numbers gave the Cuban onslaught terrifying dimensions although the SADF's full time 
army of 95,000 was not of an insignificant size. 267 Soviet weaponry and manpower was 
portrayed as increasingly sophisticated; unnecessary for a civil war. 'I do not know why 
tanks are being given to Angola, ' 268 Malan commented (Defence Appropriation vote, 1986 ). 
The suggestion hung in the air that the tanks were aimed at the RSA. Against this 
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background, Malan suggested, South African increases in defence appropriation were both 
necessary, and proportionate. The rhetoric of the defence budgets, particularly between 
1985 and 1988, emphasised that South Africa was in a war situation; the terminology 
highlighted that a military campaign of significant size and skilful execution was being 
waged against South Africa, and military might was necessary for combat. The war, 
parliament was reminded, was not just against an equal enemy, but against a superpower. 
The scale of the war, emphasised by the figures reeled off, lent impact to the argument 
that the Soviet Union was targeting South Africa via proxy forces in the neighbouring 
states. 
Direct access to the output of the defence establishment has unfortunately not been 
obtained during the course of this study. However, the extracts of papers and white 
papers that have been obtained demonstrate that Malan was an accurate representative of 
the department's views. If anything, Malan softened the emphasis on Soviet driven 
Communist attack that was evidence in departmental White Papers. For example, the 
White Paper on defence of 1986 claimed, 'The revolutionary onslaught (against SA) is 
directed and co-ordinated in such a way by Soviet Russia, as chief planner and initiator, 
that it promotes the execution of the USSR's indirect strategy'. 269 
When the Progressive Federal Party was the official opposition in the House of Assembly 
(until May 1987), the Defence Budget was depicted by the National Party as the single 
most effective method of securing and promoting constitutional development in South 
Africa; the SADF was portrayed as a crucial pillar of South African development and reform 
in the face of the Communist threat. Security was shown to be the very centre, the single 
principle on which South Africa could develop. In the defence budget vote of 1986 
(mentioned above), Malan stated that the amount proposed was the, 'absolute minimum 
to allow SA an opportunity to develop constitutionally along evolutionary lines, with a 
view to ensuring the preservation of Western standards we all want to maintain here. 
Short sighted views about supposedly spending too much on defence would only lead to 
our own debilitation and incapacity and will also destroy our ability to serve Western 
interests, for example safeguarding of the strategic Cape sea route'. 270 Malan showed the 
Communist onslaught was a military threat but in linking the need for military security 
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with the need for constitutional development, he attempted to mollify critics and 
opponents. The alleged Communist threat also enabled Malan to deride any potential 
opposition to budgetary approval as 'short-sighted'. 
By 1989 the Soviet led Communist military onslaught was no longer stressed. In keeping 
with the National Party's diplomatic policy, Malan's Defence Budget speech focused less 
on the Soviet threat, and he submitted that the Soviets had changed their approach and 
were now prepared to reformulate their interests in Southern Africa. 271 However, Malan 
proclaimed that in spite of the changed Soviets' attitude, the revolutionary onslaught 
would not let up. The onslaught was, he warned, going to, 'Increase in intensity. To tell 
the truth, I am very sure that the time scales for this increase ... may be far shorter than 
we generally think'. 272 The fact that until 1988 the Defence Minister had continued to 
refer to the Communist threat in Appropriation Bills demonstrates that the Communist 
threat had become a central feature of the annual budget discourse. The Defence Budget 
relied upon parliament agreeing that increases in defence were necessary, and this in 
turn, relied upon the conception of a Communist military threat. It is significant that in 
1989, while he no longer named the Communist threat, Malan proclaimed that a 
revolutionary onslaught would take place. The notion of an 'onslaught' was a central 
element in party discourse, particularly in military budgetary discourse, which though 
modified, was not abandoned in 1989. Elements within the National Party, as will be seen 
in chapter 7, continued to envisage an onslaught driven by Communist inspired forces as a 
source of South African discontent. 
4.4. 'A Cloak of Respectability': 273 Responses to the End Conscription Campaign and 
Criticism of the Defence Force, 1985-88 
The NP focus on the Communist military onslaught stressed the 'psychological onslaught', 
aimed at, 'The demoralising of the will of the population so that eventually they cannot 
offer enough resistance to the Marxist revolutionary onslaught'. The psychological 
onslaught's principal target, according to the NP, was the Defence Force. 274 
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The Communist revolutionaries' aims to demoralise the army were elucidated on a number 
of occasions; the absolute centrality of an army in anti-revolutionary battle was 
explained. Schapiro's quotation of a speech by Lenin was repeated on a number of 
occasions: 275 if the army was behind the State, then the revolutionaries would not have a 
chance of winning, even with the support of all the people. If the army was behind the 
revolutionaries, the revolutionaries could win even without popular support. In using such 
a quote, Dr Barend L. Geldenhuys (NP, Randfontein) reiterated that the origin of the 
threat was Communism, and the potential outcome of failure to thwart the threat was 
Communism. The quote from Lenin reminded the audience of the foreign, sinister origin 
of Communism. Similarly, soldiers and the public were consistently reminded of the 
centrality of the Defence Force in the fight against Communism, and, particularly in 
speeches on high-profile occasions celebrating the SADF, the Marxist military onslaught 
was emphasised to an unprecedented degree, and the 'forces' of evil referred to. Malan 
stated at the Armistice Day celebrations, 'Our soldiers of today ... are on the frontline of 
the defence of South Africa . . against the evil forces of Marxist expansionism and 
terrorism'. 276 The statement was remarkably nebulous; there was no specific focus for the 
SADF's efforts, but a generalist Marxist, evil enemy. In stressing the centrality of the SADF 
in combating the Marxist onslaught, NP spokespeople elevated the SADF, justified 
increased expenditure on Defence, and directed harsh criticism against anyone who 
protested at National Service or the militarisation of South Africa. 
That the SADF were fighting a foreign enemy and a historical movement heightened the 
patriotism with which the NP portrayed the army. Motions of thanks were passed in the 
House of Assembly, (for example a motion proposed by Adv. Leon Wessels (NP, 
Krugersdorp) in 1987), in praise of, 'The bulwark between the RSA and a Marxist takeover 
[which] has, in years gone by, gone hand in hand with sacrifice, privation and even loss of 
life' .277 Indeed, the most frequent use of anti-Communist rhetoric came in support of the 
Defence Force in parliament. Conversely, passions were strong to the point of being 
vicious when NP spokespeople were defending the SADF; the argument that the Defence 
Force was central in the battle against Communism ultimately meant that opponents of 
any element of the SADF's action or of National Service were dubbed opponents of the 
state. When Jan Van Eck (PFP, Claremont) argued that the war on the border was nothing 
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more than a civil war, he was accused of, 'Talking like a Communist'. 278 Later, when Jan 
Bernardus de Ruyter Van Gend (PFP, Groote Schuur) criticised the indoctrination in the 
SADF, he raised the venom of Dr Johannes Jacobus Vilonel (NP, Langlaagte). The latter 
responded, 'I can only say to him You ain't foolin' nobody - not me and not any normal 
balanced South African, whatever colour or creed, and also not as you know full well, Sir-
the ANC or SACP. They have clearly received his message, and no doubt with gratitude. 
What is more, they will undoubtedly quote his words from the Hansard to strengthen their 
Marxist revolution and propaganda'. 279 The argument that the ANC and the SACP seized 
upon any derogatory reference to the Defence Force held common tenure in the discourse 
of the period. However, Vilonel's lambasting went even further. He later associated the 
Van Eck with 'our [i.e. the PFP's] very own necklace'280 suggesting that the PFP was 
involved in the township violence. Vilonel's arguments reveal the vehemence with which 
members of the National Party defended the Defence Force during the period, and 
highlight that any criticism of the SADF was attributed to being related to the forces of 
revolution. The implication that the member of the PFP was involved in township violence 
was inaccurate and hypocritical. 'Third force' violence in the townships was intimately 
linked to the SADF /SAP, with the connivance of the National Party government. 281 
However, it seemed that such accusations by a member of the NP were justified by the 
fact that this was a 'war' against a 'Communist' enemy. 
The portrayal of a psychological onslaught on the military peaked in 1987, and the 
principal focus was the End Conscription Campaign. The ECC was a single-issue group with 
the aim of increasing awareness of and resistance to the militarisation of society. It made 
no further political prescriptions, allowing it to attract widespread support. As one of the 
Campaign's founding members stressed, the movement was a broad, dynamic and creative 
coalition representing a range of political opinions - liberals, radicals, Marxists, pacifists, 
Christians, humanists. 282 The message of the ECC caused it to be the subject of criticism 
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and vilification by the NP. Laurie Nathan outlined: 'We were subject to merciless 
vilification, the thrust of which was that we were traitors, cowards, 'mommy's boys' (as 
Magnus Malan once put it); that were in bed with Communists and that we were part of 
the revolutionary onslaught against South Africa'. 283 The criticism that the ECC was 
Communist inspired, or a cloak shielding the Communists from exposure, resonated until 
the movement was banned in February 1988. 
NP spokespeople portrayed the End Conscription Campaign as the chief vehicle for the 
Marxist attack on the morale of the military and, 'The most dangerous political movement 
to emerge in the current national crisis'. The movement was equated with that which 
defeated the Americans in Vietnam, namely apathy in the 'front room'. 284 While this was 
a more general reference to the fact that the ECC was damaging a war effort, most 
references made by the NP in parliament regarding the ECC related to the Communist 
threat. It was argued that the ECC was undermining the single greatest bulwark between 
the RSA and a Marxist take-over, 285 and Magnus Malan stated in the House of 
Representative (14 May 1987), that the ECC broke down the country's ability to fight 
Communism. This was a fairly common accusation, against which the ECC fought back 
with a public statement regarding the movement's objectives, but arguments that the 
Campaign was a movement that wished to promote Communism persisted. 286 
The NP's portrayal of the End Conscription Campaign suggested that it was 'doubly 
dangerous'. Not only did it besmirch the Defence Force; it gave the, 'Marxist inspired 
revolutionary forces ... a cloak of respectability'. 287 The End Conscription Campaign were 
depicted as local pawns of Moscow's 'Active Measures' programme via open links with the 
Helsinki based War Resisters International, and deemed to be attempting to overcome 
South Africa, like the rest of Africa, at the expense of 'progress and order' and threatened 
from abroad by international organisations. 288 The NP thus implied that concealed 
beneath the seemingly respectable movement lay another far more sinister movement, 
deliberately shrouding the Marxists and giving the Marxists a secret passageway into the 
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heart of the South African state. The NP simultaneously denied the validity of the ECC's 
cause and portrayed the movement as having a sinister, clandestine motive. This 
depiction of the ECC was evident until the movement's banning in August 1988.289 
After the May 1987 election the NP referred to a different manifestation of the Communist 
psychological onslaught: disunity. It was claimed that Moscow's instructions were to sow 
divisiveness in the population. The need for unity was stressed throughout the debates of 
1987- 1989 as an effective way to combat the onslaught. The country must unite behind 
the SADF - which was the subject of such intense onslaught. The argument was applied to 
those on both the left and the right of the National Party. The Conservative Party was 
criticised for the fact that their hatred of the NP exceeded their love of the fatherland, 
and therefore had failed in its resistance to the psychological onslaught and parliament 
was informed that South Africa's most expensive luxury was the quality of its opposition, 
and its two greatest enemies regarding the psychological onslaught were the PFP and the 
CP. 290 After 1987, the tactic for garnering support in parliament was to exhort the 
opposition to rise above any divisions and to prioritise the combating of the revolutionary 
onslaught. Geldenhuys ominously reminded the House of Assembly of the folly of the 
Russian Orthodox Church - leaders had been arguing about the colour of the priests bands 
in 1917, while the country was on the brink of revolution. The house was exhorted to not 
fall foul of the same petty mindedness and to recognise the need for unity. 291 
In addition to the assistance given to the Communist military by the End Conscription 
Campaign and by the Conservative party, the government portrayed an onslaught of 
'disinformation' by Communist forces. Arguments relating to disinformation peaked at a 
time when the SADF's role in neighbouring states was under scrutiny. When a member of 
the opposition insinuated that NP policy was aggravating the situation on the 
subcontinent, or that they were using the Communist threat to justify their moves, some 
NP spokespeople responded that the opposition were deluded. Geldenhuys declared that 
the PFP's failure to acknowledge the onslaught merely showed to what extent they were 
already the victim of disinformation. 292 But the criticism of 'disinformation' persisted as a 
feature of NP rhetoric in 1988. As a result of stringent restrictions placed upon the media 
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in the State of Emergency (and a new provision in 1987 which empowered the minister of 
home affairs to suspend the publication, production or importation of a periodical or 
appoint a censor to the journal for up to three months) there was a great deal of concern 
in liberal and media circles that the country was not being informed of developments in 
the military sphere. In response to criticism from PFP that the country was being kept in 
the dark, the NP focused upon disinformation, which, they maintained, was aimed at 
telling untruths and played into the hands of the enemy. It was suggested that excessive 
media coverage was a part of revolutionary warfare, and Brigadier J. F. Bosman (NP, 
Germinston District) spoke extensively about disinformation, portraying a situation in 
which a propaganda onslaught on South Africa from beyond the border was being lapped 
up by foreign media. He stated that media bureau like Angolan's AIM, were staffed by, 
'Well trained members of the KGB' who aimed their propaganda at the masses in support 
of a military operation. The House of Assembly was told that their 'right to know' 
necessarily had realistic limitations during a time of such intense security threat and that 
a balance must necessarily be struck between security interests and information interests. 
Disinformation was portrayed as part of the psycho-socio attack, aimed at undermining the 
military. Such social scientific terminology implied that the attack was another co-
ordinated aspect of a Communist onslaught, when in fact, media coverage and the 
questions by the likes of Van Eck were usually attempting to establish the truth behind NP 
obfuscation. 
The National Party's portrayal of a Communist military threat developed from being a 
simple depiction of a military campaign against the Republic. Initially the NP portrayed an 
overtly dangerous, Communist military threat, with weapons of destruction and methods 
of torture. However with transition on the sub-continent, the portrait changed. The NP 
continued to portray a threat of Communism, but the threat was seen to be subtler -
attacking the military through criticism, campaigning against conscription, or not uniting 
behind it. The depiction of a military threat posed by Communism thus changed - from 
being a picture of an overt and deceitful, but still tangible enemy, to being an insidious 
enemy using covert methods of contaminating the population, demoralising them, and 
destroying the will to fight. 
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5. The Socio-Economic Onslaught 
During the later 1980s, there were significant challenges to the South African state, as 
popular resistance spread across the country in the form of school boycotts, strike 
activity, and violent incidents in the townships. Prior to 1985 the National Party 
frequently related such activity to the influence of Communist activists. Indeed, in a 
resolution in 1984, the National Party's programme of principles had laid out the official 
party view of the struggle as being driven by outsiders, and not 'between White and non-
White, but as a struggle between the forces of chaos, violence and suppression on the one 
hand, and a Christian civilisation of law, order and justice on the other'. 293 Thus the 
division between 'socio-economic' and 'political' aspects of the onslaught is difficult to 
draw. However, this chapter discusses the NP's depiction of those aspects of the 'threat' 
that were not specifically related to the ANC-SACP alliance and political negotiation. 
During the later 1980s, as the international Communist threat altered, and the internal 
politics of South Africa also changed, the depiction of the Communist provocation of socio-
economic activity altered. 
Severe upheaval took place in South Africa between 1985 and 1990. In October 1984, as 
Asian and Coloured voters went to the polls and the African councils established by the 
government increased rent charges, the Vaal Triangle erupted into violent discontent. 294 
Violence spread in early 1985 to the Northern Free State and the Port Elizabeth and 
Uitenhage area and ultimately to Natal and the Western Cape. 295 Protest evolved from 
scattered demonstrations relating to specific issues (particularly the declining standards of 
living and new local authorities), to a national campaign against the government's 
reforms. Rent boycotts, school boycotts, and violent attacks on collaborators with the 
regime (policemen, councillors and government buildings) characterised the upheaval. 296 
Violent confrontation between the police and the public occurred on a number of 
occasions; an incident at Uitenhage in March 1985 when police shot 20 participants in a 
peaceful funeral heightened public awareness of the situation. Several thousand troops 
were deployed in the townships backing up the police force, and aided by emergency 
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regulations, this had largely quelled the rebellion by 1987. 297 As discontent amongst 
African communities escalated, and the question whether South Africa was facing a 
'revolutionary situation' was repeatedly raised, the National Party's explanation of, and 
proposals for solutions to, unrest became a crucial aspect of political debate. However, 
the National Party's portrayal of the unrest changed between 1985 and 1989; pivoting 
around the General Election of May 1987, in which the Conservative Party (with 23 seats) 
displaced the PFP as official opposition in the House of Assembly. Although the National 
Party still had a majority (133 of the 178 seats), 298 for the first time since it gained power 
in 1948, the National Party's opposition lay on the right. The party's parliamentary 
rhetoric changed accordingly, demonstrating the confusion caused by having a right-wing 
opponent. 
5.1. 'Experienced and Hardened Advisers': 299 Explanations for Unrest, 1987-89 
Between 1985 and 1987, Nationalist Party members frequently denied that a genuine 
liberation struggle was being conducted across the country. In accordance with the party 
resolution, unrest was frequently blamed upon 'outside agitators', who had 'politicised' 
the populace. According to President Botha, socio-economic statistics of South Africa 
nullified any contention that unrest was legitimate. The President stated that there were 
few if any economic, social and political indicators that did not place the peoples of SA -
white, brown and black - high above any other on the African continent. Ignoring the 
discrepancies between statistics for white and non-white populations, Botha claimed that 
statistics relating to life expectancy, education, income, transport, medical services, 
electricity, political parties and elected leaders refuted any legitimate motives for 
discontent in African communities. Botha contended that the Republic was a paragon of 
high standards: the very fact that people came to South Africa from the rest of the 
continent demonstrated that South African people were not discontent. 'If this is the 
'apartheid' the world is crucifying us for, then perhaps it has done more for South Africa 
than anything else has done for the rest of Africa!'. In denying that unrest could have a 
genuine cause, Botha reverted to the argument that the discontent was imported from an 
external aggressor. Botha attributed the spirit of revolution to the forces of hatred, 'not 
representative of the majority of South Africans'. 
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Botha was not alone in his stance. The NP reiterated over and over again both on the 
domestic political and the international stage that outside influences were causing 
domestic unrest. During a House of Assembly debate on the 'Defence of South African 
Security and Territorial Integrity', Malan claimed that a small, radical element in the 
black residential areas was fomenting unrest. 'It originates with the ANC- we need have 
no doubt whatsoever about this - the extension of the Communist party'. 300 Similarly, in a 
debate on the Police, Louis Le Grange, Minister of Law and Order, stated that the 
'unprecedented' revolutionary onslaught in 1985 was due to, 'experienced and hardened 
advisers [that are] involved in the background'. 301 Unrest, it was implied, was due to an 
unequivocal onslaught from external forces, answerable only by force. The terminology 
suggested that outsiders spearheaded the campaign and that callous individuals were 
stirring up discontent merely to further their own ends, irrespective of the damage 
caused. The stress on the tough and external nature of those involved in the background 
justified and even demanded a tough response, as will be seen below. 
The 'hardened advisers' that the NP suspected of involvement in causing the uprising 
included the United Democratic Front. It was true that the UDF were a key element 
fomenting uprising during 1985 - 1988. Founded in August 1983 by a thousand delegates of 
all races, trade unions, sporting bodies and community groups, by 1985 the UDF claimed a 
membership of two million through over 600 affiliates. 302 The organisational format of the 
front was said to be a stroke of brilliance, for instead of being a unitary mass organisation, 
the UDF's leadership emanated from hundreds of smaller community based organisation 
affiliated with the national body. The government could not detain members of the UDF 
without a mass arrest or detention - which would have caused international outcry. 303 
However, the UDF was banned in 1988, its activities having been inhibited by the State of 
Emergency. 304 
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There was some evidence for the presence of Communists in the UDF (for example, the 
Communist flag was flown at a number of funerals of UDF organisers)/05 however, the 
Front was a heterogeneous group representing far broader interests than just those of 
Communists. 306 National Party spokesmen, however, derided the United Democratic Front 
as having been formed by the ANC and under Communist influence. In an interview with 
Ted Koppel, of Nightline in the United States, P. W. Botha stressed that the UDF was, 
'Communist inspired and aimed at overthrowing the State and good order in this 
country'. 307 The statement hardly needs closer analysis - Botha was using the familiar 
technique of contrasting the 'Communist' force with its discursive moral adversary, 'good 
order'. UDF spokespeople (Dr Farouk Meer, acting President of Natal Indian Congress) 
vociferously dismissed as 'arrogant nonsense' Botha's claims, which had no substantial 
evidence. The revocation in December 1985 of a 588-page indictment against sixteen 
leaders of the UDF appeared to vindicate Meer's stance.308 But Botha and his NP 
colleagues persisted in the claim that the UDF was Communist inspired until the Front was 
banned in February 1988.309 
A report by the President Council (in 1988) asserted that that the ANC and the UDF 'were 
fronts for Communist Russia', 310 and National Party MPs developed an image of the UDF's 
Communist leanings in their speeches. The Minister of Defence claimed that the goal of 
the UDF was the eventual establishment by force of a Marxist system in South Africa and 
that it was 'Little more than an instrument of the South African Communist Party' which, 
he claimed, virtually controlled it as an instrument of international terrorism. 311 Although 
the expression used qualifications such as 'virtually', terms relating to the UDF conveyed 
the National Party's opinion that it was just another instrument of foreign dominated 
Communism. Mr Petrus J. Badenhorst (NP, Oudtshoorn) argued when discussing the UDF 
that 'the people of the Kremlin' initiated the UDF's actions against the RSA and was in 
full-time control of the UDF. 312 It was suggested that the SACP's power penetrated beyond 
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the ANC, right into the community through the UDF. The UDF was derided as nothing 
more than a method and instrument for a socialist government to gain power. 
The argument that forces external to South Africa drove the UDF facilitated the levying of 
the 'patriotic' argument against the UDF's supporters. Symbols of patriotism and 
treachery were referred to in discussions relating to the UDF. National Party Members 
seized upon the unfurling of the Communist party flag at UDF funerals as evidence for this 
argument. P. W. Botha's papers contain a clipping from the front page of the Citizen 
newspaper, showing Alan Boesak, leader of the UDF standing under a Communist flag at a 
UDF funeral. Louis Le Grange demanded an explanation of the Communist flag during a 
debate on the Police; it was claimed that the Communist Party had been in involved in the 
organisation of the funeral. 313 More significantly, by linking the UDF to the SACP and 
'external forces' the NP criticised members of the PFP for their support of elements of the 
UDF, suggesting that this was a betrayal of South Africa. Helen Suzman, long standing 
opposition MP, was taunted in parliament for attendance at UDF funerals. Comments such 
as, 'Does she want us to go with her under the red flag' ,314 and, 'At home under the red 
flag' / 15 conveyed an image of Suzman under the red flag, and suggested a perversion of 
nationalism and patriotism. Their association with the UDF caused the NP to taint Suzman 
and her colleagues as friends of the Communists agitators outside South Africa. 
5.2. 'Revolutionary agents': 316 The School Children's Uprising 
The National Party explained one of the most disturbing elements of the unrest of the 
1980s, the rebellion of school children, with reference to the Communist threat. School 
boycotts had disrupted black education frequently- in 1980 almost no black education had 
happened at all, 317 and by the mid 1980s, the phenomenon was common and numerous 
secondary schools were affected by boycotts during 1985-89. 318 
The National Party offered a complex explanation for the school children's uprising, the 
crux of which related to the Communist influence. Geldenhuys stated that the 
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schoolchildren's uprising were a new example of the phenomenon of the 'revolutionary 
agent' (namely those individuals on the 'first level who have to cause the violence that 
brings about change'). In Russia the revolutionary agent had been the worker, in China 
the peasant, in Europe the student, but in South Africa, the new element added to the 
classical Marxist protocol meant that scholars were being used as revolutionary agents. 319 
Geldenhuys argued that the initiator of the onslaught was without doubt the South African 
Communist Party acting as the agent of Soviet expansionism. 320 Geldenhuys' conjecture 
simplified a baffling element of the unrest of the 1980s. His pseudo-scientific terminology 
lent credence to his argument. The phenomenon of a 'revolutionary agent' sounded as if 
it could have been drawn straight from the textbook of a social scientist, and furthermore, 
by putting a label on the scholars' uprising, Geldenhuys provided an explanation that 
suited the National Party's stance. The implication that Soviet led revolutionaries were 
using the school children simultaneously emphasised the children's innocence and the 
Communist's threatening potential; by stressing that the children themselves were not 
guilty; it emphasised the exploitative nature of the Marxist onslaught. This explanation 
justified security measures, and reform. The answer to the schoolchildren's rebellion was 
not simply to shoot the scholar - but to deal with the social problem, the crisis of 
authority in the Black residential areas which had been exploited to promote Marxism. 
Geldenhuys advocated abandoning the migrant labour system, in order to provide paternal 
role models in those areas. The tenor of his speech and the complex explanation given 
for the uprising, however, drew attention away from the weakness of government 
legislation and emphasised that the threat was due to outside influences. 
As with many aspects of the social Communist onslaught, the NP portrayed the situation as 
being one not just of local, but of global significance. Piet G. Marais (NP, Stellenbosch) 
commented that the unrest in schools was part of a 'world-wide assault [in education] by 
Marxist-Leninism on the existing order'. 321 In portraying the rebellion in this way, the MP 
created the impression that other countries as well as South Africa were under threat. 
Like Geldenhuys, Marais focused on the methods for countering discontent, but by blaming 
the threat of Marxist Leninism, avoided broaching the uncomfortable subject of the true 
origins of schoolchildren's discontent. 
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5.3. 'Defusing Revolutionary Unrest': 322 Justifying Security Measures and the State of 
Emergency, 1985-87 
Drastic steps were taken by the Government to contain and curtail violence. In July 1985 
a State of Emergency was imposed on 36 districts. 323 It was temporarily lifted in March the 
following year, before being re-imposed nation-wide in June 1986. 324 The emergency 
regulations empowered police commissioners to restrict the movements and access of 
people, or to confine and remove them, to control services and protect installations, and 
to distribute or withhold information. In addition the army was used extensively to 
control violence in the townships. 325 The elaborate network of security committees 
established under the total strategy gained a 'free hand' under the State of Emergency. A 
powerful State Security Council headed by P. W. Both a served as a permanent cabinet 
secretariat headed by a general from the military intelligence. In March 1986, the extent 
of the structure was partially revealed to the public when General Magnus Malan (Minister 
of Defence) acknowledged the presence of 12 Joint Management Centres, which were, he 
said, 'A lean, highly effective mobile mechanism to defuse revolutionary unrest'. 326 These 
structures were backed up by almost 500 joint monitoring structures, which brought 
military police and civil structures under the chairmanship of one ranking military office, 
which could gain access to the State President's office within hours. The structures meant 
that any issue could potentially be a security issue. 327 
The prevalent NP attitude that unrest was caused by Communist agitators was used to 
justify the NP's continued elevation of security to a central issue of government policy and 
discourse, and the increased use of the army in domestic incidences. The most viable 
response to a Communist onslaught, according to the Party, was to suppress dissent and 
clamp down on uprisings. Security was at the nub of the National Party policy and 
discourse during 1985-87. The NP acted as if the country were fighting a war against a 
foreign enemy. 
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During 1985-87, the NP undertook some reform. Significant aspects of the apartheid 
system were dismantled. In September 1985, Botha announced citizenship would be 
restored to all Africans residing permanently in white South Africa. 328 The Mixed Marriages 
Act of 1949, and Section 16 of the Immorality Act of 1957 were repealed. Inter racial 
mixing was no longer forbidden. The Black Communities Development Act of 1986 
conceded Africans the right to property ownership in urban areas. The abolition of the 
Influx Control Act repealed the pass laws and removed one of the most potent symbol of 
white domination. 329 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, talk of further constitutional 
change abounded. There were categorical denials of one-man-one-vote, which would lead 
to 'group domination' and 'black majority rule'. But it was suggested that although 
'democratic ideals would have to be realised in a novel way', 330 Africans would be allowed 
to participate in structures up to the 'highest level' of government'. 331 However, the NP's 
discourse reflected the party's perception that reform itself was not the answer to the 
Communist threat; in the party's view, that socio-economic unrest was Communist 
inspired justified a slow pace of reform or 'evolutionary reform', and parliamentary 
discourse emphasised the need for security instead. 
Reform, it was stressed by the NP during this period, could only take place under the 
umbrella of security. It was frequently stated that security (and particularly, large 
defence budgets) enabled the country 'to develop along evolutionary lines' 332 and reform 
must necessarily take place at an 'evolutionary' pace. Anything faster was seen to be 
giving in to the demands of the revolutionaries (as, it was argued, the PFP would). 333 The 
phrase 'evolutionary reform' was frequently used in NP terminology. It was deemed 
necessary to, distinguish between on the one hand, the 'just demands' of South Africa's 
population in all spheres - constitutional, political socio-economic and social, and, 'The 
Communist danger which is also threatening this country on the other hand' (Meiring). 334 
The dividing line between 'just' reforms and 'the Communist danger' was significant. It 
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seemed that the Party dubbed those reforms 'Just' reforms which they had engineered 
and sanctioned. (For example, J. Christian (Chris) Heunis, Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Planning, defended the Group Areas Act's protection of individual rights 
as the only defence against Communism); 335 the Communist danger was embodied in the 
demands of the ANC-SACP, UDF and even the PFP. In this way, members of the NP prior 
to the May 1987 election frequently defended the status quo or moderate changes thereto 
as the right defence against Communism. 
Another key element of the NP's argument prior to 1987 was that reform could not be the 
only solution. Symptomatic of the Party's attitude was the argument put by Willem J. 
Hefer (NP, Standerton) that, 'It would be glib to suggest that an immediate repeal of 
South Africa's race laws would solve the whole problem and signal a warm welcome back 
into the world community. South Africa is a bigger piece than that on the superpower's 
chessboard. Nor would a rapprochement between the races in South Africa cause Moscow 
to cease coveting the mineral riches and strategic location of the Republic'. 336 The 
statement conveyed a sense that South Africa was merely being played with in a grand 
power game, (in which, it was implied by the second sentence, the Russian's were more 
covetous than their American counterparts). More significantly, Hefer's warning 
(addressed to Fredrick Van Zyl Slabbert, Leader of the Official Opposition (PFP)), that 
reform would not solve South Africa's problems suggested that there were more effective 
methods of combating the Communist threat. It also used the Communist threat to deny 
the ·rationale of reform. 
5.4. ' •• Good Health Services and Prosperity ... the Answer to Communism?': Rationale 
For Reform, 1987-89 
In the May 1987 General Election, the National Party sought a mandate for 'reform' based 
on 'security', 337 and the Conservative Party displaced the PFP as official opposition. In 
addition, across the country, the domestic situation began to change. The 
implementation of a State of Emergency in June 1985 and June 1986 (thereafter renewed 
annually) meant that violent unrest was quietened to some degree. The National Party's 
discourse relating to the revolutionary threat in the domestic sphere altered. In 
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parliament, a more sop_histicated analysis of the causes of and potential solutions to the 
unrest began to infuse NP statements. The emphasis turned to evolutionary reform to 
quell the threat of Communism; this was accompanied by a more sophisticated analysis of 
the cause of violence and unrest. References to the Communist military onslaught did not 
cease after May 1987, but the nature of references to the Communist threat in the socio-
economic sphere changed. 
It is true that the NP continued to repress dissent after 1987, and when it did so, it 
portrayed the source of that dissent as being Communist inspired. For example, strictures 
against the UDF and COSATU were couched in anti-Communistic terms. In March 1988, the 
Minister of Law and Order, defending the banning of several organisations spoke of the 
government's decision, 'in favour of Christianity and against Marxism and Communism'. 338 
The government's depiction of COSATU, which before 1987 had not tended to focus on 
'Communist' links with the Trade Union, repeatedly associated COSATU with Marxism 
during 1988. When COSATU was restricted to strictly trade-union activities in 1988, it was 
suggested that this was necessary in order to prevent it acting as another Communist front 
organisation. Johannes W. Maree, (NP, Klip River) spoke of the organisations' 'devilish 
work' and their desire to establish a Communist community. 339 The Minister of Law and 
Order stated in the House of Representatives that the government had to take action 
against certain organisations and persons that the ANC described as fighting allies. He 
stated that in 'Problems of Communism', the UDF had been described as a key 
organisation for the ANC and COSATU was described as the second key organisation. The 
Minister stressed that COSATU was, 'The second important tool of this Communist 
controlled organisation. COSATU is openly and vocally anti capitalist and pro-ANC'. 340 
Thus the repressive measures post 1987 continued to be couched in anti-Communist 
terminology. 
After May 1987 need for a constructive reform programme to combat the influence of 
Communism in the townships was widely acknowledged amongst party spokespeople. Few 
statements during 1987-89 suggested that the Communist threat had been eliminated. It 
was tacitly acknowledged that the 'threat' still existed. But, instead of positing more and 
more military measures as a response to the threat, the discourse of 1987-89 emphasised 
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reform measures. A number of significant speeches illustrate the point. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs' preceded most of his nationalist colleagues in positing a proactive, social 
welfare method for combating the Communist threat. In a significant speech during the 
debate on the motion of censure in 1987, Pik Botha argued that the struggle now awaiting 
SA was between power sharing and a power take-over. Those who advocated power 
sharing suggested the prosperity and the freedoms of the country be shared. Would it not, 
argued Botha, 'Contribute to a safer South Africa if the vast majority of Blacks were home 
owners and landowners; if they felt safe in this country and if they could share in a system 
they felt was fair, which benefited them with good health services and prosperity? That is 
the answer to Communism'. 341 Both a was addressing the CP, who had put forward the 
motion. His argument suggested not that the Communist threat should be discounted, but 
that the threat should be met with a positive, constructive social response, rather than a 
negative, repressive one. The speech was emotive, using rhetorical questions to 
emphasise the plight of the poor African. It marked a decisive move away from the 
arguments of the previous years that the Africans were lapping up the Communist 
propaganda and that the principal solution should revolve around security measures. 
Instead, Botha's speech posited reform to counter the socio-economic aspects of the 
Communist onslaught. Botha's speech did not divert from the NP policy of perceiving the 
uprisings in terms of an external onslaught. Indeed, by drawing the line between those 
advocating power sharing and a power takeover, Botha drew upon the NP's construct of a 
dividing line between radicals and moderates. But in suggesting that reform could counter 
the problem, Pik Botha acknowledged that there was genuine socio-economic and even 
political discontent in the townships. 
Ministers of all shades of opinion, after May 1987, followed Pik Botha's example and 
focused on the need for positive social action rather than simple repressive measures. 
F. W. de Klerk, for example, (who, as Minister of National Education, had not been known 
for progressive views)342 responded to Conservative Party challenges about educational 
reform saying that a 'realistic response' to the threat was needed. Conservative MP Dr 
Ferdinand Hartzenberg held that Black education was used as a vehicle to 
'promote ... Communist aims' and the solution lay in a system of ethnic education. De Klerk 
applauded the State of Emergency which had ensured the return of normality, but stressed 
that equal educational opportunities were best and asked, whether, 'The Communists do 
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not precisely want the government to abandon its ideal of providing equal educational 
opportunities?' 343 The question was an almost verbatim reiteration of a frequent PFP jibe 
at the NP, and it demonstrated that the NP were challenged by the threat from the right 
and were forced, particularly after 1987, to adopt aspects of the rhetoric of their more 
liberal opponents. 
Even members of the defence and security establishment spoke of the necessity of reform. 
In September 1987, Magnus Malan talked of six important requirements to help South 
Africa overcome the revolutionary onslaught (which, he made plain, had as it final goal 
the implementation of Communist ideology). The requirements as well as 'law, order and 
stability' included, effective third level structures, housing, job opportunities, education 
and training and a strike prevention plan. 344 Malan's exposition of a six-pronged strategy 
demonstrated how the National Party's attitude towards defeating the Communist threat 
had developed, and how the Party was prepared to discuss at length the more socially 
constructive aspects of their programme. That a Defence Minister, (whose speeches prior 
to 1987 had served to endorse his reputation as a 'cold war warrior') was prepared to 
consider such wide reaching changes, demonstrated the extent to which the need to 
change the portrayal of the necessary response to the Communist threat had taken seed 
within the party. Other pro-defence MPs made similar speeches. Geldenhuys when 
referring to 'Evolutionary Reform' claimed that, 'For a Marxist inspired revolutionary 
every manifestation of political reform is in fact, counter productive'. 345 
One of the key precepts of the 'total strategy', that reform was an essential feature of 
combating the Communist threat, was thus elucidated more clearly in Nationalist 
discourse after 1987. This may have been influenced by the fact that the NP faced 
clamorous opposition from the Conservative Party who challenged the NP's reform 
programme as a fatal course of action. 346 The NP therefore had to address these 
complaints, either covertly or overtly, and in the speech cited above Geldenhuys had 
made explicit that he was speaking for 'the Conservative Party's benefit'. 347 
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Members of the National Party referred increasingly after May 1987 to 'winning hearts and 
minds' 348 and to the notion of a 20-80% strategy for combating revolutionary onslaught. 
The dual-pronged nature of the 20-80% strategy is seldom appreciated by commentators. 
The NP recognised the need for more than just a security response to the uprising and 
onslaught, and couched this terms of military action being, as Dr J.A. Vilonel elucidated, 
'only 20% of their action. 80% is social, economic and political action'. 349 The emphasis in 
NP rhetoric was increasingly placed on the 80% of non-violent action, particularly after 
1987. Vigorous action was taken to eliminate discontent as Allister Sparks recounts. 350 
Secondly, the 20%-80% strategy dictated that the government needed to gain a 'critical 
mass of moderate support', 351 (20% of the African population according to some 
securocrats), and then the remaining 80% would cease to be the support base of the 
revolutionary movement and would swing over to support the government. 352 The second 
prong of the 20%-80% principle received some attention in the discourse after the election 
of May 1987. Both elements of the 20-80% strategy tapped into John McCuen's counter-
revolutionary theory - firstly that the onslaught should be combated using a plethora of 
methods, and that security should only be one of those methods (see Chapter 1 ), and 
secondly, that the 'apolitical majority' would be won over by the change of allegiance of 
a small body of approximately 20% of the population. References to the 20/80% principle 
were absent from NP parliamentary discourse during 1985-87, but were more frequent 
during 1987 and 1988. 
In the 20-80% strategy lay the roots of the NP government's misinterpretation of the 
situation across South Africa. For the 20%-80% notion reflected the National Party's belief 
that they were countering a revolutionary onslaught driven by outsiders; a Communist 
threat. McCuen's strategy, effective as it might have been had the threat been driven 
entirely by outsiders, was not as usefully applicable to South Africa. The masses were not 
apolitical, to be won over by piecemeal reform and bread and butter issues, or swayed by 
the crushing of a small number of their leaders. 353 Neither was the onslaught driven by a 
minority group of Communists who, once dealt with would be rebuffed by counter-
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revolutionary strategy. Therefore although the NP's conception of the most effective 
response to a Communist onslaught became more sophisticated during the late 1980s, the 
perception of a Communist threat was not sufficiently realistic to counteract the ANC. 
Furthermore, as will be seen in the next chapter, the NP remained hostile to what it 
perceived as the ANC's Communist nature, and so continued to deny what the ANC wanted 
above all else -democracy for all South Africans. 
The depiction of the socio-economic threat therefore altered substantially between 1985 
and 1989, pivoting primarily around the May 1987 election. After the election and in the 
face of opposition from a Conservative Party that claimed that Africans were not by 
nature democratic (thereby denying them the right to any political power)354 and that 
placed an even stronger emphasis on the threat of Communism, the NP discourse relating 
to the Communist threat in the socio-economic sphere changed significantly. By 1989, 
when discussing socio-economic problems, the National Party did not deny the Communist 
threat, but they no longer emphasised it. The Party also stressed that the most effective 
method for combating the threat was reform - rather than security. But the internal 
inconsistencies of the NP's argument were visible after 1987. Acknowledgement that the 
Communist threat could be countered by reform undermined the argument that the 
onslaught was external, since it suggested that it could be combated at home amongst 
unhappy citizens; which could not fail to imply (in spite of McCuen's rather convoluted 
arguments) that the source of the discontent was internal rather than external. The NP's 
changing perception and portrayal of the Communist threat reflected their difficulty in 
adjusting to a new locus of opposition, from the right rather than the left wing. The fact 
that the threat was seen to be soluble through far reaching socio-economic changes 
inadvertently furthered the argument of the left wing, that the political onslaught could 
be combated through far reaching (and not merely superficial) political changes. The 
fragmentation of views relating to the Communist threat in the socio-economic sphere 
reflected the confusion of a party for whom anti-Communism, as well as apartheid, had 
been central to their grasp on power. 
354 SAIRR, Suryey. 1986, p.xx. 
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6. The Religious Onslaught 
Significant developments took place in the sphere of organised religion in the 1980s. The 
Dutch Reformed Church, known colloquially as the 'National Party at prayer', 355 had 
pressure placed upon it by churches within and outside South Africa to reject the doctrine 
and practices of apartheid, and in 1985 and 1986 the impact of this upon NP rhetoric can 
be discerned. The swelling of revulsion with apartheid in the ranks of organised 
Christianity (which had developed under the influence of inter alia the South African 
Council of Churches and the Black Consciousness movement) was epitomised by a charter 
drawn up by the Alliance of Black Reformed Christians in 1981. The Charter stated that 
the, moral and theological justification of apartheid was heretical, a travesty of the 
Gospel and a betrayal of the Reformed tradition. 356 The Anglican church later made a 
similar declaration. In 1982, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches in Ottawa accepted 
the indictment of apartheid, suspending the Dutch Reformed Church and ultimately 
causing one branch, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk to resign and the main branch 
(Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk) to stop paying fees. 357 The publication of the Kairos 
document by fifty theologians from all races and denominations in September 1985 gave a 
theological critique of the state's use of concepts such as law and order, divine right, and 
the threat of Communism in the political crisis in South Africa. The Afrikaans churches 
document, 'Church and Society, a witness of the DRC' was more cautious, but it 
articulated that the 'application of apartheid as a political and social system by which 
human dignity is adversely affected, and whereby one political group is detrimentally 
suppressed by another, cannot be accepted on Christian-ethical grounds'. 358 Christians' 
role in combating apartheid took on a higher international profile during the 1980s, when 
Bishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1984), in recognition of his non-
violent campaign to limit international trade and investment activities in South Africa and 
became Archbishop of Cape Town and head of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa 
(1986). 359 Thus the National Party was confronted with a swelling of religious opinion 
against apartheid and church leadership that promoted eloquent African leaders as a 
355 Mark R. Amstutz, Failure and Hope: Church and state In South Africa, Christianity Today, March 2000. 
356 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p.285. 
357 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p.287. 
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statement of their non-racial intentions360 and openly and effectively supported an 
international sanctions campaign. 
The NP's response was predictably defensive. References to Communism frequently 
outlined its evil nature, opposed to the kingdom of God (as outlined in Chapter 3.2). 
Willem J. Cuyler (NP, Roodeport) in a debate on the Appropriation Bill quoted Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn to emphasise the threat that the NP believed Communism posed to 
Christianity. 'The world has never before known a Godlessness so organised, militarised 
and tenaciously malevolent as that preached by Marxists. Within the philosophical system, 
of Marx and Lenin and at the heart of their psychology, hatred of God is the principal 
driving force, more fundamental than all their political and economic pretensions'. 361 The 
reference to organised and militarised Godlessness had connotations of the battlefield and 
wartime. The use of the word 'Godlessness' suggested a dangerous-sounding vacuum at 
the very core of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and thus implied that the philosophy was 
inherently evil. The implication was that to give in to Marxism would be to inaugurate a 
spiritual ice age. Marxism was also characterised as fraudulent. At a later stage of the 
same debate, P. W. Botha showed how men of religion in other countries had been drawn 
to a supposed freedom struggle. He quoted from an open letter from two Vietnamese 
refugees in the US to a South African bishop, urging him not to get involved. 'You will 
realise that you have turned away from God and his people and that you are being 
manipulated by Communists'. 362 For the religious members of parliament, the chilling 
description implied that South African churches were in danger of being duped by and 
manipulated by revolutionaries into conceding defeat - a defeat which would ultimately 
spell their own downfall. Like the Vietnamese Revered Tran Huu Than those men of 
religion - or otherwise, who supported the anti-government movements might end up in 
prison. 
The threat posed to the regime by liberation theology (as enshrined in the Kairos 
Document) was examined in parliament. The Kairos document had argued that the South 
African government had its own concrete symbol of evil and of hell and that the South 
African state had invented, or taken over, the myth of Communism in order to frighten 
360 Davenport a Saunders, South Africa, p.684. 
361 Hansard, House of Assembly, 9 Apr111986, col. 2969. 
362 Hansard, House of Assembly, 17 Apr111986, col. 3597. 
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people into accepting any kind of domination and exploitation. 363 In the NP's rhetorical 
response, the Party proclaimed the danger of liberation theology and liberation 
theologians. 364 It was claimed that liberation theology was not true theology. For 
example, Meiring in a speech on the Kairos document in June 1986, termed liberation 
theology, 'Christian Marxism' which differed from genuine Christianity in several ways: it 
was person oriented not church oriented; it was humanist and not Christian; it had its 
origin in Marxism instead of the bible; it was, 'Political ideology based on Marxist theory' 
and a smoke screen behind which the Marxists hid in order to twist people in South Africa, 
'Around their little fingers'. 365 Meiring created a picture of a dangerous, manipulative 
theological deception and in analysing the document the MP attempted to undermine its 
very origin - suggesting that those who wrote the document were not true Christians. 
In analysing the Kairos document, Alwyn F. Fouche (NP, Witbank) claimed that Christianity 
in South Africa was at an hour of crisis and that some churches were promoting the 
objectives of Communism, becoming part of the problem, rather than part of the search 
for solutions. He exhorted Christian leaders to, 'Unite against the onslaught of Communist 
enslavement in the time which we are living' and sought to discredit those churches that 
opposed the apartheid system by implying that they might be midwifes to a system of 
Communist enslavement. 366 He advocated that Church function separately from the 
State, though the Government must endorse Christian principles and apply them in the 
management of the country, and simultaneously tried to invoke a spirit of unity and to 
unite the church behind the NP. The message of the speech was that unity, and unity 
behind the NP's policies, was needed to combat the Communist threat. 
A principal target of the NP's (in particular P. W. Botha's) anti-Communist venom was 
Bishop Desmond Tutu. Statements (particularly when provoked by Tutu's actions) 
frequently questioned whether Tutu was driven by Communistic motives, and implied that 
he was. For example, in March 1988, when Tutu had petitioned against the banning of 
seventeen organisations and the proposed execution of the 'Sharpeville Six' (a group 
which had been found by a court to be responsible for killing a town councillor in the Vaal 
363 htto://www.bethel.edu/-letnle/AfrfcanChrfstfanlty/SAKalros.html 
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triangle in September 1984 )367 Botha responded in a letter which was later publicised 
extensively. Tutu was asked, 'Whether you are acting on behalf of the kingdom of God or 
the kingdom promised by the ANC and the SACP?' 368 The letter questioned Tutu's 
understanding of evil: 'Is atheistic Marxism the evil, or does your view of evil include the 
struggle on behalf of Christianity, the Christian faith, the freedom of faith and worship 
and against the forces of godlessness and Marxism?' 369 The President suggested that the 
ANC/SACP and Christianity were dichotomously opposed and that the Archbishop was 
confusing the two, or even deliberately mimicking or acting on behalf of the former. 
Botha highlighted phrases from Tutu's letter, (which were simply statements of the need 
for a democratic approach) 'people's organisations', 'democratic activity', and 'the 
struggle for justice and peace' in Tutu's petition, and quoting an extract from Radio 
Freedom (the ANC's radio station), he underlined where the same or similar phrases had 
been used, implying that the Archbishop was merely echoing the ANC/SACP alliance's 
phraseology. The letter was a typical example of the President's contortion of the 
evidence in order to confirm that an individual opposed to the NP regime had Communistic 
leanings. Later in 1988, when Tutu visited the USSR, the Minister of Law and Order, 
Adriaan Vlok repeated Botha's criticism. 370 Although Tutu deflected the criticism 
extensively, (stating in the second instance that, 'I cannot waste my time responding to 
such utter nonsense, especially when Mr Vlok knows it is nonsense') the criticism persisted 
until1989. 
While church leaders who criticised the regime were subjected to verbal attack and 
criticism suggesting that they were Communist inspired, loyal churches (in particular the 
Zionist Christian Church) were praised and preached at in the virtues of loyalty. In April 
1985, in a publicity coup the President spoke at a gathering of the Zionist Christian Church 
at Moira. 371 The speech warned the congregation of the, 'Forces of darkness and evil', 
the, 'Messengers of terror' and exhorted them that South Africa would not 'Tolerate the 
people who come from far away with evil minds to kill and injure innocent people, ' 372 and 
367 Tutu, The Rainbow Peoo!e of God, p.145. 
368 P.W. Botha, Letter to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, March 1988.[ /NEG}, PV 203 P5/13/32/1. 
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presented himself as a divinely sanctioned ruler. 373 The white population were consistently 
reminded that their president had addressed the largest African Church in the country, 
and a special edition supplement of the South African Digest, the President's speech was 
reported and distributed around the world. Those churches loyal to the regime were 
characterised as legitimate and Christian, while those critical of the regime were deemed 
to be Marxist inspired and ultimately Godless. 
The notion of a Communist threat to religion was employed as a rhetorical device when it 
seemed to the NP expedient to do so. The Communist threat was highlighted as corrosive 
to the very core of the spiritual foundation of the nation - a Communist regime would 
herald 'Godlessness'. For the Afrikaans audience, who were often deeply religious, 374 fear 
of Communist atheism must have been potent. As churches increasingly criticised the 
apartheid regime, the threat of Communism was often referred to. Tutu was a particular 
focus for tainting as a Communist. 
373 Sparks, Allister, The Mind of South Africa, p.296. 
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7. The Political onslaught 
During 1985-89, the National Party devoted consistent attention to the political threat 
posed by the perceived Communist onslaught. As has been shown, the depiction of the 
international, military and socio-economic aspects of the Communist threat changed 
substantially, but the discussion of the political threat remained common and largely 
unchanged until 1989. As discussed previously, the political onslaught could not be 
divorced from the other aspects of the Communist onslaught. But, as will be 
demonstrated, while other aspects of the perceived Communist onslaught were brought 
under control (through reform and repression) or resolved (through the settlement of the 
Namibian situation) the political situation remained unsolved. Consequently, the NP's 
portrayal of a political threat from Communists continued right up until 1990. 
Between 1985 and 1987, international and South African attitudes to the inclusion of the 
ANC in a negotiated settlement changed. Members of the international community made 
tentative overtures to the ANC. Under Thatcher's leadership, the British government had 
initially been reluctant to acknowledge the ANC as anything other than a terrorist 
organisation, but in 1986 international and domestic pressure impacted upon the British 
government's policy. The EPG's abortive visit (March to May 1986) to South Africa was 
followed in June 1986 by a meeting between Mrs Lynda Chalker, Minister of State at the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and an ANC representative and in and in 
September 1986, Oliver Tambo met Geoffrey Howe. 375 Progress between the ANC and US 
diplomats followed a similar pattern; tentative contacts were made when Representatives 
of the ANC met US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker in 
October 1986,376 followed in January 1987 by a meeting between Secretary of State 
George Schultz and Oliver Tambo. 377 Such meetings enabled probing questions about the 
ANC's economic, social and political policies. Mr Schultz for example, expressed concern 
that the apartheid system would be replaced by another form of unrepresentative 
government. 378 The National Party portrayed the meetings as an exposure of the ANC as 
terrorists, 'with direct links to Moscow'. 379 However, meetings between the ANC and 
375SAIRR, Survev.1986 Part 1, p.137. 
376 SAIRR, Survey. 1986. Part 1, p.137. 
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others enabled the ANC to air their views, without the National Party's prohibitions and 
distortions. 
Internationally, academics challenged the NP's portrayal of the Communist Party, and 
reports by the EPG and the State Department in the US echoed the views of the academic 
reappraisal. Although, the journal 'Problems of Communism' held a pessimistic opinion of 
the SACP's dominance of the ANC, 380 many academics of stature argued that the ANC was 
not dominated by the SACP, and these academics clearly held influence. Tom Lodge, a 
South African historian, played down the role of the Communist influence in the ANC, and 
Thomas Karis, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the City College of the City 
University of New York, wrote convincingly in Foreign Affairs that the ANC's strength lay in 
its stature as a national movement rather than a party, iterating that most students of 
South African politics did not believe that the ANC was dominated or controlled by the 
South African Communist Party. 381 The report of the EPG, and a report by Washington's 
State Department on the Communist influence in South Africa accommodated such views 
and demonstrated the National Party's portrayal of Communist influence was no longer 
accepted as a true picture. The EPG's Report claimed that the NP's exploitation of white 
fears and creation of a picture of the ANC as wedded to Marxism was a 'tragedy'. 382 The 
US State Department's report viewed the SACP's role in the alliance with caution and 
hostility, but questioned the ideological and numerical dominance of the alliance by the 
SACP (as posited by the National Party). The non-Communist leaders of the ANC were 
deemed to have considerable counter-leverage and it was unequivocally stated that 
government intransigence would aid the ANC 's radical wing, affording the ANC the luxury 
of postponing discussion of the real issues within its own ranks. 383 Thus a reappraisal of 
the Communist influence and potential influence accompanied the increased interface 
between the international community and the ANC. 
380 Radu, Michael 'The African National Cont~ress Cadres and Credo' pp. 58-81. 
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Meanwhile members of the South African business community (led by Anglo American 
Chairman, Gavin Relly) visited the ANC in October 1985; representatives from the PFP and 
from Stellenbosch University followed later that year. 384 In 1986, Chairman of the 
Broederbond, Pieter de Lange, held a discussion with Thabo Mbeki (then ANC information 
director) in New York. In July 1987, sixty-one white South African intellectuals - the 
majority Afrikaners, led by Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert (who resigned from parliament in 
February 1986) went to Dakar, Senegal and held three days of talks with seventeen 
members of the ANC. Significantly, members of the NP establishment also commenced 
covert discussions with the ANC. Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee visited Nelson Mandela 
while he was in hospital for surgery; the bedside meeting culminated in a series of twelve 
secret meetings beginning in November 1985. 385 Late in 1987, Coetsee proposed Mandela 
meet with a team of four, headed by Dr Nii:H Barnard, the thirty-six year old head of the 
National Intelligence Service, and meetings commenced in May 1988. Meetings went over 
the old arguments: violence; nationalisation; Communism. 386 In November 1987, with 
Botha's knowledge, a British mining house officer, Goldfields organised a series of secret 
meetings in England between prominent Afrikaners and ANC leaders. 387 In July 1989, P.W. 
Botha agreed to see Nelson Mandela at his residence in Tuynhuys. 
At the same time, the ANC's attitude to negotiation evolved. During 1987-89, the ANC 
pushed forward a campaign to establish dialogue with the United States and Western 
European governments and business, and white South Africans opposed to apartheid but 
unwilling to identify fully with the UDF. However, the movement ostensibly stepped up its 
opposition to the government and declared after the consultative conference at Kabwe in 
July 1985 that the peoples' war would be intensified in order to make South Africa 
ungovernable388 and deemed 1986 to be the 'year of the people's army'. 389 1988 was 
declared to be the year of united action towards people's power. The ANC refused to 
cease the armed struggle or abandon its links with the South African Communist Party and 
383 The Cape Times, 'Government lntransfaence will aid ANC's radical wing' 20 January 1987. 
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therefore to negotiate on the terms demanded by the government. Numerous 
declarations to this end were made from Lusaka, reminding the government that the ANC 
would not dissolve links with former allies. A document of October 1987, for example, 
stated that the ANC would not bow down to pressures intended to drive a wedge between 
it and the SACP, nor would they submit to attempts to divide or weaken the movement by 
conducting a 'witch-hunt' on the basis of ideological belief. 390 Prior to meeting Botha, 
Mandela issued a document in June 1989 rejecting the charge that the ANC was dominated 
by the SACP, highlighting that the movement was non-aligned and pointing out the NP's 
inconsistency when it negotiated with Marxist neighbours but refused to negotiate with 
Marxist within its own polity. The document asked, 'Which man of honour will ever desert 
a life long friend at the instance of a common opponent and still retain a measure of 
credibility among his people?' 
However, in spite of the commitment to the SACP declared by members of the ANC, a 
reappraisal in the ANC's policy was discernible, and iterations by the SACP also suggested 
that a new direction might be imminent. Joe Slovo stated in an interview in March 1987 
that he believed that transition in South Africa would come through negotiation, and that 
he would be the first to say 'let's do it' to any prospect of settling peacefully. 391 The 
ANC, while maintaining a suspicion of the government's approach and dedication to the 
principles of the Freedom Charter, between 1987 and 1989 issued documents that implied 
a willingness to negotiate under certain conditions. In October 1987, the ANC National 
Executive Committee endorsed negotiations under certain provisos: the release of political 
prisoners, lifting of the State of Emergency and withdrawal of the SADF from townships, 
the repeal of 'politically repressive laws', the end of the Bantustan system, and the 
permission for unconditional return of political exiles. 392 The 'Constitutional Guidelines 
for a Democratic South Africa' of July 1988 laid down the ANC's vision for the future of 
South Africa including inter aUa a mixed economy, a multiparty democracy in a unitary 
state, and the protection of cultural and language rights. 393 In 1989, the Organisation of 
African Unity adopted the ANC's guidelines for negotiation as the 'Harare Declaration' (as 
had been discussed by the NEC in October 1987). The declaration committed the ANC to 
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intensifying the liberation struggle and the drive to mobilise international pressures but it 
also stated that circumstances existed in which the ANC could negotiate. 
7.1. .. 'Also Members of the SACP' .. Depictions of the ANC alliance 1985-87 
This chapter focuses on the NP's analysis and depiction of the Communist's influence on 
the ANC during 1985-87. The NP's single most prominent contention regarding the ANC 
endured until 1989. The NP claimed that the South African Communist Party was in 
control of the organisation, had been since the late 1950s, and therefore the ANC was a 
Communist controlled organisation. (Communists were depicted, as discussed in Chapter 
3.2, as dangerous, power-ravenous and evil creatures). In 1985-87, the Communist 
domination of the ANC was frequently posited as the single reason why negotiation with 
the ANC should be avoided; this view was propagated internationally. 394 SACP domination 
of the ANC was subject to both qualitative and quantitative analysis during the years 1985-
87. 
Members of the National Party depicted the South African Communist Party as being 
dominant numerically within the ANC. During 1985 and 1986, scant attention was paid to 
the ideology of the ANC, their aim was dismissed as 'one man, one vote .. [which would] 
cause the greatest blood bath this country has ever seen', without any further explanation 
or exploration. 395 Instead, statements relating to the ANC focused on the number of SACP 
members within the ANC executive. While the real number of SACP members was not 
known, statistics relating to the numerical dominance of SACP members on the ANC 
executive were frequently quoted to emphasise SACP domination of the ANC. Estimates of 
the number of SACP members on the ANC varied, however Daniel J. Nel's (NP, Pretoria 
Central) assertion in the House of Assembly that, '23 out of 30 members of the ANC 
executive are either members of the SACP or supporters' was not atypical. 396 Nel 
repeated the same information twice, expounding the point and underlining the 
magnitude of the problem. Statistics were also laid out to undermine the credibility of 
those who argued that the ANC should be unbanned, and to make the proponent of 
negotiation look ignorant or stupid. Fredrick Van Zyl Slabbert's suggestion that 
394 In March 1985, P.W. Botha claimed unequivocally on American television that the ANC was under the control of the SACP., Cape Times, 18 
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Communists did not dominate the ANC was met with the implication that he was unable to 
perform basic arithmetic. 'He did not explain how this could be possible given that 19 out 
of 30 members of the executive committee also being members of the SACP', (H.C. 
Coetzer, NP, East London North). 397 Numerical arguments regarding the role of 
Communists in the ANC-SACP alliance were posited as a principal reason for not 
negotiating with the ANC, to the discredit of the PFP. 
While the NP stressed the extent of the Communist domination of the ANC's executive, it 
was acknowledged that not all ANC members were Communist. P.W. Botha, for example, 
stated in April 1986 that the government had never said all ANC members were Communist 
and that it was clear that there were black nationalists within the ANC who were not 
aware that Communists were manipulating them. 398 Some observers welcomed Botha's 
statement as an indication that the door to negotiation 'was ajar' and that a more 
sophisticated approach was on the horizon. 399 But Botha's statement did not represent a 
new departure or a new attitude towards the ANC; the speech stressed the manipulative 
and deceitful nature of the, 'Terrorist alliance under the auspices of the SACP' placing 
them alongside the Libyans as an anti-Western terrorist group. 400 
That Botha was not prepared to commence negotiation with the ANC was made abundantly 
clear in Botha's analyses of the ANC in April 1985 (State President's Appropriation Vote) 
and June 1986 (Statement on the Security Situation in South Africa). In these speeches, 
Botha discussed Communist penetration of the ANC at some length. In April 1985, Botha 
claimed that since the 1960s there had been more and more signs of Marxism and Leninist 
influence in the ANC, and that the Communist Party regarded the ANC as an instrument to 
achieve its particular form of liberation in South Africa. The grip of the SACP over the 
ANC was getting stronger, he argued. 401 Using a device common in National Party rhetoric, 
Botha backed up his argument with a slim piece of evidence taken out of context, stating 
that Joe Slovo's declaration in the Washington Post (that the SACP held a unique position 
in the ANC) was confirmation of the SACP's increasing domination by the ANC. From a 
single statement by one individual, Botha extrapolated that the SACP was increasingly 
397 Hansard, House of Assembly, 9 Apr111986, col. 2950. 
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dominating the ANC. The use of evidence made his argument sound convincing, yet the 
evidence was itself insubstantial, and not directly related to the point that he made. 
When introducing a nationwide State of Emergency in June 1986, the State President 
similarly used ostensibly solid evidence to justify his action. A document to be released to 
the public, allegedly originating in the SACP's politburo, was cited as evidence of the 
implacable commitment of the SACP to violent revolution, and the dangerous intertwining 
between the ANC and the SACP. The ANC was itself implied to be ignorant of the SACP's 
influence in its ranks - the State President called upon the ANC to investigate the 
infiltration of its structures and its ideology by the SACP. The implication of the State 
President's comments was that the SACP was so secretive, or the ordinary, non-Communist 
ANC so stupid, that the ANC itself did not understand the relationship with Communists. 
The conclusion of the President's speech was that no-one could enter into discussions with 
the ANC 'without the knowledge that he is probably also in discussion with the SACP'. 402 
The underlying assumption was that Communists were so dangerous and so manipulative 
that negotiation with them was beyond contemplation. 
The link between the ANC and the SACP was depicted as the fissure through which the 
USSR might gain influence in the Republic of South Africa. The relationship between the 
ANC and Moscow was rarely properly explained or examined in the NP's public discourse. 
While in March 1987, P.W. Botha explained to a public meeting in Lichtenburg that the 
struggle for political power to subject South Africa to a Communist dictatorship was given 
'financial assistance from abroad', 403 frequent assertions were made without clarifying the 
nature of the support by Russia for the ANC. More often, ringing rhetoric was used to 
imply Russia's control of the ANC, without any further analysis. It was argued on one 
occasion that the ANC was a 'tool of Moscow close to us' (Malan), 404 on another that it was 
an 'instrument of the USSR' .405 The suggestion that the ANC was merely a small object in 
the hand of a larger movement was repeatedly asserted. The implication was that people 
should avoid negotiation, since they could not possibly grapple with the larger movement. 
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While discussing the number of Communists on the ANC, executive, members of the NP 
also portrayed certain individuals within the ANC as under the influence of Communism. 
Oliver Tambo was portrayed as an 'ogre .... terrorist ogre', 406 during a speech relating to the 
State of Emergency. But more venom was reserved for Joe Slovo. In the NP's lexicon 
Slovo personified white Communist domination of the Black Nationalist members of the 
ANC and was portrayed as, 'the real devil...the power behind Tambo' (P.W. Botha), 407 and 
as a KGB general (Geldenhuys). 408 The implication of NP statements was that Slovo was 
'proof' that whites led the SACP and Slovo's profile within the liberation movement was 
posited as proof that the SACP dominated the ANC. As leader of Umkhonto We Sizwe, and 
a Chairman of the SACP, Slovo's persona also gave substance to the allegations that 
Communists were behind the ANC commitment to violence. The portrayal reinforced the 
notion that the liberation struggle was not a black on white struggle. It also lent credence 
to the argument that the blacks were incapable of organising their own struggle. The 
demonization of Slovo continued in political discourse right up until negotiations were 
underway after 1990. 
Nelson Mandela, who had previously been portrayed as a Communist, was not overtly 
referred to as a Communist but the insinuation remained. Pressure to free Mandela 
reached a climax in the later 1980s, as the Free Mandela campaign, which began in March 
1980, reverberated around the world. 409 At the opening of Parliament in 1985 the P.W. 
Botha offered to release Nelson Mandela, on the condition that he renounce violence. 410 
In January 1986, Botha offered the release of Mandela in return for Wynand du Toit and 
two Jewish dissidents. 411 However, on both occasions, Botha's choice of words implied 
that the Communists dominated the prisoner. Botha's offer in 1985 was overshadowed by 
an analysis of the forces ranged against South Africa, Russian dominated forces which 
were interested only in 'power' and dedicated to subjugating the masses. The nature of 
Botha's offer to 'swap' Mandela's freedom, for the freedom of three captives, implied 
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that there were two sides pitted in a war against each other. Furthermore, Botha claimed 
that Mandela was 'in effect being jailed by the SACP and its affiliate the ANC'. 412 
Offers to release Nelson Mandela were undermined by the implication that Mandela was 
under the influence of Communism. During the Rubicon Speech, Botha asserted that if 
Mandela gave a commitment that he would not make himself guilty of planning, instigating 
or committing acts of violence, then the President would be prepared to consider his 
release. But the President immediately hinted at the improbability of such a commitment 
from Mandela. Citing Dr Yutar's conviction of Mandela and quoting from a document that 
had been instrumental in the conviction, in which it had been written, 'We Communist 
party members are the most advanced revolutionaries in modern history. The enemy must 
be completely crushed and wiped out from the face of the earth before a Communist 
world can be realised' ,413 Botha implied that Mandela's determined Communism would 
prevent him from negotiating. The relation of a link between Mandela and Communism at 
this juncture had multiple implications: that Mandela would not change or modify his 
views and that he was devoted to violence: Communists, in the NP's lexicon, were 
irreversibly committed to violence. Thus the impression of a dangerous and violent man 
who did not deserve to be released was created; in spite of Botha's 'offer' to release him. 
Allusions to Mandela's commitments to Communism declined after July 1986, when the 
Minister of Law and Order admitted in an interview with Leadership magazine that he 
believed the ANC leader was no longer 'Communist controlled'. 414 It seemed that the 
contact made between the NP and the prisoner allowed him to allay their fears, and 
discredit previous statements. 415 
7.2. 'Useful Idiots': 416 Depictions of the ANC in Response to its Increased Publicity 
During 1986, the NP's depiction of the ANC as dominated, numerically, by members of the 
SACP, began to evolve new elements. A 42-page government pamphlet, entitled 'Talking 
with the ANC' 417 was produced and widely distributed. The pamphlet went to some length 
to demonstrate that the NP's stance towards negotiating with the ANC was, in fact, the 
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safest option, the correct and morally right one. When introducing the pamphlet, Louis 
Nel claimed that it was important that South Africans were properly informed of the ANC's 
nature, history, ideological orientation, composition and policy. 418 The pamphlet was an 
extensive justification for the government's policy, and an example of the National Party's 
methods in convincing their audience that the ANC was Communist and therefore it merits 
close examination. 
The document focused on how the ANC was linked to the SACP and the Soviet Union; how 
this impacted on their tactics for liberation and revolution, and the implications for 
negotiation. The argument was conveyed visually and textually. At the outset it was 
stated that, 'This publication is based primarily on the ANC's and the South African 
Communist Party's own statements and documents'. The technique (that has been 
referred to before) of arranging the statements of the liberation groups to suit the NP's 
own depiction of the situation was highly visible in the document. The document served 
two purposes: it denied the validity of arguments for unbanning the ANC, and it refuted 
the contention that the NP were keeping the population 'in the dark' or misinformed 
about the true nature ANC. Members of the NP argued in parliament that they had made 
the most authoritative policy statements of the ANC publicly available. 419 However, the 
government twisted the evidence to suit its own ends. The document argued that the ANC 
had a formal alliance with the SACP and that both groups were committed to the violent 
overthrow of government, that elements in the ANC viewed negotiations simply as a tactic 
for the seizure of power; influential elements in the ANC played a leading role in the 
formulation of a strategy for a two-stage phase of the revolution; which had as its 
objective the establishment of a Communist state; the ANC strongly opposed the US and 
the West. The document painted a picture of an initially loyal ANC, systematically 
corrupted by the Soviet Union since 1928; increasingly infiltrated by the SACP since 1950. 
Evidence for the SACP's domination of the ANC from the party's beginning to the current 
day was illuminated. The evidence given in the pamphlet was not unfamiliar. The state's 
417 Department for Information, Talkf!!l! with the ANC, June 1986 [African Studies Library, UCT]. 
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case against Nelson Mandela at the Rivonia Trial ('proving' that he was a Communist); 
Bartholomew Hplane's testimony at the Denton hearing (1982); Oliver Tambo's speech to 
the SACP in July 1981 ('It was not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign 
organization. Rather we speak of and to our own'). Numerical evidence was also given-
that 30 members of the ANC National Executive Committee, 23 were members and/or 
active supporters of the SACP. The evidence given here was not so much incorrect, as 
distorted. No reference was made to Mandela's defence; no reference to Tambo's 
statements about interdependence of the two movements. Moreover, of the 23 members 
of the SACP, two were listed as deceased. The document was an exposition of the two-
phase revolution, which it was maintained, had been implemented successfully in a 
number of countries. Historical precedents - Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, were all given as 
evidence that the same thing might happen in the RSA. The document suggested that 
SACP would seek to assume leadership during the second phase of the revolution. Those 
negotiating with the ANC were naive, and divorced from the hard political reality of the 
modern world. The price of negotiation, 'by way of personal, community, political and 
economic freedom', would be too heavy 'Talking with the ANC' concluded. 
The arguments of 'Talking with the ANC' were not unfamiliar. Novel ways of presenting 
the Communist threat were represented in the pictures and diagrams. Of eleven pictures 
or diagrams in the booklet, six concerned the link between the ANC and Communism, the 
Soviet Union or the SACP. The visual imagery in the document effectively conveyed the 
impression that the ANC was Communist influenced. A graph depicted the two phases of 
the revolution: the ultimate objective being cited as 'A classless Communist society in 
terms of international proletarianism' .420 Another picture had a 'variety of publications 
of the ANC and the SACP' including, prominently displayed, a cover from the African 
Communist magazine with 'Long live the ANC-SACP Alliance!' The picture lent credence 
to the argument that the government had access to the ANC-SACP material and so 
endorsed arguments that the ANC was dominated by the SACP. On another page, a picture 
of Nelson Mandela, beneath which the text read 'Nelson Mandela, former leader of the 
African National Congress (ANC): 'We Communist Party members are the most advanced 
revolutionaries in modern history'. 421 The text, taken from a document used as evidence 
against Mandela during the Rivonia trial, suggested that he had spoken it himself as an 
exhortation to fellow members. This was not the case, but the arrangement in the 
420 Bureau for Information, Talking with the ANC, p.16. 
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publication suggested convincingly that it had been, and so implied that Mandela was a 
dangerous individual who should remain behind bars. The ANC's Communist links, and in 
particular the two-phase revolution were thus depicted in such a way that the ANC was 
misrepresented, but probably not misquoted. The document thus cleverly portrayed the 
ANC as a Communist threat, and discredited members of the population who had indulged 
in 'talking with the ANC'. The leaflet 'Talking with the ANC' was evidence that, in 1986, 
the government felt that it was justifiable to try to win hearts and minds to their strategy 
of not negotiating with the ANC. 
During the 1987 and 1988 sittings of the Houses of Assembly and Representatives, the 
arguments of 'Talking with the ANC' were incorporated into the NP's parliamentary 
discourse. This meant that several new elements were introduced into the NP's depiction 
of the ANC: the ANC's deception (as evidenced by the two stage revolution, and the 
Freedom Charter, the meaning of the phrase 'peoples democracy', and the ANC's use of 
other parties). These had been occasionally mentioned prior to 1987, but they were the 
principal feature of the NP's discourse on the subject of the ANC after 1987. 
The NP depiction of the Communist influence in the liberation movement after 1987 
focused increasingly on the deceptive nature of the alliance. While the ANC's links with 
Communism had previously focused on the number of Communists within the alliance, 
there was far less reference to the numerical dominance by the SACP after 1987. (This 
may have been due to Philip Gastrow's (NOM, Durban Central) categorical statement that 
it was not known how many members of the ANC were Communist; and having visited the 
ANC, he was in a position to discern this). 422 Instead, the notion that the ANC was merely 
a front organisation - and a deceptive one - for a Communist master became a common 
suggestion in parliamentary discourse. Malan asserted that, 'The ANC is the spokesman, 
the actor on the stage. It sets the scene, but behind the scenes is the actual producer, 
the man pulling the strings, the manipulator, the SACP'. 423 It was implied that while the 
liberation struggle might look like children's entertainment, the sinister side, behind the 
screen, was a serious threat. Malan tapped into the notion that the ANC was the tool in 
the hand of a larger force - a familiar argument. The reference to a puppet show served 
to emphasise the naivety of those who had visited the ANC - as if, like children, they had 
fallen for a mere puppet show without being aware of the major implications. Thus, the 
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NP persistently argued that although the ANC might appear conciliatory at this juncture, 
in reality neither they nor their masters were. 
The State President accentuated the dangerous and deceptive nature of the Communist 
influence within the ANC in a speech about the Dakar 'safari'. Reprimanding the Dakar 
visitors, as if they were disobedient children, 'Lured by curiosity, feelings of guilt, or 
misguidance ... make light of my warnings and standpoints on the ANC', he depicted an 
ANC delegation that had been chosen with deliberation and cunning to manipulate the 
pilgrims. The phraseology implied that the individuals were totally incapable of 
comprehending or grappling with the nature of the problem. The 'masters' of the ANC 
were 'clever and sophisticated' and those who went to Dakar were not capable of dealing 
with those masters. An allegedly 'Leninist' term was used to discredit the visitors. The 
ANC, Botha claimed, 'is laughing up their sleeves at the naivety of 'useful idiots' who, as 
Lenin puts it, can be used to further the aims of the revolution ... For the ANC/SACP 
alliance talks are only a means to an end, namely the revolutionary takeover of power'. 424 
In fact, the Dakar visitors had had the covert support of the National Intelligence Service. 
Perhaps Botha was surprised or threatened by the declarations following the meeting, 
which revealed that common ground had been found with the ANC, and challenged the 
persistent 'myth' of a total onslaught, (William Van Vuuren). The revelations of the Dakar 
visitors that a vigorous debate existed within the ANC-SACP alliance over the relationship 
between armed struggle and a broader political strategy, and that the state in South 
Africa was responsible for the strategy of the ANC, (Andre Du Piasani)425 may have made 
the ANC-SACP alliance look more of a viable bargaining partner than Botha had planned. 
Certainly, the ferocity with which the State President reprimanded the Dakar visitors 
suggested that they had approached something far too dangerous for them to handle: a 
clandestinely Communist manipulative group, acting according to a revolutionary strategy 
used by lenin, and much cleverer than those who tried to negotiate with it. The State 
President thus discredited the PFP and other visitors to Dakar by hinting that they were 
victims of a Communist plot, merely being used as pieces in a Leninist jigsaw. Alluding to 
the international links of the SACP, Botha also questioned the patriotism of the Dakar 
visitors, demanding how using foreign money to talk with a Communist-controlled banned 
organisation could possibly be deemed patriotic. Thus Botha tapped into the notion of a 
foreign onslaught, to discredit his opponents and critics. 
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The intransigent nature of Communism received more emphasis during 1987-89 than 
previously. It was emphatically claimed that talks were only a means to an end, namely, 
the revolutionary takeover of power; and that negotiation was merely a continuation of 
the struggle by other means; designed to divide the ruling class and gather 'useful 
idiots'. 426 It was maintained that the ANC, under the influence of the SACP had only 
agreed to the talks with certain parties in order to divide the whites and the ruling class. 
A favourite phrase was that a leopard would not change his spots (P. W Both a, J. H. Kriel), 
the implication being that the Communist would never abandon violence in spite of all 
protestations to the contrary. 427 In response to the implicit challenge by the Dakar visitors, 
Botha in particular implied that he had a monopoly of superior information, and an insight 
into the true nature of a Communist. Other MPs echoed his stance as late as 1989, 
proclaiming superior comprehension of the ANC's attitude towards negotiation. 
Frequently, jibes were directed at the newly formed Democratic Party (an alliance of the 
PFP, dissident Nationalists, and an Independent Party). The State President's words were 
echoed, 'The ANC is laughing at them [the DP] .. They call them useful idiots who do the 
enemies work for them so well that they can achieve victory without a war'. 428 The term 
'useful idiots' attempted to discredit the DP opposition and the policy of negotiation. 
7.3. 'Stripped of pretence •• ' Depictions of the ANC-SACP alliance 1987-89 
The National Party paid far greater attention to the ideology of the ANC-SACP alliance 
after the Dakar discussions. While up until 1987 the most frequent comments about the 
alliance had alluded to the dominance (particularly the numerical dominance) of the 
Communists, with little attention to the ideology of the alliance, after 1987, members of 
the NP scrutinised the Freedom Charter, in particular analysing what a 'people's 
democracy' was. Such analysis often attempted to expose the ANC 's hidden Communist 
desires, and emphasised that any argument to the contrary was merely a further example 
of the ANC's deceptive nature. The Freedom Charter, for example, was portrayed as the 
starting point for a Communist revolution, at the crux of the ANC's deception, a, 
'Dangerous wolf in sheep's clothing' .429 The Freedom Charter was seen to have a 
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socialist/Communist core, which meant that it could not be acceded to. It was 
discredited on the grounds that those demands that in the NP's view were justifiable had 
already been satisfied. Malan claimed the Charter was an exceptionally significant 
document, and that any member of the House of Representatives who had not read it 
should do so. 430 On a different occasion, ignoring some of the key demands of the 
Freedom Charter, Geldenhuys argued that most of the demands of the Freedom Charter 
were now a reality and suggested that radicals were fighting to win a society in which the 
socialist hub of the Freedom Charter could be implemented. He claimed that, 'The SA of 
1950 and the SA of 1987 are not after all one and the same. Yet apart from the demands 
relating to the economy which amount to flagrant socialism ... many of these demands have 
already been met. Nevertheless the violence continues'. 431 The terminology - 'flagrant 
socialism' emphasised that within the charter lay bald, unadulterated socialistic demands, 
placing emphasis on these. The speech recognised as valid some of the original demands 
of the Freedom Charter, which made the viewpoint seem balanced, but in claiming that 
those had been met, the speech tried to deny the validity of the document by arguing that 
its economics were socialist. Carried to its conclusion, the argument implied that if it had 
any purpose at all, the current violence related entirely to the socialist/Communist 
demands of the Charter. In this case, the conception of a threat of Communism prevented 
Geldenhuys from seeing, or at least acknowledging, the reality of the situation and 
understanding properly the multifaceted causality of the violence. 
The Freedom Charter was also dangerous as a Communist-inspired document since in 
reflected the two-phase nature of the proposed revolution. As explained in chapter 2.1.4, 
the ANC-SACP alliance had forged a compromise to enable them to both work in harmony 
towards the 'first' phase of a 'two-phase' revolution. In 1987-89, the NP laid 
disproportional emphasis on prospects for the second phase of the revolution. Malan 
emphasised at length that for the revolutionaries, the Freedom Charter was only a starting 
point. He claimed that the document served the ANC's (implicitly duplicitous) needs, 
because it was acceptable in Western circles but after the first, democratic phase of the 
revolution, it would be discarded, would disappear from the scene completely and a 
switch to Communist ideology would take place. Malan stressed that the SACP was 
preparing itself for an opportune moment when it would take over from the ANC. To 
Malan the Freedom Charter was the blueprint for a two-stage Leninist revolution. The 
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freedom charter was the banner for the first stage of the revolution, but the SACP, in the 
second phase, would consummate a social revolution with Marxist goals. 432 
The terminology employed in the Freedom Charter and in the ANC's announcements was 
scrutinised far more closely between 1987-89. Particularly close attention was paid to the 
ANC's and the Communist's definition of 'democracy' and 'people's democracy'. For 
example, Dr FJ Van Heerden (NP, Bloemfontein North) emphasised the vagueness of the 
definition in the Freedom Charter of who the 'so-called 'people" are, and who the 'so-
called anti- 'people" are. Heerden derived the interpretation from the Communist 
definition. Government by 'the people' as proposed in the Freedom Charter would in 
practice mean government by, 'An elite party with misery, famine, civil war for the 
masses', Heerden claimed. 433 Though the sinister motives in the Freedom Charter were 
not overtly clear, Heerden convincingly implied that there were sinister motives. 
Dismissing the Freedom Charter's purportedly inclusive references to 'the people' as mere 
Communist terminology, Heerden emphasised that the document was Communist, and 
therefore deceptive and dangerous. By emphasising that a 'people's democracy' was a 
Communist notion, Heerden dismissed any statements in the Freedom Charter that 
reflected a constructive plan for the future. For example, Heerden stated that group 
rights (which had become a key precept for the NP) were acknowledged in the Charter, 
but that this did not mean much. The difference between the NP's vision of group rights 
and the ANC/SACP alliances was that, 'That they will pursue this objective only as long as 
it serves their own interests'. 434 In laying emphasis on the alleged Communist core of the 
Charter, the NP stressed that the regime envisaged by the Charter would be exclusive, 
government by a minority and sought to demonstrate that the Charter's promises 
concealed a sinister reality. 
Similarly, when the ANC's new political dispensation was made public in July 1988 it was 
argued that Marxist conception of democracy was so different to the Western one that the 
new dispensation of the ANC needed to be considered with extreme caution. Geldenhuys 
argued that the ANC had three factions, an old guard, a Soweto Group and Marxists- and 
that one needed to know who the authors of the constitutional provisions were. The 
implication lingered: that if the Marxists did not give in and accede to change, then 
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change would not be possible. The NP looked for holes in the ANC's document to prove 
that the new guidelines represented a narrow, exclusionist, Marxist conception of 
democracy. For example, Geldenhuys stated that under the ANC's policy everyone would 
be tolerated but, in terms of one of the document's provisions, those who practice racism, 
fascism, Nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness would be 
outlawed. 435 Geldenhuys proclaimed indignantly that under these terms lnkatha would be 
banned, and concluding that this was an exclusionist clause. In associating the ANC with 
Marxism members of the NP thus tried to proclaim that it would be a narrow exclusionist 
sect. 
Furthermore, in spite of the ANC's new political dispensation, according to the NP, the 
ANC's link with Communism meant that it was still bent on destruction of South African 
society. The link with Communism was often portrayed as the principal reason for the 
movement's failure to abandon violence, and it was frequently suggested that should the 
ANC dissolve its link with Communism, it would also abandon violence. The Minister of 
Law and Order, for example, argued that, 'The Communists know that the ANC is 
launching certain political reform directed initiatives, but not one of them has given a 
convincing indication, either in private or in public that they are relinquishing their 
original violent objectives'. 436 The movement's link with Communism, alongside its 
refusal to abandon violence, remained a reason for the continued ban. The stipulation 
that the ANC dissolve its commitment to Marxism and violence indicated that the National 
Party was not prepared to negotiate. The ANC had repeatedly made it quite clear that it 
would not abandon the SACP. And the National Party did not believe that the SACP would 
ever lay down their arms. The portrayal of the Communist threat in the latter half of the 
period therefore emphasised its deceptive influence on the ANC, and its commitment to 
violence because of its indissolvable link with the SACP. 
In 1988 and 1989 the National Party called on the ANC to disassociate themselves from the 
Communists. They claimed that it was not the NP's duty to draw the line between the 
Communists and the ANC; it was the ANC's. 437 In 1988, the National Party suggested that 
the ANC could return to South Africa provided it cut its ties with Communism and ceased 
its violence. In the statement on 'Matters of National Importance' uttering the 'offer' 
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Botha reminded his audience (a joint sitting of Parliament) that many states on the 
continent, 'Had been brought to their knees by such destructive policies and ideologies'. 
438 Botha stressed that the ANC should cut ties with international Communism and return 
to the country to search for peaceful solutions, build the economy and improve social 
conditions. The speech suggested that the problem in South Africa was essentially social, 
but that those motivated by revolutionary ideals exploited it. The implication of the 
speech was that, due to the emergency measures, which had changed the circumstances, 
the ANC was pursuing new tactics of deception, and pursuing the struggle in different 
ways without relinquishing violence. The ANC was deemed to be trying to attain political 
acceptability, and concealing their undemocratic, Marxist goals beneath the apparently 
congenial meetings. A number of speeches in 1988 and 1989 reaffirmed the President's 
statements, suggesting that the ANC's new democratic stance was merely a deception. 
The ANC's failure to abandon violence caused NP to argue that the ANC was not totally 
subservient to the USSR. In a contradiction of many preceding statements that had 
maintained that the ANC was simply a 'tool of Moscow', it was now argued that the ANC 
was not at the Soviet's beck and call. Geldenhuys commented that the, 'ANC is not going 
to come to the negotiating table because the Soviet Union asks it to do so'. 439 This 
comment, amongst others, was in stark contrast to the argument that had been 
propagated previously, that the ANC were dominated by the Soviet Union and the SACP 
and entirely at the Communists' beck and call. 
The Communists were deemed to be dedicated to thwarting the National Party's political 
reform initiatives. When political reform measures were introduced, the Communist 
nature of the ANC-SACP alliance was often held up. For example, in 1988, when a bill for 
a National Council including Africans was introduced, the Deputy Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Planning, Badenhorst, stressed the 'inclusive' nature of the reform and 
argued that any aggravation caused to the ANC merely reflected the SACP's influence in 
the movement. He said that if the ANC was not prepared to support the proposed council, 
'We will see it for what it actually stands for, stripped of pretence'. 440 Again, the 
phraseology reflected the impression that the ANC had a great deal to hide because of 
their Communist connections, which needed to be exposed. In response to questioning, 
438 Cape Times, 21 June 1988. 
439 Hansard, JotntMeettng, 14 Aprtt 1989, Cot, 6014. 
440 Hansard, House of Assembly, 24 June 1988, cot. 14827. 
Page 120 
Badenhorst indicated that if the ANC rejected the initiative, only one inference was 
possible, that they wanted a Communist model of government. Geldenhuys similarly 
argued that the NP was not merely offering the crumbs from the political table and that 
consequently, the ANC's rejection of the reform, confirmed the long-standing suspicion 
that the ANC were not interested in black participation in the decision making process but 
only in the destruction of the existing order and its replacement by a Marxist one party 
state. 441 The so-called political liberation struggle was being used as a means to an end, 
that end being to establish a 'people's democracy' which in essence was not anything 
other than a Communist dictatorship. Those who remained in jail or continue to sojourn 
abroad were there, Geldenhuys claimed, because they were, 'Deliberately refusing to turn 
their backs on a system on a system of, 'Godless Marxism ... radical 
destruction .. terrorism'. 442 Thus the ANC was portrayed as being wedded to Communism 
and the Communist influence ensured that the alliance was implacable enemies of good 
governance and reform. Whereas in a previous instance the NP had portrayed the rank and 
file of the ANC as unwittingly and unknowingly being led by Marxists, Geldenhuys now 
created the impression that the ANC members were deliberately excluding themselves by 
their active commitment to Communism and terrorist destruction. Thus the ANC was 
portrayed as a more, and not less dangerous group. 
Ironically, under P.W. Botha, as negotiation with the ANC became more and more of a 
likelihood, declarations by members of the NP as to the futility of negotiating with 
Communists became more prominent. As late as February 1989, it was stressed that the 
negotiation would be futile given the 'facts' of Communist domination of the movement. 
'The ANC cannot speak for itself because as a party to the so-called liberation alliance it 
must also pursue and promote the objectives of the SACP. In terms of this liberation 
alliance dialogue with the ANC is also dialogue with the SACP. Not one of these 
organisations' objectives can be reconciled with democracy. The question remains: why 
dialogue?'443 The clarity with which the speaker iterated the point repeatedly suggested 
that it was so blatant, so intuitive that it should not be argued with. In July 1989, the 
Minster of Law and Order, Vlok claimed that, 'At no stage had the South Africa Communist 
Party/ ANC alliance dropped their revolutionary aim to seize power and install a Marxist 
regime'. Vlok warned that 'The SCAP-ANC planners are trying to pull wool over the eyes 
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of nai"ve people in South Africa, including Mr Wynand Malan, who held discussions with the 
ANC'. 444 The rhetoric of previous years of intransigence of Communists and of deception 
being played off against naivety was as strong in this declaration as it had been in 1987 
and even 1985. 
A perception of the Communist political threat endured until 1989 as a feature of the 
National Party's discourse, even when the depiction of a Soviet led onslaught was no 
longer used. Thus by 1989, references to the Communist onslaught had declined, but were 
still present in NP discourse. Colin Eglin (PFP/DP) welcomed that the NP had come to 
realise that, 'Our problems in SA do not originate in Moscow but in Pretoria and in Cape 
Town'. 445 However, although the NP no longer referred to the threat from the Kremlin, 
they continued to use the Communist threat to defend against criticism of their lack of 
initiative, to rebuff those who had been involved in such initiatives, and to demolish ANC 
declarations regarding the future possiblity for negotiation. The election of September 
1989, showed that the National Party had not ceased criticising its opponents for their 
promise to negotiate with the ANC · and, by inference the SACP. The dual threat of 
Communism and black majority rule remained an NP electioneering strategy. This 
tendency had reached its peak in 1987 but was still alive in 1989. 
7.4. 'Frightening White Voters Back into the Laager'446 The Communist Threat During 
Elections 
The National Party's depiction of the Communist threat peaked during election time. 
Electioneering material proved difficult to obtain, 447 but the available material indicates 
that the 'rooi gevaar' was commonly referred to during the two General Elections that 
took place in the period, 1987 and 1989. It is not insignificant that the Communist threat 
was a principal feature of the election of 1987. 
The life of the House had been extended until 1989 and so in actual fact there was no 
need for an election in 1987. But P.W. Botha, perhaps in response the Conservative Party's 
challenges to test white public opinion in the light of the CP's breakaway from the NP 
444 Nationalist Newspaper 'Facts belle DP's troika claim' (New Action, Geo!'Be/Knysna edition, July 1989) 
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before the new constitution came into operation in 1984, had announced in his New Year's 
Eve broadcast that an election would be held on 6 May. 
Whatever the president's motives for setting that particular date for the election, it was 
a hard fought battle. The National Party as a coalition of factions was facing pressure from 
within the party. 448 The decision of Wynand Malan, Dennis Worral and Esther Lategan to 
contest seats as independents demonstrated the rising tide of opinion against the National 
Party's failure to implement reform amongst former party supporters. The election was 
also to prove a genuine test of the party against the Conservative Party. 
On the left of the NP, the PFP was beset with problems. Since the resignation in February 
1986 of their leader, Fredrick Van Zyl Slabbert, and of another valued member, Alex 
Boraine, the party had been in a state of confusion. The appointment of Colin Eglin to act 
as leader of the party assigned a man who was seen by some as a 'political retread' to a 
challenging role. 449 An uneasy alliance was forged with the NRP. The party also had a 
thorn in its side in the figure of Horace Van Rensburg, a former frontbencher who had 
defected· from the party at the end of the previous parliamentary session. Van Rensburg 
made public the rationale for his resignation, and alleged that the PFP was soft on 
security, unpatriotic, cynical in their response to the total onslaught scenario, and hostile 
to Afrikaans elements. In spite of these handicaps, the party had high hopes to increase its 
representation and to put up a strong campaign. The party was not short of funds as a 
result of support from The Slabbert Trust, and the alliance with the NRP meant that the 
party was free of debilitating inter-opposition conflicts. The name 'Operation 
Turbocharge' demonstrated the party's expectations and the decision to contest seats on 
a wide front. 
Dubbed as a referendum on the next stage of the reform process and a public declaration 
of proposals for the future, the key feature of the election was a conflict between the PFP 
and the National Party. 450 The NP therefore emphasised 'evolutionary reform', but 
defended a narrow path of reform, which did not include negotiating with the ANC. The 
NP's campaign commenced with the statement, 'Over my dead body will I vote for the 
448 Frontline, March 1986, p.35. 
449 Swart, Progressive Odyssey, p.183. 
450 The Anzus, (Editorlal)1 May 1987. 
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ANC, so why vote PFP'. 451 Some observers contend that the PFP's response was effective. 
In one advertisement the opposition listed, year by year, the catastrophic progress of 
white nationalism. 
But the National Party's counter-reaction 'pulled out all the stops', and 'exploited the 
'total onslaught' theme to the maximum'. 452 The campaign echoed Van Rensburg's 
allegations. Indeed, in a newspaper advertising campaign, which went full page in the 
Sunday Papers, 453 the NP directly and deliberately linked the PFP (perceived to be their 
principal opponents) with Communists. References to the Communist threat in the public 
domain reached a climax during the election of 1987. A number of contemporary 
commentators observed the heightened use of references to the red peril in National Party 
statements. An editorial in the Cape Argus commented in 1987: 'Running through every 
election campaign since the NP won power in 1948 has been one or another bogey, but the 
two traditional favourites have been the swart gevaar and the rooi gevaar. The current 
election campaign has seen these two obsessive fears combined in the almost hysterical 
use of the ANC as a menace with which to frighten white voters back into the laager'. 454 
In line with the National Party's resolution to view the threat to South Africa not as black 
on white455 but as radical against moderate, the 'swart gevaar' (black threat) was only 
referred to covertly. Black majority rule, it could be inferred from National Party 
statements, was a threat in so far as it heralded the end of democracy in South Africa. 
The 'rooi gevaar' took the centre stage. The NP publicly claimed to be fighting 
Communism for the good of the South African people. A key feature of the election 
campaign therefore was discrediting the ANC as a potential negotiating partner. The 
ANC's link with Communism was frequently and vociferously stated. Communists were 
extremely dangerous. An election poster, 'We must hate - hatred is the basis of 
Communism' cited Lenin's quotation exhorting the people to hate. 'Children must be 
taught to hate their parents- if such are not Communists. If they are, then the children 
need no longer worry about them. Children should be present at the executions, and 
451 Swart, Pr011resslve Odyssey, p.191. 
452 Swart, Progressive Odyssey, p.191. 
453 Hope, White Boy Runnlnl!. p. 91. 
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should rejoice in the death of the enemies of the proletariat' .456 The poster linked Lenin's 
exhortation to hatred with the township violence - suggesting that the two were one and 
the same thing. 'You've probably noticed that this barbaric philosophy has been violently 
evident in our black townships of late'. It then went on to suggest that senior PFP 
spokesmen had proposed unbanning of the ANC and the SACP, because both would be 
dealt with in the courts. The PFP therefore, was 'dangerously naive' to propose the 
unbanning of the SACP. The poster concluded that, 'Lenin was less polite. He bluntly 
labelled such naiVe liberals as 'useful idiots'. Thus the PFP was shown to be soft on 
security and unrealistic for wanting to unban the ANC and the Communist Party. The 
threat of Communism - the dangers of the 'hatred' that Communists represented, were 
used as a weapon with which to attack the Nationalist's liberal opposition. Though the 
link between the two was theoretically weak, the National Party made it rhetorically 
strong. 
The campaign against the PFP was based on several assumptions, that the party would 
unconditionally lift the ban on the ANC and the SACP. This was an inference, not a stated 
fact. One National Party MP stated that, 'We will say to the electorate, and we will say it 
clearly until such time as we have an authoritative statement from that side of the House 
- that the policy of the PFP is the unbanning of the ANC, the unbanning of the SACP, the 
unbanning of Umkhonto We Sizwe, and the condoning of commitment to violence and 
revolution'. The NP appeared to publicise this view in whatever media available. For 
example Mr Japie Basson, in a letter to the Cape Times argued that the PFP would unban 
the ANC's 'partner in violence', the SACP. 457 
The international dimension of the Communist threat was also referred to during the 
election campaign. The subcontinent was portrayed to be under an onslaught from 
aggressive predators against whom the only effective defence was an NP government. 
Under the heading of 'Our plan for peace' one leaflet stated: 'Your guarantee for safety. 
We are all concerned about the safety of our country and its people. We cannot afford to 
fall prey to Communism'. 458 The use of the word 'prey' echoed statements that 
Communists were avaricious, greedy all consuming force. A picture of a tank implied that 
the action to be taken in defending the country was necessarily military. The reference to 
456 The Nationalist, Apr111987. 
457 Hansard, House of Assembly, 9 February 1987. 
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the Communist threat emphasised the NP's role as a protector of the people and justified 
the increased expenditure on an armament building programme. The repeated use of the 
word 'we' stressed that the NP was together in unity with the people in the face of the 
common enemy - Communism. 
The portrayal of the PFP as being soft on Communism was prominent in advertisements in 
English language newspapers. The NP paid for a number of advertisements that depicted 
the Communist threat. The aim was not to rally the people against the Communist threat, 
but in reminding them of the threat, to rally the people against the PFP. An NP campaign 
advertisement placed on the 4 May is illustrative of the tactics used in depicting the 
Communist threat to the electorate. The advertisement was purportedly addressed to the 
PFP leadership459 (who, the advertisement claimed, 'still haven't grasped what it is 
about'). The advertisement claimed that the PFP were naive to the point of being stupid 
in their belief that they could talk the Communists out of what they wanted. It argued 
that no one had said that the PFP were Communists, but they were incapable of 
understanding the real issue facing South Africa and therefore incapable of dealing with it. 
The poster quoted Brezhenev, 'Our aims is to gain control .... of the mineral treasure house 
of Central and Southern Africa'. It further stated that: '23 out of the 30 members of the 
ANC national executive committee are Communists on Moscow's payroll'. Finally, it 
quoted Lenin, 'when a country is demoralised you can take it over without firing a shot'. 
The first of these statements was outdated (there had been two leaders since Brezhenev); 
the second was misleading (even if there were that many SACP members working within 
the ANC national executive, they were not on 'Moscow's payroll' as such). Although the 
statements were misleading or inaccurate, the National Party propaganda machine would 
not, by May 4 1987, have been unduly concerned. At this stage in the campaign (a day 
before the election) the NP abandoned responsibility to facts. The rhetorical resonance of 
the argument was what counted. Innuendo was as important as direct statement in a 
campaign that implied that the PFP was 'soft' on Communism and 'soft' on security. 
Members, supporters and campaigners for the PFP did their best to refute the claims that 
it was soft on Communism. A Cape Times editorial stated, 'The NP's advertisement 
campaign smearing the PFP as soft on Communism needs to be forcefully rebutted ... it is 
falsely implied that the PFP's readiness to unban representative black leaders and 
negotiate with the ANC means that the Opposition condones Communist - inspired 
459 The Star, 5 May 1987. 
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violence. What nonsense! '460 Indeed the NP's campaign was often factually incorrect or 
based upon a statement made by a single member of the PFP rather than on party policy. 
In one instance, the NP was made to withdraw the statement made in an advertisement 
because it was wrong. However, the PFP could not afford to ignore the allegations, and 
the campaign had the party lurching from one defensive position to another. The NP had 
success over in its portrayal of the PFP as pro-Communist was shown by a PFP 
advertisement on the morning of the election stating categorically that it was not 'for' 
Communism, terrorism and the ANC'. 461 Such last minute desperation and damage 
limitation did not augur well for the PFP. 
On the soapbox, and in opposition to PFP candidates, NP candidates became vitriolic in 
their denunciations of Communism and suggestive of the opposition's softness on 
Communism. P.W. Botha took centre stage in the campaign. For him, the Communist 
threat was a central issue, and as a result the Communist threat remained a pivotal aspect 
of the NP election campaign in 1987. The hackneyed arguments about the Communist 
threat were used. There was little variation in substance from the speeches made during 
parliamentary sessions. However, the style of references to the Communist threat altered 
during election time. At a speech to the NP in Pietermaritzburg, six days before the 
election, Botha devoted substantial time to the Communist onslaught. 462 The speech was 
a deliberate attempt to win votes, and as such was balanced between humour and 
seriousness, rhetoric and vitriol. Even the humorous anecdotes were underpinned by a 
sense of the seriousness of the Communist threat. With reference to negotiation, Botha 
told the following story: 'The hunter took careful aim at the big bear, but pulling the 
trigger, he heard the bear say: Isn't it better to talk than to shoot? Let us rather 
negotiate, make your choice. The hunter lowered his gun and he said: I want a fur coat. 
Good, said the bear, that is negotiable, I only want a full stomach. So they sat down and 
they negotiated. Eventually the bear walked away, his stomach full, and the hunter had 
his fur coat!' The light-hearted tone with which Botha told the story suited the occasion. 
But the metaphor of the bear -(the choice of predator was surely no coincidence: Russia 
was portrayed as a Bear) to portray the ANC/SACP alliance served to remind the listener 
that this was no joke. The ANC, because of its links with Communism, were hungry and 
460 Cape Times, 28 April 1987. 
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predatory; dangerous and unpredictable. The only answer to the Communist threat, 
according to Botha, was to elect him as State President again. He pitched himself as a 
central defence against Communism throughout the campaign, and argued that the 
Communists didn't want to isolate Colin Eglin or Worrall, but they wanted to isolate Botha 
because 'Botha is standing in the way of Communism against South Africa'. 463 
The National Party's campaign at the May 1987 election also referred to the Communist 
threat as a justification for the State of Emergency, which might otherwise have been a 
vote-loser. For example, NP candidate at Sandton, Roland Host, stated 'People do not 
realise the extent of Communist activity here. The total Communist onslaught is not 
calculated over a period of two to three years. It is a long-term exercise. If we don't 
curtail and hinder the development of Communist organisation in South Africa we are in 
big trouble'. 464 Host's speech might not have been typical of the NP's speeches; that he 
admitted to being a man who, 'Sees a Communist behind every bush' indicates the tenor 
of his opinion. However, the speech does give an indication of the Party line during the 
election. 
The Communist threat was therefore a central feature of the 1987 election. Although the 
Communist threat was viewed as less serious internationally, it was still a useful vehicle 
for NP propaganda, and as Swart points out, the NP was assisted in this by the heightened 
unrest amongst the local black population, and ANC incursions across the border.465 
Measured by immediate electoral returns, the campaign worked. The PFP lost six seats, 
and the NRP lost all but one seat it held. However, NP may have overplayed their hand in 
the 1987 election. The Conservative Party benefited from the swing to the right, and 
gained twenty-two seats. Though this was only enough two more than the PFP held, it 
was sufficient to displace the PFP as official opposition. As Colin Eglin bitterly commented 
in the first meeting of the new parliament, the NP's "Rooi en Swart gevaar campaign' and 
its exploitation of the siege psychosis that is developing among the voters of SA caused 
those voters to turn to the right'. 466 The character of parliamentary discourse after 1987 
changed accordingly. 
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By 1989, anti-Communism was no longer as central a pillar of the NP's election strategy. 
However, the NP continued to attempt to demonstrate that the newly formed Democratic 
Party (DP) was unfit to govern and in so doing, continued to make references to the DP's 
attitude to Communism. A focus of the National Party's arguments was that the DP 
promises were pie in the sky. The implication was that the DP was weak on security. The 
promise that one of the DP leaders had made, to lift the ban on the ANC and Communist 
Parties was referred to in a poster that drew parallels with the DP leaders and 'three blind 
mice' and concluded 'Climb on the DP coach and you'll end up with a pumpkin'. 467 In 
spite of the scaling down of references to Communism, a key feature of the discrediting of 
the DP was the fact that they would unban the SACP. This was reflected in parliamentary 
debates. (Shortly before the election, the DP were mocked as "useful idiots' who can do 
the enemies work for them'). 468 In a speech which drew upon generations of anti-
Communism, and the perception that the Communists like locusts would strip South Africa 
bare, de Klerk lambasted the DP for their proposals to unban the ANC, suggesting that it 
would not be worthwhile to live in South Africa as a result. 469 The ANC-SACP alliance was 
therefore subject to continued demonization by the end of 1989. But criticism was not as 
intense, in spite of the precarious nature of the National Party's electoral stance. 
Thus as late as 1989, the Communist threat was still casting a shadow over National Party 
discourse, and there was certainly no suggestion or hint that the ANC and the SACP's 
unbanning was imminent. The National Party had used the 'rooi gevaar' for many years, 
and the fact that it was still prepared to do so, albeit less vociferously, in the election of 
September 1989 showed that the Party was not prepared to lay down this useful political 
weapon - effective against left and right. But the explanations of Communism in the 
previous parliamentary sessions had revealed what a dead end party policy had come to. 
Though the Party claimed that the ANC's rejection of their reform measures revealed that 
it was Marxist controlled and interested only in the violent seizure of power and Marxist 
revolution, in the context of increased interface with the ANC, the warnings sounded more 
and more like hollow scare mongering. 
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Nonetheless, however hollow the scare mongering was, there is no doubt that the NP was 
deeply concerned about black majority rule. It would take a complete change of mindset 
to unban the ANC and the SACP. But the rhetoric of the election of September 1989 gave 
no indication that such a transformation was on the political horizon. 
The hollow nature of threats highlighted during the 1989 election represented the fact 
that, by this stage the National Party could not rely on a homogenous body of support and 
therefore were resorting to electoral messages which sounded weak; which sought an 
'enemy' in order to unite a fairly disparate body of support. By 1989, there was 
dissatisfaction amongst many elements of the National Party's traditional support base -
the Afrikaner community; any belief in the total onslaught that had existed during the 
previous election was diminished. At VanWyk describes himself as an Afrikaner who found 
'himself in no man's land'; had there been an IP candidate in his constituency, he would 
have voted for them, he maintains; he hoped to see the NP forced into an alliance with 
the DP. As a patriotic Afrikaner who had previously 'swallowed it all [the total onslaught 
argument] hook, line and sinker', Van Wyk's disclosure demonstrates how disillusioned 
many Afrikaners were by 1989.470 By 1989 many key pillars of support for the NP within 
the polity had been eroded. The Broederbond, the secret lobby of some of the most 
powerful men in Afrikanerdom, had circulated a document proposing a non-racial charter 
with built in protection of minorities, which accepted that the majority could be black. 471 
In the mind 1980s, alternative Afrikaner youth movements had sprung up - the punk 
movement held its elders in undisguised contempt. 'We Afrikaners were always from the 
bottom of the barrel. We realize that many of the country's problems of the last 40 years 
must be laid at the door of the National Party and us Afrikaners. But we are angry about 
this. We are furious because our parents have ! "£$%" up everything'. 472 473 The movement 
attracted members of the Security Branch to its concerts. Developments in other spheres 
also reflected fissures within the Afrikaner race. 1988 had seen the formation of the Vrye 
Weekblad, the first newspaper fully in Afrikaans that was in favour of 'non-racial, 
democratic, united South Africa' .474 Furthermore, students and academics at the alma 
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mater of some of the most prominent minds of apartheid had been alienated. 475 In 1987 
the Independent Movement was supported by 50% of Stellenbosch academics. 476 Thus by 
1989, there were many within the Afrikaner community who were prepared to challenge 
the long standing beliefs of the National Party. Under P.W. Botha, these developments had 
been opposed and resisted, but their presence was a realistic consideration for any 
pragmatic government. 
Thus although the election of 1989 saw some elements of the 'total onslaught' message 
persisting - the electioneering materials attained demonstrate that it was weaker. It 
appeared that the NP was searching for enemies. That they had to turn upon previous 
members, defectors to the DP, in order to find those enemies reflected that the 'total 
onslaught' was no longer perceived to be as politically useful as it had been, and 
demonstrated the wider fissures in the NP's traditional support base. 
8. The Transition 
8.1. South African Politics and the Global Context, August - November 1989 
In January 1989, P W Botha suffered a stroke, which temporarily incapacitated him. In an 
extraordinary political gesture he issued a statement declaring that the roles of State 
President and Party Leader be separated and that he would retain the presidency while 
relinquishing control of the party, in order to be a, 'Special force for Cohesion in our 
Country'. 477 In the elections to the party leadership that followed, (after the elimination 
of Chris Heunis and Pik Botha in the first round), F.W. de Klerk won a narrow victory (of 8 
votes) over Barend du Plessis, (the candidate of the enlightened element in the party 
caucus). Soon after the new party leader took up office, tension flared up between Botha 
and de Klerk, and in August 1989, P W Botha resigned. De Klerk assumed the Presidency. 
Though de Klerk had a reputation for conservatism, the new president's inauguration 
demonstrated that this was going to be a different style of government than his 
predecessor's had been. On 6 September 1989 de Klerk allowed a march of 30,000 
demonstrators, assumed by some observers as a de facto acknowledgement that such 
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public demonstrations were now to be permitted. In October 1989, he announced the 
release of the last prisoners, except Nelson Mandela. On 28 November 1989 he announced 
the dismantling of the National Security Management Systems; these actions demonstrated 
that the new State President's government was to assume a different tone than that of his 
predecessor. 
Beyond the borders of South Africa, F. W. de Klerk's first few months were dramatic ones 
in the history of the modern world. A crescendo of events in Eastern Europe began in May 
1989 when the much-hated leader of the Hungarian Communist Party was dismissed. 
Hungary began to dismantle the Iron Curtain, opening up its border fence with Austria and 
permitting East-West traffic. The Polish Communist Party was defeated at the polls in 
June 1989, and on 12 September the first non-Communist government took over in 
Warsaw. On 10 September Czechoslovakia opened up its border to East Germany and the 
many people of East Germany poured across it, en route to West Germany. Some of the 
East Germans who were not fleeing began to demonstrate, and when Gorbachev refused 
East German premier Honecker's request to send in troops (7 October), the latter resigned 
(18 October 1989). Gorbachev made a public statement that all East European regimes 
were in danger unless they responded to the 'impulse' of the times. On 4 November a 
million demonstrators marched in East Berlin and on 9 December East Berlin party boss, 
Gunter Schabowski announced that its frontier police would no longer try to prevent East 
Germans from leaving the country. In November 1989, popular discontent with 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe swelled, and ultimately, the Berlin wall was 
breached. Other regimes toppled like dominoes - Czechoslovakian demonstrations began 
on 17 November, Bulgarian on 18 November; and in Romania Ceausescus and his wife were 
executed on Christmas Day 1989. Images of the toppling of authoritarian regimes were 
beamed across the world. 478 
South Africa. 
8.2. 2 February 1990 
Inevitably this had an impact on the political climate in 
None of the changes that took place across the globe entirely predicted or removed the 
impact of de Klerk's declarations at the opening of parliament in South Africa on 2 
February 1990. On that day, in a move that surprised the local and international 
community, de Klerk announced that not only was Nelson Mandela to be released, the 
478 Johnson, Modem Times pp. 759·765. 
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bans on the ANC, the PAC and the SACP were to be lifted. The following chapter of this 
dissertation seeks to assess the NP's depiction of Communism during the early months of 
1990 and to analyse how it changed since 1989. For, as has been shown, the ANC's link to 
Communism was still seen to be a reason to continue to distrust and ban the movement 
until1989. The chapter also assesses whether de Klerk and his colleagues misinterpreted 
the collapse of Communism (as discussed in the introduction) and how de Klerk's own 
conception of Communism impacted on the declaration of 2 February 1990. 
De Klerk's statements of February 1990 demonstrate that he no longer viewed the 
Communist threat as a serious one. Indeed, early in his speech, de Klerk stated, 'The year 
1989 will go down in history as the year in which Stalinist Communism expired ... The 
collapse, particularly of the Marxist economic system in Eastern Europe, also serves as a 
warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa. Those who seek to force this 
failure of a system on South Africa should engage in a total revision of their point of view. 
It should be clear to all that it is not the answer here either'. 479 This view of Marxism, as a 
defunct ideology - having 'expired' and become unworkable, a 'failure of a system' 
demonstrated that de Klerk no longer saw the ideology as a danger to South Africa in 
itself. The assonant resonance of the phrase 'force this failure' drew attention to the 
futility of any attempt to impose Communism on South Africa. De Klerk perceived a lesson 
for the ANC in the expiry of Communism; in highlighting that others needed to be aware 
that Communism was unworkable, de Klerk preached at those who continued to believe in 
the Marxist ideology, as if, somehow having misinterpreted the events, the ANC needed 
the warning pointed out to them. At a later point in his speech, when de Klerk announced 
the rescinding of the ban on the ANC and the SACP, of his list of the most important facets 
which had informed the decision, the first was, 'events in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, to which I have referred already, weaken the capability of organisations which 
were previously supported strongly from those quarters'. 480 This reflected a view that the 
ANC had changed as a result of the collapse of Communism, and that it had been 
profoundly weakened by the collapse of the latter. 
De Klerk chose to seize the advantage of the collapse of Communism, using it as a vehicle 
to proactively promote change. In language that posited a vision for South Africa he 
claimed: 'Hostile postures have to be replaced by co-operative ones; confrontation by 
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contact; disengagement by engagement; slogans by deliberate debate. The season of 
violence is over. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived'. 481 De Klerk 
overtly used the collapse of Communism positively, to launch South Africa into a new era 
of negotiation and reconciliation. 
In seizing the initiative, de Klerk drew members of his cabinet with him. In the House of 
Assembly, Minister after Minister took to the floor, affirmed their support for de Klerk in 
his decision and reiterated that Communism was no longer a danger to life in South Africa. 
But the speeches of most of the ministers demonstrated that there was still a 
preoccupation with Communism. Pik Botha, speaking on 6 February 1990, referred to his 
statement of 3 May 1989 and claimed that though Gorbachev was not a poorer or less 
inspired Communist, this did not matter because, 'Russia no longer has an interest in 
supporting organisations that favour violence'. In the passage, Botha suggested that the 
turnaround in Russian attitudes would have inflicted massive harm on the opposition to 
the NP regime. He postulated that the events of Eastern Europe clearly illustrated that 
one party states, the Communist economic system, collectivism, management, planning 
and control of national economies from a central state bureau was no longer acceptable. 
In a tone reminiscent of a school master, Botha talked about the lessons that South Africa 
had to learn from Europe, namely that Communist economic and ideological systems had 
not worked and that the support that certain organisations received from Eastern 
European countries have been dealt a 'tremendous psychological blow'. The speech 
suggested that the initiative lay entirely with F. W. de Klerk's ministry as a result. Botha 
claimed that the ANC leaders must be thinking, 'We had better watch it. That chap de 
Klerk might be moving too fast for us'. 482 Botha implied that the decline of Soviet Union 
had reduced the ANC to children without guidance who were incapable of taking their own 
initiative. 
Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, also declared his support for the State President. 
Malan asserted that the securocrats had not 'had their wings clipped', and went on to say 
that the ideology of the SACP and its ally the ANC has been based on the Moscow model 
since the '20s' and that because of this same dependence on the Moscow model, (and the 
collapse of the Communism) the State President was able to unban the AN C. 483 The ANC 
4811btd. 
482 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col. 140. 
483 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col. 147. 
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now had to return with, 'An ideology, a political vision and an economic system that have 
not worked anywhere in the world. Their vision has failed before the entire world. They 
admit it. They can come back to participate and I hope that the media will place their 
thoughts under close scrutiny'. 484 This was a stark contrast to previous statements in 
which members of the NP (including Malan) had stated that the media was responsible for 
the disinformation and for propagating the Communist onslaught. Malan stressed that the 
ANC were coming back with a discredited ideology, as if the rug had been pulled from 
under their feet. He suggested that the ANC was a dismal failure. 
Geldenhuys' speech had similar elements to Pik Botha's. He claimed that the fact of the 
matter was the Soviet Union was no longer willing to use violence to maintain a socialist, 
Marxist government in any other country. Claiming that it was time that the people were 
confronted with the reality of Communism - which had been perceived to be a kind of 
Robin Hood organisation -and therefore be able to reject it. 485 Numerous other speeches 
were made along the same lines: the Minister of Law and Order stated that the NP had 
beaten Communism by restrictions and charges against Communists, but that to beat it in 
hearts and minds was necessary (i.e. by unbanning the SACP). Most of the speeches 
referred to Communism but only to state that it was something that could be dealt with by 
law, since it had proved to the world that, 'It cannot work and that is why it is no longer 
necessary to ban it by way of legislation'. 486 In a remarkable speech Coetsee, the Minister 
of Justice, claimed that the Conservative Party were longing for the days when, 'The 
country was faced with an attack by the combined forces of Russians, the ANC, the Red 
Chinese, Bolshevists, Communists and Marxists', because they would not know what to 
frighten voters with now. 487 
Perhaps, inwardly members of the NP were themselves longing for those days of simplicity 
outlined by Coetsee, when they were facing the months of uncertainty and negotiation 
ahead. But on 2 February 1990, members of de Klerk's cabinet laid down the 'red peril' 
as a rhetorical and ideological weapon with which to justify oppression. The speeches 
outlined above created the impression that the ANC was no longer something to be feared. 
Instead, due to the collapse of Communism, it was a body with which meaningful 
484 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col. 153. 
485 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col. 164. 
486 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col. 164, The Citizen, 7 February 1990. 
487 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 col 378. 
Page 135 
negotiation could be held. They created the impression that as a result of the collapse of 
Communism, the ANC would limp back to South Africa, lame because its ideology was 
discredited, paralysed because its lifeblood had been withdrawn, that it would be blinded 
by the light of media scrutiny and that its supposed Communism would be revealed as 
nothing more than a sham. It was as if now, the NP could unban the ANC, lecture them, 
and the ANC would hang their heads in shame and accede to the NP's desire for power 
sharing. The National Party's speeches and proclamations about the weakness of the ANC 
should be considered in context. They were faced with outright fury from the Right Wing, 
who believed that they had betrayed their election promises. 488 Perhaps members of the 
NP were merely trying to mollify their opponents; or perhaps the cabinet ministers who 
spoke about the collapse of Communism genuinely believed that the withdrawal of Soviet 
support for the ANC would enable the NP to maintain the upper hand in negotiation, and 
to implement a 'power sharing' model. It is probable that they realised - when urged by 
De Klerk - that the impasse into which the country, and that National Party, had fallen and 
that the erosion of the National Party's power base needed a radical solution. The final 
stage of the dissertation focused on F.W. de Klerk, the key player in the National Party's 
decision to unban the ANC, the SACP and the PAC, and assessed his perceptions of 
Communism, to consider whether the NP did misjudge the ANC when they unbanned them. 
8.3. F.W. de Klerk's perceptions of Communism 
With a National Party heritage of more than a generation, (his father had served in the NP 
cabinets under three Prime Ministers and his grandfather was a friend of Paul Kruger) de 
Klerk undoubtedly grew up with anti-Communist influences around him. While he cannot 
cite particular instances, a number of factors in his life shaped an anti-Communistic 
stance, including, 'Afrikaans newspapers, cultural organisations, churches and the 
National Party'489 and also events such as the 1960's so-called International Conference in 
Pretoria which drew attention to the danger of Communism. 490 De Klerk drew parallels 
between anti-Communism to which he was exposed and the views of many Americans in 
this regard. 491 In addition, de Klerk had a reputation as a conservative, both as leader of 
488 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 February 1990 
489 De Klerk, Interview, November 2001. 
490 David Steward, Interview, August 2001. 
491 De Klerk, Interview, November 2001. 
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the Transvaal NP after the overthrow of Treurnicht, 492 in cabinet posts (Home Affairs and 
Education) and as Chairman of the Ministers' Council. De Klerk's conservative policies 
included opposing the entry of African students to white universities, acting harshly 
against radical students, and in 1986 defending the Own Affairs system of government. 493 
His conservative image was reinforced by speeches inside and outside parliament that had 
as their leitmotiv the notion that the South Africa's racial groups (i.e. Whites, Coloureds, 
Indians and Africans) should be given separate institutions at all levels of government. 
The defining characteristic of de Klerk's speeches and writings was his belief in, 'Diversity 
and interdependence' .494 On the grounds that South African racial groups were both 
diverse and interdependent, de Klerk claimed inter aUa that the Conservative Party's view 
of the Afrikaner's sovereign country and state, and the ANC's view of 'one man, one vote' 
were equally impracticable. 495 
De Klerk's exposure to the security apparatus' views of a Communist onslaught seemed to 
convince him that it should be taken seriously. For example, in 1986, though recognising 
that the ANC was a crucial factor that could not be ignored, he was ambivalent about 
negotiation. 'It was an indisputable fact that the USSR with its expansionist policies 
exerted enormous influence on the ANC'. 496 De Klerk did not ridicule P.W. Botha's view of 
a total onslaught, stating that during the mid 1980s the intelligence received in the sse 
underlined a very grave situation; not only a concerted campaign to make South Africa 
ungovernable as the prelude to general revolution but also extremely serious external 
threats. 497 De Klerk held the view that seldom had such a comprehensive international 
campaign been mounted against one country; he alluded to the sanctions net, to the fact 
that Soviet Union and their Cuban allies had established imposing positions in some of 
South Africa's neighbouring countries, to South Africa's involvement in a low intensity war 
in Northern Namibia and Southern Angola that had brought the SADF to direct conflict with 
492 W. De Klerk, FW: Man In His Time, p.14. 
493 Citizen, 30 April 86. 
494 This view Is borne out by a number of his speeches and writings. For a thorough explanation of It, see Address by Mr F W De Klerk, Minister of 
National Education and Chairman of the Ministers' Council (Administration: House of Assembly) City and Civil Service Club Dinner, Cape Town May 
20 1987, 
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Cuban and Russian-led forces, and to attack by guerrilla groups on South Africa. 498 De 
Klerk's close colleague, speechwriter and co-author of his autobiography, David Steward, 
backed this up. 'We didn't need to invent a bogey, the bogey existed, in fact' .499 
De Klerk's speeches often alluded to the expansionist nature of Marxism, and the threat it 
posed to South Africa. In a speech to UNISA in 1985, for example, he claimed that the 
ideology of Marxists and other radicals, 'Had to be unmasked by objectivity and a critical 
attitude for the unscientific wishful thinking'. He denounced Marxism saying it was, 
'False, but also dangerous'. 500 Like other members of the NP during 1985- 1989, de Klerk 
highlighted the link between Communism and opposition to the National Party regime, and 
links between the ANC and the SACP. He claimed that the 'Communist dominated ANC' 
was a negative influence on potential group based solutions. In a speech to Assocom (the 
Association of Chambers of Commerce) discussing the challenge of responding to 
adversity, de Klerk referred to, 'The threat of Communist expansionism and related Black 
power dictatorship which has devoured the largest part of Africa'. 501 Similarly, de Klerk 
was inclined to make electioneering statements regarding the DP handing power over to 
the ANC and the SACP, claiming that thereafter South Africa, 'Won't be worthwhile to live 
in either'. 502 Thus de Klerk held an impression of a Communist threat to South Africa, 
which had been created during his upbringing and sustained during his cabinet 
membership by the influence of security briefings, and which were exposed on certain 
occasions both before and during his presidency. 
However, de Klerk's speeches and activity upon accession to the position of Party Leader 
and State President demonstrated that he was not as obsessive as his predecessor about 
the Communist influence over the ANC. While his speeches occasionally referred to the 
'terrorist ANC' as a 'radical organisation', they did not emphasise the threat to the same 
extent as P.W. Botha. In his speech to the National Party Conference on 21 August 1989, 
he referred to the ANC-SACP, when discussing the reasons for his discussions with Kaunda, 
but he did not go into detail about the alliance. 503 Furthermore, the dismantling of the 
498 De Klerk, The Last Trek, p. 114. 
499 David Steward, Interview, Auaust 2001. 
500 The Citizen, 28 September 1985. 
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National Security Management System, announced on 12 September 1989,504 suggested 
either that de Klerk objected to the prominent role of the military in politics, or that he 
did not envisage the scale of threat that his predecessor had anticipated. 
De Klerk also appeared to view the Communist threat in its international context, and to 
scrutinise the changes in the Soviet Union, rather than merely persisting in using the 
terminology of the previous years. In 1989, de Klerk responded to questioning on 'World 
Monitor' with the statement that, 'Like the rest of the free world, we are watching with 
interest developments in Russia, changes in policy; as far as we are concerned important 
changes seem to be aimed at withdrawing from regional conflicts, withdrawing support of 
organisations who participate in violence, that sort of thing. It is interesting, I think in as 
much as it is true, it is a good development, but as far as future relations are concerned, I 
think it's early days at this stage'. De Klerk espoused more of a flexible view of the Soviet 
Union than his predecessor. 505 In discussions of the Communist threat he was less 
vehement and ideologically focused, and more pragmatic. 
Pragmatism played a role in de Klerk's decision between November 1989 and February 
1990. He recognised that South Africa's position was becoming more and more precarious, 
that the country was economically crippled and that, 'Internationally we were teetering 
on the edge of the abyss'. 506 He possibly also recognised the extent to which the National 
Party was losing its traditional support base, and he was certainly more prepared to listen 
to caucus members. 507 Thus de Klerk's February speech marked a departure from the 
dominance of ideological motivation and a response to the reality of the situation in South 
Africa. This was a significant departure, for although anti-Soviet feeling had dimmed in 
the later 1980s and had little raison d'etre after 1989, it was clear from the speeches of 
1988 and 1989 that members of the National Party could contort the notion of a 
Communist onslaught beyond its original parameters. De Klerk did not permit such 
contortions to take place during and after February 1990. 
However, judged against the future that de Klerk envisaged for South Africa when he 
unbanned the various movements, it becomes clear that the decision was also generated 
504 F.W De Klerk, The Last Trek, p.151. 
505 De Klerk, Interview, November 2001. 
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by a conception of the passing of the Communist threat. The collapse of Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe impacted heavily upon de Klerk and influenced the decision to 
unban the ANC, the SACP and the PAC. Questioned by Ted Koppel of American 
Broadcasting Corporation's Nightline as to how events in eastern Europe influenced his 
decision, de Klerk claimed that it contributed indirectly by creating a scenario where the 
Communist threat lost its sting, giving the opportunity to break new ground. 508 De Klerk 
recognised an opportunity in the collapse of an ideology, and on the back of that collapse, 
persuaded his cabinet to take a 'quantum leap', which he had spoken of in his first speech 
to the party caucus. 509 'A window had suddenly opened which created the opportunity for 
a much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable. It was as if 
God had taken a hand - a new turn in world history. We had to seize the opportunity'. 510 
Though the decision was driven by a combination of pragmatism and ideology, de Klerk 
was dazzled by the legacy of ideological motivation that had driven the party for so long. 
De Klerk seemed to believe that, as a result of the collapse of Communism he could 
control the ANC. De Klerk claimed that negotiation was possible, but denied that he 
would concede ground on 'black majority rule' (which, though not explicit in the ANC's 
demands was implicit in a fair electoral system because of South Africa's demography). 
On 9th February 1990, de Klerk stated in parliament that the DP advocated a 'majority 
domination model', which the NP rejected, but the NP advocated a 'power sharing model' 
(which, it was implied, would protect the white minority). 511 De Klerk subsequently 
claimed that he accepted the, 'Full logical consequences of power sharing provided there 
would be reasonable protection for minority rights'. 512 However, though he might not 
publicly admit it later, de Klerk hoped and expected to tightly limit any 'power sharing' 
model. In a letter to a constituent, dated 29 May 1990, de Klerk explicitly stated: 'I 
would like to make it plain that there is no possibUity of the ANC taking over the 
Government of the country. That would be possible only under a system providing for 
simple majority domination. That is something to which my Government will not 
agree'. 513 The fact that de Klerk did not envisage an ANC government was evidence of his 
508 Interview Transcript from Ted Koppel's Nlshtllne Prosramme, February 1990. [INEG]. 
509De Klerk, Interview, November 2001 • 
510, W. de Klerk, F.W. De Klerk the man In his time, p.8. 
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conviction that he could out-negotiate what he believed to be a newly weakened ANC, and 
of the fact that he had not accepted any one-man, one-vote system in 1990. 
That de Klerk misjudged the ANC's power-base was clear in 1989, when in a speech he 
aired his, 'Sincere belief' that, 'too much credence is attached to the ANC ... Scientific 
surveys proved beyond doubt that the support of the ANC is absolutely overrated in many 
quarters'. 514 The suggestion was that the ANC's support lay externally to South Africa. 
This was incorrect. The ANC was a popular local movement, not one that drew its 
strength entirely from external sources. An HSRC survey in 1990 of African urban areas 
showed that 20% supported ANC, and 30% were sympathetic to it, which was remarkable 
given that it was a crime to support the ANC. 515 The Soviet Union's diminishing support for 
the ANC did not cause it to wither and die. Though the armed struggle might fizzle out, 
the strength of the ANC was as a local political force; its influence had penetrated deep 
into black society with the help of movements like the UDF and the National Forum. Just 
three hours after Mandela's release an indication of the strength of the ANC, and the 
calibre of its leadership was given when the former prisoner addressed a crowd of 60,000 
on Cape Town's Grand Parade. 516 Over the coming months and years, the ANC-SACP's 
negotiating skills demonstrated that the movement had not been ideologically crippled by 
the collapse of Communism; the resounding election victory (with 62.6% of the votes) in 
1994 showed that the alliance had genuine popular support. 517 
In February 1990, when taking a pragmatic decision in the context of the deteriorating 
economic situation in South Africa, de Klerk was assisted by the momentum created by the 
changing international climate. He used the situation to generate an internal momentum 
within the cabinet, convincing them that it was now important, and 'safe', to 'seize the 
initiative', and later he and his colleagues tried to ensure that the momentum stayed with 
the National Party. For example, recognising that timing was crucial in sustaining world 
media attention, the 2 February speech withheld the most important announcements until 
last. Similarly, the release of Mandela nine days later ensured that the National Party was 
'the only show in town', and all the cabinet ministers were able to confirm their 
514 De Klerk, 'Uittreksels ult slotboodskap deur Mnr. F.W. De Klerk, Leier van die Naslonale Party: Naslonale Party Konsres, Kaapland', 22 July 
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commitment to de Klerk's decision in the glare of the world media in anticipation of 
Mandela 's release. 518 Such media handling was effective, and had the NP been facing a 
movement genuinely discredited or crippled by the collapse of socialism, the initiative 
might have remained with the NP. But the fact was that the ANC was not crippled by the 
decline of socialist ideology. As a result the NP could not discredit the ANC as easily as 
they might have anticipated. 
518 De Klerk, The Last Trek, pp. 160. 
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9. Conclusion: the myths we live by 
With the words, 'Stalinist Communism .. expired' on 2 February 1990, F. W. de Klerk finally 
destroyed anti-Communism and· the threat of Communism as a rhetorical device for 
justifying oppression in South Africa. Until that date, the National Party's portrayal of the 
Communist threat to South Africa had frequently been used in political discourse. It had 
peaked prior to the May 1987 election, and changed and declined slowly thereafter. The 
NP's changing portrayal of the Communist threat was complex. It was used to defend the 
National Party's chosen pace of 'evolutionary' reform against threats from the right and 
the left. 
The NP's perception of international Communism did change, albeit slowly, in response to 
the events of the period. The impression that the Soviet Union was an implacable enemy, 
the root of all evil in the world, and irrevocably set on a path of total world domination, 
changed slowly as the Angolan/Namibian conflict on the subcontinent was settled with 
Soviet assistance. Gradually, a new conception of the Soviet Union emerged. The West, 
in imposing sanctions on SA, displaced the Soviet Union as enemy in much of National 
Party discourse. With this change in perception of the Soviet Union, other elements of the 
Communist bogey were irrevocably weakened, for the strength of the Communist bogey 
had been that it united local and international enemy, justifying a siege psychosis, and 
military might. 
Whereas the change in portrayal of the Soviet Union was a response to international 
events led by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the change in NP portrayal of other 
aspects of the Communist threat was linked closely to domestic political exigency. The 
NP's portrayal of the Communist threat altered in response to their perception of the 
sources of opposition within the country and within parliament. Communism was a 
ubiquitous 'bogey', wheeled out in support of a personal, departmental, party political or 
national argument. Therefore in spite of the fact that the USSR was no longer consistently 
portrayed as the instigator of violent change, the concept of a Communist onslaught on 
the military establishment was slow to decline. 
Members of the defence establishment continued to imply (during Defence Appropriation 
votes) that a Communist onslaught could and would undermine the South African Defence 
Forces and the country's ability to defend itself, right up until1989. 
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In the domestic political sphere, the notion that Communists were at the centre of socio-
economic uprising was eroded, as a more sophisticated conception of the situation in the 
townships emerged amongst National Party members. The Communist threat received a 
different emphasis, and became a justification for 'evolutionary reform' in the face of 
Conservative Party opposition after 1987. However, this in itself further weakened the 
Communist threat as a political zeitgeist, for it affirmed that the threat could be solved 
by local socio-economic palliatives, thereby confirming that it was a domestic and not an 
international problem. 
But the enduring aspect of the NP's discourse on the subject of the Communist onslaught 
was the Communist 'political' onslaught. Throughout the period, the NP branded any 
source of political opposition as active proponents or victims of the Communist threat. 
This analysis was most prominently applied to PFP members, and Afrikaners who had 
ventured to meet the ANC in Dakar. Even by 1989, the ANC was demonised by members of 
the NP as being irrevocably wedded to Marxism and, as a result, to violence and 
revolution. It appeared, even in 1989, that there was no way the ANC would be unbanned 
until it renounced its links with the SACP. 
The National Party thus blew up the myth of Communism to such an extent that it had 
become larger than reality. The Party used the threat of Communism to deny to 
themselves, as well as to the wider political community, that African nationalism (without 
a Communist agenda or Communist support) was a genuine threat to National Party 
hegemony and white political power in South Africa. Communism and 'black majority 
rule' were wedded in their minds; once one had collapsed as an international force, the 
National Party seemed convinced, at least outwardly, that demands for the other would 
expire, too. 
As explained at the outset, the course of negotiations after 2 February 1990 is 
unfortunately outside the scope of this study. But this dissertation has shown that the 
National Party's 'myth' of the Communist threat, though it had some elements of reality, 
ultimately prevented the National Party from comprehending the nature of the ANC, or 
understanding the strength of the ANC. This misunderstanding, placed together with the 
revelations of gross human rights abuses and the skilful negotiating power of members of 
the ANC, meant that by the time of the April 1994 elections, the NP was a faint shadow of 
its former self. 
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Through dissecting the 'myth' of anti-Communism, other 'myths' are exposed, namely 
those that any politician creates about himself or herself, and that those surrounding them 
propagate, create and sustain. A study in contemporary history is fraught with difficulty, 
especially when that period in history is dominated by big personalities such as P. W. 
Botha, F. W. de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, and Joe Slovo. Each individual inevitably creates 
their own 'myths', and institutions that are active in South Africa in 2002, the ANC, the 
New National Party, and de Klerk's own foundation ('Working for peace in multi-cultural 
societies', )519 sustain these 'myths'. Some individuals - and P. W. Botrha was one of these 
- are more successful at imposing their own personal 'myths' on the wider populace. 
When analysing contemporary history it is easy to be buffeted around by the 'myths' 
associated with individuals - indeed, they may themselves believe the myth. Though it is 
only human to be susceptible to the influence of such myths, the historian cannot afford 
to be unduly swayed by the myths that surround the individual politician; he has to look 
beyond that and to visit and revisit the statements made by the individuals in order to 
draw a conclusion. 
There is no doubt that as the historiography of the period matures, historians will be 
better able to decipher the 'myth' and the 'reality' of the Communist threat to South 
Africa. This study is a first attempt at the task: future studies would be enhanced by 
analysis of the numerous National Party and governmental papers in Afrikaans, by access 
to the papers of the SADF and the State Security Council and by a more thorough analysis 
of the election campaigns of the party. Ultimately, historians may be able to pinpoint the 
extent to which fear of the Communist threat motivated individuals within the National 
Party and shaped policy; and to distinguish between genuine fear and rhetoric used to 
garner support. This study represents a preliminary attempt to analyse the NP's portrayal 
of the Communist threat, to comprehend the 'myth', to see beyond the myths which will 
be propagated for years to come about the individuals involved with events, and so to 
'understand the people of the past better than they understood themselves'. 520 
519 htto://www.fwdklerk.on!.Zal 









'Moscow's Africa Policy of the 1970s' in D. Albright, Ed. Africa and 
International Communism, (London, 1980), pp. 35-67. 
Apartheid's last stand, (London, 1996). 
The Politics of Official Discourse in twentieth century South Africa, 
(Oxford, 1990) pp. 120-164. 
J. Barber, South Africa in the twentieth century, (Oxford, 1999) pp. 223-283. 








South Africa's Foreign Policy: the Search for Status and Security, 
1945-1988, (Cambridge, 1990) pp. 247-344. 
Twentieth Century South Africa, (Oxford, 2001) pp. 228-285. 
Memory Against Forgetting, Memoirs from a life in South African 
politics 19 38 - 1964, (London, 1999). 
Op die Vooraand van Apartheid: die Rassevraagstuk en die blanke 
politiek in Suid-Afrika, 1939- 1948, (Pretoria, 1994). 
The Gorbachev Factor, (New York, 1996), pp.1-25, 155-251. 
'Diplomacy by other means' C. Leys, and J. Saul, (eds. ), Namibia's 
Liberation Struggle- the two edged sword, (London 1995), pp.1-35. 
World Politics since 1945, (London, 1992), pp1-70, 556-629. 
Exporting Apartheid. Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978 - 88, 
(London). 





War and Society - the Miliatarisation of South African Society, (Cape 
Town, 1985). 
Domestic Sources and consequences of aggressive foreign policy: the 
folly of South Africa's Total Strategy, (University of the Western 
Cape, Cape Town, 1995). 
Gister Se Dade Vandag Se Oordeel (Pretoria, 2000). 
High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough 
Neighbourhood, (Johannesburg, 1993 ). 
Colonialism of a special type: the ANC-SACP Alliance, (Notes 
available from University of Cape Town's African Studies Library). 




South Africa - A Modern History, (London and New York, 2000), 
Russia and South Africa- Parallels for the future, (Cape Town, 1994). 
A. B. Davidson, and 1.1. Filatova, 
C.J. Driver, 
D. De Villiers, 
F. W. de Klerk, 
W. de Klerk, 
E. De Kock, 
A. D' Agostino, 
Russia in the Contemporary World, (Cape Town, 1995). 
Patrick Duncan, South African and Pan African (Oxford, 2000). 
PW, (Cape Town, 1984). 
The Last Trek, A New Beginning, (London, 1998). 
F. W. de Klerk, The Man in His Time, (Johannesburg, 1991 ). 
A Long Night's Damage, (Saxonwold, 1998). 
Gorbachev's Revolution, (Basingstoke, 1998) pp.64-84 and 91-108. 
U. Dhupelia-Mesthrice, 'A blast from the past - the teaching of South African history 







at an apartheid university - 1960s -80s', South African Historical 
Journal, 42, (May 2000), pp.49-69. 
Comrades against Apartheid, (London, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
1992). 
'Alliance politics of a special Type: The Roots of the ANC/SACP 
Alliance'. Journal of South African Studies, val 18, no 1, (1991), 
'The National Party and the South African transition' in R. Lee, 
& L Schlemmer, (eds. ), Transition to democracy, policy perspectives, 
(CapeTown 1991), pp.175-197. 
Who's Who in South African Politics, (Johannesburg, 1987 and 1985) 
(Selected bibliographies). 
Democratisation in South Africa Political Science Quarterly, Vol 110 
(Spring 1995) pp.83-104. 
South Africa in Transition, the Misunderstood Miracle, (London, 
1999), pp.1-59. 




A History of Christianity in SA, pp.246-301. 
White Boy Running, (London, 1988) 
Breaking Story- The South Af~ican Press. (Oxford 1993). 
The 1988 Peace Accords and the future of South West Africa, 
(London, 1990). 
Page 148 
S. Johns, Raising the Red Flag: The International Socialist League and the 
Communist Party of South Africa, (Belville, 1995). 












Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the stru~~le 
against apartheid 1948 - 1990: a documentary survey, (Oxford 1991 ), 
pp. 1-32, 309-317. 
Modern Times - A history of the world from the 1920s to the year 
2000, (London 1999) pp. 693-795. 
The USSR and Marxist revolutions in the Third World, (Cambridge, 
1990). 
'South African Liberation: The Communist Factor', Foreign Affairs, 
Winter 1986/7. pp. 267-280. 
'Armed and dangerous', (Oxford, 1993). 
Power, Pride and Prejudice, The Years of Afrikaner Nationalist Rule 
in South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1991 ). 
Communism and South Africa, (Cape Town, 1979). 
Seks, Drugs En Boeremusiek: Die Memoires Van 'N Volksverraaier, 
(Cape Town, 2000). 
Selfs Die Kerk Kan Verander, (Cape Town, 1998). 
'Myth & Reality in the struggle against apartheid', Journal of 
Southern African studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1998) pp.443-459. 
FW de Klerk, the Politics of Enigma, Review of FW de Klerk: The Man 
in His Time, in D. Welsh, ed., Hope & Fear, Reflections of a 
Democrat, (Johannesburg, 1998). 
'Moscow's Africa Policy of the 1970s', in D. Albright, Ed. Africa and 
International Communism, (London, 1980), pp. 7-35. 
C. Leys, and J. Saul, (eds.), 
C. Louw, 
N.R. Mandela, 
Namibia's Liberation Struggle- the two edged sword, (London 1995). 
Ope Brief aan Willem de Klerk, in Boetman en die Swanesang van die 
Verligtes, (Cape Town, 2001 ). 
Long Walk to Freedom, (Randburg, 1994). 
S. Marks, and S. Trapido, (eds. ). 
G. Mills, 
The Politics of Race, class and Nationalism, (Harlow, 1987). 
SA: the total National Strategy and regional policy during the Botha 


















The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography. 
(London, 1997). 
The Art of Counter Revolutionary War: the strategy of counter 
insurgency, (London, 1966). 
South from the Limpopo: travels through South Africa (London, 
1998). 
'Marching to a different beat: the history of the ECC' in J. Cock, and 
L. Nathan, (eds. ), War and Society - the Miliatarisation of South 
African Society, (Cape Town, 1985), pp.308-323. 
Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy 1917 -
1991, (London, 1992) pp.285-327. 
A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria? (Cape Town, 1990). 
'Perceptions, Images and Stereotypes in Soviet South Africa 
Relations - a cognitive interpretative perspective'. Die Annale Van 
die Universiteit van Stellenbosch No 4, (1992). 
Deconstructing apartheid discourse, (London, 1996). 
Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the 
National Party, 1948-1994. (Johannesburg, 1996). 
A History of Communism in South Africa, (Pretoria, 1988). 
The USSR in Third World Conflicts, (Cambridge, 1984) pp.87-147, 
'A Battlefield of Perceptions: State discourse on violence 1985-
1988', in J. Cock, and L. Nathan, (eds.), War and Society - the 
Miliatarisation of South African Society. (Cape Town, 1985) pp.263-
274. 
'The Imperial Presidency, P. W. Botha - the first ten years', 
(Johannesburg, 1988) pp.1-45. 
The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South 
Africa, 1975- 1990, (Oxford, 1991 ). 
Stem Uit die Wilderness, 'n biografie oor our-pres. PW Botha, 
(Mosselbai, 1997). 
Ries and E. Dommisse Leierstryd: Die dramas rondom die uittrede van pres. P. W. Botha, 
(Cape Town, 1990) 
E. Riley, 
E. Roodie, 
Major Political Events in South Africa, 1948 - 1990, (Oxford, 1991 ). 







'Eddie, Brian, Jack and Let's Phone Rusty: Is this the History of the 
CPSA (1921-1950), South African Historical Journal, May 2000, 
pp.191-209. 
A Concise History of South Africa, (London 1999). 
Mandela , The Authorised Biography. (London, 2000). 
'Of treks, transitions and transitology'. Review Article. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 40,(May 1999), pp.247-256. 
The Military in the Making of South Africa, (London, 1996) pp.247-
289. 














The Hidden Hand, Covert Operations in South Africa (Pretoria 1998). 
'The turn in the road, emerging conditions in 1990', in R. Lee, & L 
Schlemmer, ( eds.), Transition to democracy, policy perspectives, 
(Cape Town 1991 ), pp.14-23. 
Every Secret Thing (London, 1998). 
The Unfinished autobiography, (London, 1996 ). 
The Cape Times, An informal history, (Cape Town, 1999). 
Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to De Klerk, (Cape 
Town, 1994). 
ANC, A View from Moscow, (Cape Town, 1999). 
The Soviet Union/Russian Federations relations with South Africa, 
with Special Reference to the Period since 1980. African Affairs, Vol 
96, 1996. pp 5-31. 
The Mind of South Africa, (London, 1990). 
Tomorrow is Another Country The Inside Story of South Africa's 
Negotiated Revolution, (London, 1995). 
'Southern Africa in the Cold War', History Today, Volume 49 Issue 2 
February 1999, pp. 43-49. 
Progressive Odyssey, (Cape Town, 1991 ). 
South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative voices in the last 
generation under apartheid, (Athens (Ohio) 2000) pp 1-75.' 
In No Uncertain Terms, A South African Memoir, (Johannesburg, 
1993). 






'State power in the 1980s, from total strategy to counter 
revolutionary warfare', Cock, Jackyln, and Nathan, Laurie, Ed: War 
and Society- the Miliatarisation of South African Society, pp.35-40. 
A History of South Africa, (New Haven and London, 1995), pp.187-
The Political Mythology of Apartheid, (Newhaven, 1985), pp.184-243. 
The Rainbow People of God, (London, 1994). 
Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts, (Transaction 
Publishers, 1990). 
I. Van Kessel, 'Beyond our wildest dreams' The United Democratic Front and the 
Transformation of South Africa, (Charlottesville, London, 2000). 
A VanWyk, The Birth of a New Afrikaner, (Cape Town 1991). 
F. Van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament, (Johannesburg, 1988). 












Liberals Against Apartheid, (Basingstoke, 1998). 
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, (Basingstoke, 1998) pp.181-
328, 432-533. 
Anatomy of A Miracle, the End of Apartheid and the Birth of a new 
South Africa, (London, 1997). 
A History of South Africa, (London, 2000). 
Endurance and Endeavour, (London, 1994), pp.497-536. 
Russia's Historic Stake in Black Africa, in D. Albright, Ed. Africa and 
International Communism, (London, 1980), pp.67-93. 
The Making of Modern South Africa, (Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, 
1995). 




(Extensive use of the website for documentary evidence. Particular extracts were drawn 
from the URLS given below): 
ANC 'On Negotiations' 9 October 1987 
http: I lwww .anc.org.za/ ancdocs/pr I 1980s/pr871 009. html 
Page 152 





http: I /www. anc. org. za/ ancdocs/ history/ charter. html 
President Of The African National Congress, Speech at The 
International Congress Against Imperialism, Brussels, 10-15 February 
1927 
http: I /www .anc. org.za/ ancdocs/speeches/ 1920s/ gumedesp. htm 
'Freedom in Our Life Time', Liberation, June 1956 
http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/campaigns/cop/freedom-
in-our-liretime. html 
'The Mandela Document' A document presented by Nelson Mandela 
to P.W. Botha before their meeting on 5 July 989 
http: I /www. anc.org.za/ ancdocs/history/ mandela/ 64-
90 I doc890705. htm l 




Class and Colour in South Africa 
http:/ /www.anc.org.za/books/ccsa25.html. 
African Christianity 
http:/ /www.bethel.edu/ -letnie/ AfricanChristianity/SAKairos.html 
Rev. D. Tutu 
http:/ /sunsite. wits.ac.za/histp/tutu.htm 






Digging in the gold mine: the Mayibuye Centre Archive as a Source 
on the history of the South African Liberation Struggle: 
http: I /www. history. ilstu.edu/mtavakol/cssaame/Vol.%2019-
1 /Shubin. DOC. 
Page 153 
Contemporary Articles, Surveys, Pamphlets 
Bureau for Information, The National State of Emergency, (1987). 
Bureau for Information, Talking with the ANC, (1986 ). 
K. Campbell, The ANC: A Soviet Task Force (London, 1986). 
F. W. de Klerk, A New South Africa (1990). 
IDASA ANC-Afrikaner talks at Dakar July 1987 Notes, (1987). 
IDASA: Geldenhuys D. Official South African perceptions of the Soviet Union, From 
Confrontation to Accommodation, (1986). 
IDASA Occasional Papers, Numbers 





The Dakar Reports (Responses from 16 Delegates) (1986). 
Leverkusen (Irina I Filatova, Deon Geldenhuys) (1986). 
'The African National Congress Cadres and Credo', Problems of 
Communism (July- August 1987) pp.58-81. 
The USSR and Southern Africa, Problems of Communism (March- June 
National Party Various Election Leaflets and pamphlets (Obtained from African 
Studies Library, UCT, and INEG). 
PFP Various Election Leaflets and pamphlets (Obtained from African 
Studies Library, UCT, and INEG). 
J.J. Scholtz, 
1989). 
P.W. Botha, Fighter and Reformer (Bureau for information, Pretoria 
South African Institute of Race Relations 
Race Relations Surveys, (Johannesburg, 1985; 1986, parts 1 and 2; 
1987-88; 1988-89; 1990). 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Business Day (Selected articles from South Africa Media Archive). 
Cape Argus (Selected articles from South Africa Media Archive). 
Cape Times (1985- 1991). 
The Citizen (Selected articles from South Africa Media Archive). 
Leadership Magazine. 
Frontline Magazine, March 1986. pp. 35-37. 
Nationalist (1985 -1990). 
Newsweek (Selected articles from South African Media Archive). 
Page 154 
South African Digest (1985-1989; (the paper was discontinued in 1989). 
The Star (Selected articles from the South Africa Media Archive). 
Archives 
The papers of P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk and L. Wessels, all held at the Institute of 
Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein, Orange Free 
State. 
The Newspaper search facility of the South Africa Media Archive, University of the Orange 
Free State, Bloemfontein, Orange Free State. 
Parliamentary debates: 
Debates of the House of Assembly (Hansard), (Annual Publication) Pretoria: Government 
Printers. 
Debates of the House of Representatives (Hansard), (Annual Publication) Pretoria: 
Government Printers. 
Analysis of debates between the following dates: 
1985 25 January 1985 - 19 June 1985. 
1986 31 January 1986 - 20 June 1986 and 18 August 1986 - 5 September 1986 
1987 30 January 1987 - and 19 May 1987 - 7 October 1987 
1988 8 February 1988 - 22 June 1988 
1989 6 February 1989 - 19 May 1989 
1990 2 February 1990 - April 1990 
Interviews 
• F. W. de Klerk (Eaton Square, London, UK, 7 November 2001 ). 
• David Steward (Offices of the de Klerk Foundation, Cape Town South Africa 11 August 
2001 ). 
• Phillip Nel (Stellenbosch University, November 2000). 
• Margee Probyn, Alan Macintosh Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of English in 

























African National Congress 
Association of Chambers of Commerce 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Democratic Party 
End Conscription Campaign 
Eminent Person's Group 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
Front of Liberation of Mozambique 
Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security 
National Party 
Progressive Federal Party 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
National Democratic Movement 
Pan African Congress 
South African Communist Party 
State Security Council 
South West African People's Organisation 
United Democratic Front 
United Nations 
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